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The baby boom after the Second World War, the subsequent decline in fertility
rates in the 1970s and 1980s and the ongoing increase in life expectancy cause
the ageing of populations in many developed countries. Although population
ageing is the result of positive developments like the emancipation of women
and better provision of health care, the unprecedented rise of the relative num-
ber of elderly will put facilities like pension- and health care schemes under
pressure. In the EU15, the number of inactive elderly compared to the labour
force, the so-called old-age dependency ratio1, rose from 13.9 percent in 1950
to 30.5 percent in 2005. The United Nations projects that this figure will more
than double to 65.4 percent in 2050 (UNCDB, 2007). This enormous increase
of the relative number of pensioners forces governments to think about the
way their pensions are organised.
Most public pension schemes are financed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis,
which means that the pension benefits of the retirees in a certain period are
financed by contributions levied on the working people in the same period.
These pension schemes were introduced to provide people with a minimum
standard of living during retirement. In the United States a social security
scheme was introduced after the stock market crash in the 1930s where many
retired people lost all their savings and did not have any resources anymore
1The old-age dependency ratio is defined as the number of people aged 65 or older in
proportion to the number of people aged 15 to 65 (the labour force).
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2 INTRODUCTION
to finance their consumption during old age. Many European countries in-
troduced a public pension system after the Second World War to improve the
living standard of the elderly. At the time of the introduction of these public
pension schemes life expectancy was much lower than current life expectan-
cies. Moreover, women gave birth to a larger number of children than nowa-
days, so that the tax base to finance the pension benefits and the implicit rate
of return of the PAYG scheme was larger2. In the 1970s the size of public PAYG
pension systems increased to a large extent, even though it was known that
the demographic situation would change in the future. The fact, however,
that more people receive a pension benefit for a longer time period, combined
with the fall of the relative number of working people leads to the question
whether the public pension schemes currently in place will be sustainable in
the coming decades.
Several countries have already taken measures to lower the pressure on their
public PAYG pension systems. Some countries, e.g., Germany, will gradually
increase the retirement age. Countries like Sweden and Italy moved to a pen-
sion scheme where pension benefits change when the demographic compo-
sition changes, that is, pension rights will fall when average life expectancy
at retirement rises. In the Netherlands the government primarily focuses on
increased labour force participation. One of the most suggested solutions by
economists is to switch to a more funded pension system where people save
for their own pension and realise a higher expected rate of return on their
contributions. This type of reform is proposed by the Bush administration.
Funded pension schemes, however, will not be immune to ageing either. Be-
cause population ageing is a worldwide phenomenon it will have macroe-
conomic consequences and thus affect the rates of return that pension funds
earn on their investments. Moreover it is difficult to implement such a switch
to more funding as it will probably hurt some generations during the transi-
tion phase of the reform. And finally, although it is generally believed that the
rate of return on contributions to a pension fund is higher than the implicit
rate of return on PAYG contributions, the higher rate of return of a funded
pension scheme goes together with more financial market risk and inflation
risk. In order to diversify the various types of risks it is often proposed that
the provision of retirement income should be a combination of PAYG-financed
2The implicit return on PAYG contributions is equal to the growth rate of the economy,
which is the sum of the population growth rate and the rate of technological progress. Higher
fertility rates imply a higher rate of population growth and thus a higher implicit rate of
return of PAYG pension schemes.
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pensions and funded pensions.
The public debate about the sustainability of pension schemes primarily
focuses on how the problems that result from an ageing population can be
solved within the country itself. However, given the fact that ageing is a global
phenomenon and capital markets become increasingly integrated, citizens of
one country will also be affected by ageing and the policy measures taken in
response to ageing in other countries. Open economies will therefore have
to cope with international spillover effects of ageing via capital markets. For
example, although most OECD countries will have an ageing population in
the coming decades, the ageing pattern differs between countries. Population
ageing implies a fall of the relative number of working people and therefore
makes capital relatively abundant compared to labour. This will reduce the
rate of return on capital. In case countries differ in the timing and the extent of
ageing the change of the rate of return varies between countries and this will
lead to international capital flows. These capital flows will affect the well-
being of people by changing the factor rewards on capital and labour. The
utility effects of these capital flows are referred to as international spillover ef-
fects. This thesis analyses the international spillover effects of ageing via cap-
ital markets. We do not focus on differences in ageing patterns, but on the fact
that countries differ in the degree of funding of their pension systems. This
is especially relevant for the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
where the members have one capital market and one monetary policy. Within
the EMU, the timing and intensity of the ageing process will be largely the
same, but there are large differences in the way pensions are financed. There
is a large group of countries with extensive public PAYG pension schemes but
almost no funded pensions. In these countries PAYG pensions finance more
than 90 percent of the income of retirees (Boeri et al., 2006). On the other hand,
there is a smaller group of countries that have large funded pension schemes.
In a country like for example the Netherlands total investments of pension
funds amount to 124.9 percent of GDP (OECD Global Pension Statistics, 2006).
These differences in pension schemes will lead to capital flows between coun-
tries, even if the pattern of ageing is identical across countries. These capital
flows will have welfare effects, i.e., international spillover effects.
There are various channels why differences in pension schemes will induce
international spillover effects when the population is ageing. As described
above population ageing will affect PAYG pension systems and funded pen-
sions differently. Pension arrangements financed on a PAYG basis are directly
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affected by the rise in the old-age dependency ratio, while funded pension
schemes will be affected indirectly by changes in the rates of return on in-
vestments. Therefore savings reactions in response to ageing will not be the
same when countries differ in the retirement scheme they use. Savings will
also change if a country reforms its PAYG pension system and moves to a
more funded pension system to improve the sustainability of its pension sys-
tem when the population is ageing. In a common capital market differences
in savings between countries will lead to capital flows, which causes inter-
national spillover effects. Countries with large PAYG pension schemes may
also use government debt to finance their pension burden. High levels of gov-
ernment debt may lead to inflationary pressures or make government bonds
more risky. In a monetary union like the EMU this will necessarily affect other
members that accumulated large pension funds. This thesis gives a theoreti-
cal analysis and economic interpretation of these issues. In particular, the aim
of this thesis is to gain insight how people that live in countries that rely to a
large extent on funded pensions are affected by the fact that other countries
have large PAYG pension schemes when the population is ageing, and vice
versa. These international spillover effects will vary for different generations.
The analysis in this thesis is positive, i.e., we only analyse how population
ageing and certain policy measures in response to ageing affect the welfare
of individuals. We do not consider the political decision process of certain
policy changes and we assume that governments in funded countries do not
redistribute the international spillover effects between generations.
The rest of this introductory chapter is organised as follows. In Section 1.1
we will give some stylised facts about population ageing and the differences
in pension schemes currently in place in Europe. Section 1.2 will give a brief
overview of the literature and explain some important standard concepts. We
end the chapter by giving an overview and summary of the thesis in Section
1.3.
1.1 Some facts
In this section we will give some facts and figures that underly the questions
we try to answer in this thesis. First it will be explained why the western
populations are ageing in the coming decades. Secondly, we describe how
European countries differ in the way they organised their retirement schemes.
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1.1.1 The ageing problem
Population ageing arises as a result of changes in two determinants of demo-
graphic structure; the fall in fertility rates and a rise in longevity. In Figure 1.1
we show the change in the fertility rate, i.e., the average number of children
per woman, from the 1950s until 2050 for a number of developed countries
and the EU15. After the second world war there was a baby boom which
continued until the mid 1960s. In 1965 the average number of children per
woman was 2.8 in the EU15, while the fertility rate in the US was even 3.7 in
1960. From the 1970s onwards, however, there has been a large drop in fertility
rates, caused by the introduction of contraceptives and the increased labour
force participation of women. In 2005 the average number of children women
gave birth to was 2 in the US, 1.6 in the EU15 and 1.3 in Japan. Currently, the
fertility rates are particularly low in Italy and Japan. For the coming decades
it is expected that fertility rates will improve somewhat, but will stay below
the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman.
Figure 1.1: Fertility rate






















Source: United Nations Common Database (UNCDB), 2007 and
own calculations. The figures for 2010 and later are based on the
medium variant projection of the UN population division.
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The second source of demographic change is the ongoing increase in longevity.
The average lifetime of people is increasing because of better nutrition and
better provision of health care. Figure 1.2 shows the development of life ex-
pectancy at birth between 1955 and 2050. In the EU15, life expectancy was 67.1
in 1955, this increased to 78.7 in 2005 and in 2050 life expectancy at birth is
forecasted to be 84.2. The rise in life expectancy is most pronounced in Japan.
In the first half of the twentieth century life expectancy mainly increased as
a result of reduced rates in infant mortality. The current decline in mortality
mainly occurs at old ages, however, which causes the ageing of populations.
Figure 1.2: Longevity
























Source: United Nations Common Database (UNCDB), 2007 and
own calculations. The figures for 2010 and later are based on the
medium variant projection of the UN population division.
The rising trend in life expectancy has been consistently underestimated in
the past. This can be seen in Figure 1.3. The horizontal lines show the asserted
limits to life expectancy by various studies, where the short vertical line indi-
cates the year of publication. Dublin (1928) estimated the ultimate figure for
life expectancy at 64.75, while female life expectancy in New Zealand was al-
ready 65.93 at the time. Olshansky et al. (1990) estimated the upper limit of life
expectancy at 85 years, in 1996, however, life expectancy of Japanese women
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already exceeded this figure. The ceilings on life expectancy of some recent
studies have not been reached yet, but this will happen in the coming decades
in case the depicted upward trend will continue. The extrapolated trend lies
above the projections of female life expectancy in Japan made in 1986, 1999
and 2001 by the United Nations (UN), which are depicted by the dashed lines.
This implies that if the rise in life expectancy will continue in this linear fash-
ion, the predictions by the UN are again too low and the population will age
even more.
Figure 1.3: Female life expectancy
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Fig. 1. Record female life expectancy from 1840 to the present [suppl.table 2 (1)].The linear-re-Source: Oeppen and Vaupel (2002). Reprinted with permission from AAAS. Th
bold line depicts the linear regression trend and the dashed grey line is the extrap-
olated trend. The horizontal lines show asserted ceilings on life expectancy, with
a short vertical line indicating the year of publication. The dashed lines denote
projections of female life expectancy in Japan published by the United Nations in
1986, 1999 and 2001.
The underestimation of the improvement in life expectancy is also shown in
Table 1.1, which compares the realised gains in life expectancy at birth with
past UN projections. Each number shows the difference between actual life
expectancy in 2003 and projected life expectancy for the average of period
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2000-2005 made by the UN in 1999. A positive number indicates that actual
life expectancy exceeds projected life expectancy. These mistakes in life ex-
pectancy forecasts may cause that people make the wrong savings decisions,
as on average people always live longer than what they could reasonably have
expected at the time they made their savings decisions. In this sense the rise in
longevity can be seen as unexpected and therefore we model population age-
ing as an unexpected shock in this thesis. The assumption that people do not
expect ageing only affects the short-run effects of ageing, the long-run effects
do not change.
Table 1.1: Comparing actual and projected life expectancy at birth
France 0.6 EU15 0.7
Germany 0.6 Japan 1.5
Italy 1.1 US -0.2
UK 0.5
Source: Antolin (2007). The numbers reflect the difference between actual
life expectancy in 2003 and the 1999 UN forecasted life expectancy for the
average of 2000-2005.
The combination of lower fertility rates and higher longevity results in a rise
of the relative number of elderly people, i.e., an increase in the so-called old-
age dependency ratio. From Figure 1.4 we can infer that from 2000 onwards
the number of inactive elderly compared to the labour force will rise to a large
extent in all developed regions. In Japan the expectation is that the number of
retirees will be even larger than the working-age population in 2050, i.e., the
old-age dependency ratio will exceed 100 percent.
The forecasts in Figure 1.1 suggest that fertility rates will not continue to
decrease in the coming decades, but stabilise around the current level or will
even rise to some extent. Life expectancy, however, will continue to increase.
This implies that the fall in mortality rates among the elderly will be the main
source of population ageing in the coming decades. The fact that we live
longer is in the first place a blessing of course. On the other hand, a rise in
the old-age dependency ratio implies that a smaller group of working people
have to take care of a larger number of retirees when retirement ages do not
change. This puts the pension systems in different countries under pressure.
In the next subsection we will discuss the different pension arrangements cur-
rently in place. We focus on the European Union as this region is also the main
focus for the rest of this thesis.
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Figure 1.4: Old-age dependency ratio






































Source: United Nations Common Database (UNCDB), 2007 and
own calculations. The figures for 2010 and later are based on the
medium variant projection of the UN population division.
1.1.2 Pension schemes
A useful way to distinguish between the different components within retire-
ment systems is the three-pillar system (or the Cappuccino model) proposed
by the World Bank (Worldbank, 1994). The first pillar (the coffee) is the basic
public pension with the main goal to alleviate poverty among the elderly. It
is financed on the basis of pay-as-you-go (PAYG), implying that the govern-
ment collects taxes from the working young to finance the pension benefits of
the retired old. The second pillar (the milk) is a supplementary and obliga-
tory pension to ensure that people do not experience a too large fall in income
when they retire. It is supplied by the private sector and can be organised
both at the occupational or personal level. These pension schemes are mostly
funded so that each individual saves for its own pension. The third pillar (the
cocoa) refers to voluntary (individual or occupational) saving and insurance
plans and provides additional protection to people who like a better income
and security during retirement. This classification of the World Bank shows
that ideally each pillar has its own goal. In reality, however, we see that in
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many countries public PAYG pensions are not only used to provide a mini-
mum standard of living for the elderly, but also insure people against large
income losses. This means that the goal of the second pillar is shifted to the
first pillar and that a relatively large part of pension income is financed by
first pillar PAYG pensions. This can be seen in Table 1.2 where we show the
relative size of the three pillars in some European countries. In most coun-
tries, first pillar public pensions finance more than 90 percent of the income of
retirees. The second funded pillar is only significant in Denmark, Sweden and
the Netherlands.
Table 1.2: Composition of retirement incomes in 2003 (%)
First pillar Second pillar Third pillar
Greece 98 1.5 0.5
France 97 1.5 1.5
Spain 97 1.5 1.5
Italy 96 2 2
Austria 95 3 2
Germany 94 4 2
Denmark 76 20 4
Sweden 75 20 5
Netherlands 56 37 7
Source: Boeri et al. (2006)
In Table 1.3 we show total expenditure on pensions by the government rel-
ative to GDP and Table 1.4 presents the size of pension funds as a percent-
age of GDP. These two tables confirm the differences in financing methods of
pensions sketched in Table 1.2. There is a large group of countries with exten-
sive public PAYG schemes but almost no funded pensions. In large countries
like Italy, France and Germany public pension expenditure is already quite
large, while the funded component is fairly small. On the other hand, there
is a smaller group of countries that have sizeable pension funds, while pub-
lic expenditure on pensions is smaller (e.g., the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom).
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Table 1.3: Public expenditure on pensions as % of GDP (2004)
Italy 14.2 Belgium 10.4
Austria 13.4 Luxembourg 10.0
France 12.8 Denmark 9.5
Germany 11.4 Spain 8.6
Portugal 11.1 Netherlands 7.7
Finland 10.7 UK 6.6
Sweden 10.6 Ireland 4.7
Source: European Commission (2006)
Table 1.4: Total investments of pension funds as % of GDP (2005)
Luxembourg 0.4 Portugal 12.9
Italy 2.8 Sweden 14.5
Germany 3.9 Denmark 33.6
Belgium 4.2 Ireland 52.8
Austria 4.7 Finland 66.1
France 5.8 UK 70.1
Spain 9.1 Netherlands 124.9
Source: OECD Global Pension Statistics, 2006
The fact that countries with large public PAYG schemes also use these first-
pillar pensions to provide high earnings-related pension benefits, so that the
drop in income during retirement is not too large, is shown in Table 1.5. This
table presents the division between the so-called Beveridgian- and Bismarck-
ian factor within public pension schemes. A pension system is called Bismar-
ckian in case the pension benefits are linked to previous contributions to the
system. In case of a complete Bismarckian system, like in Italy, there is no re-
distribution between rich and poor people of the same generation, i.e., there
is no intragenerational redistribution. The advantage of such a system is that
tax distortions are absent. The disadvantage, however, is that the amount of
poverty reduction is minimal. A Beveridgian pension scheme is characterised
by the fact that there is no link between the PAYG contributions people pay
during their working life and the public pension benefit people receive during
retirement. In the Netherlands, for example, PAYG contributions are income-
dependent, while the pension benefit is flat. This implies that there is a lot of
intragenerational redistribution in case the public pension scheme has a large
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Beveridgian factor. The Bismarckian factor is large in countries with large
public PAYG schemes, which suggests that in these countries first-pillar pen-
sions are not only used to alleviate poverty among pensioners, but also serve
to maintain a certain standard of living during retirement. Countries where a
relatively large part of retirement income is financed by funded pensions, on
the other hand, have a lot of redistribution within their public PAYG schemes.
In these countries pension arrangements are organised along the lines sug-
gested by the World Bank. Second-pillar funded pensions ensure that retirees
do not endure too large income losses, while public PAYG pensions provide a
minimum living standard for the elderly.
Table 1.5: Redistribution within public pension systems (%)
















In this thesis we will not distinguish between Bismarckian or Beveridgian
pension schemes, but we focus on the distinction between PAYG and funded
pension systems. Population ageing will affect countries in different ways de-
pending on the way pensions are financed. In countries with extensive public
PAYG pension systems (like Italy, France and Germany), the rise in the old-
age dependency ratio will put these pension schemes under pressure as the
number of contributors falls and the number of recipients rises. This implies
that either PAYG contributions have to increase or pension benefits have to
fall. Another option would be to use government debt to cope with the costs
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of ageing. Given the fact that public pension expenditure is already quite large
(see Table 1.3), an often discussed solution is to reform the PAYG scheme and
switch to a more funded scheme, so that a larger part of pension income is fi-
nanced by the second pillar. This thesis will analyse the international spillover
effects of all these policy scenarios.
Within funded pension systems a rise in the old-age dependency ratio will
not cause the type of financing problems that occur in PAYG schemes as peo-
ple save for their own pension3. Funded pensions, however, are vulnerable
to changes in rates of return on investments. This implies that in case age-
ing changes the rates on return this will affect funded pension systems. As
population ageing is a world-wide phenomenon we can expect that rates of
return will change when the number of working people falls compared to the
number of inactive elderly. So funded pensions will not be immune to age-
ing either. Moreover, countries with a more funded pension scheme will be
affected by countries with relatively large PAYG schemes in case there is free
movement of capital.
1.2 An overview of the related literature
This section gives an overview of the main literature related to what is done
in this thesis. We also explain some important concepts and mechanisms that
will used in the thesis.
1.2.1 The basic model
The basic model used in this thesis is the two-period overlapping-generations
model first introduced by Samuelson (1958) and later extended by Diamond
(1965). In this model individuals live for two periods, people work in the
first period and are retired in the second period of life. This implies that in a
given period both a young and an old generation are alive. This demographic
structure allows for transfers between generations and therefore this model is
3A funded pension system can be characterised by defined benefits (DB), however, which
implies that there is a PAYG element in the scheme. In a DB funded pension scheme the
young participants bear the residual risk of an unexpected shock. This thesis only considers
funded pension systems with defined contributions (DC), so that the retirees are the residual
risk bearers. Assuming a DB funded scheme instead means that the short-run utility effects
of ageing are shifted from the old to young, the spillover effects do not qualitatively change,
however.
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a very useful tool for modelling PAYG pensions, where the working young
finance the pension benefits of the elderly.
Steady state per capita consumption is maximised at the point where the real
rate of interest (r) is equal to the growth rate of the economy, which equals the
population growth rate (n) when there is no technological progress. This sit-
uation is often referred to as the Golden Rule point. Diamond (1965) showed
that it is possible that consumers save too much, this is a dynamic inefficient
situation. There is too much capital accumulation in a dynamically inefficient
economy and r < n. In that case it is possible to increase welfare of all gen-
erations by lowering the capital stock, that is, by substituting private savings
for consumption. Aaron (1966) showed that this can be done by the introduc-
tion of a PAYG pension scheme. In case r > n, however, the capital stock
is smaller than the Golden Rule level of capital and the economy is dynami-
cally efficient as it is not possible to increase long-run welfare without hurting
some current or future generations. In that case the introduction of a PAYG
pension scheme benefits short-run welfare, but reduces long-run welfare, as
PAYG pensions will lead to an even smaller capital stock. Most studies as-
sume that economies are dynamically efficient nowadays, this will also be the
assumption in this thesis.
Buiter (1981) and Persson (1985) were the first to extend the overlapping-
generations model of Diamond and Samuelson to an open economy with two
countries. Buiter (1981) studied the effects of integration of two economies
that differ in their rate of time preference. Consumers with a high time prefer-
ence consume relatively more when they are young and save relatively less, so
that capital-labour ratio in the high-time-preference country is relatively low
under autarky. The opposite holds for the country where individuals have a
low rate of time preference. In case these two countries integrate their capi-
tal and commodity markets, international trade and international borrowing
and lending make sure that the capital-labour ratio is the same in the two
countries. The integration results in a higher capital-labour ratio for the high-
time-preference country, while the capital-labour is lower in the low-time-
preference country. This change in the capital-labour ratio has welfare effects
in both countries because wages and interest rates are affected. The long-run
welfare effects of integration crucially depend on the fact whether there is un-
deraccumulation of capital or not, that is, whether the economies are dynam-
ically efficient or not. Moreover, Buiter (1981) shows that it is not necessarily
the case that both economies gain from the integration. Consider for example
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the case where both economies are dynamically efficient under autarky and
stay dynamically efficient under openness. The long-run welfare effects of in-
tegration will be unambiguously positive in the high-time-preference country
in that case. First, because the capital-labour ratio is higher under openness, so
that capital underaccumulation is less and the economy is closer to the Golden
Rule point. Second, as the high-time-preference country will be a net borrower
after integration it gains from the lower interest rate that results for the higher
capital-labour ratio. The long-run utility effects of integration for the country
with the low rate of time preference can be either positive or negative, how-
ever. On the one hand, as the country is a net lender under openness it gains
from the lower capital-labour ratio because this leads to a higher interest rate.
On the other hand, a lower capital-labour ratio has negative utility effects un-
der dynamic efficiency. This shows that in this model it is not necessarily the
case that the opening up of countries improves welfare. The reason for this
result is that international trade and financial mobility do not expand the con-
sumption possibility set of consumers and there are no potential gains from
specialisation, as only one good is produced. Openness only means that the
two countries get one capital market.
The analysis of Persson (1985) focuses on the intergenerational welfare redis-
tribution of an increase in public debt in open economies. It is well-known that
in a closed economy with overlapping generations government debt reduces
steady state welfare in case of dynamic efficiency, because capital is crowded
out and taxes have to increase to service the higher government debt. Persson
(1985) shows that the negative welfare effects are smaller in a small open econ-
omy, because the capital-labour ratio is exogenous so that future generations
only bear the higher tax burden of the higher public debt. In case of two large
countries that affect world factor prices with their debt policy, the long-run
welfare effects of public debt are not clear anymore, however, as there is an
extra terms-of-trade effect besides the two negative effects of increased taxes
and a lower capital-labour ratio. If the country is a net borrower on the in-
ternational capital market it is affected negatively by the higher interest rate
resulting from the fall of the capital-labour ratio. In this case the extra terms-
of-trade effect reinforces the two other negative effects and an increase in gov-
ernment debt unambiguously decreases steady state welfare. If the country is
a net lender, on the other hand, it gains from the higher interest rate and the
two negative effects are alleviated. When this positive terms-of-trade effect is
large enough, government debt may even increase welfare in the long run.
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The models of Buiter (1981) and Persson (1985) serve as a basis for the mod-
els used in this thesis. Both models do not include pensions, however. Breyer
and Wildasin (1993) examine the steady state welfare effects of unfunded pen-
sion schemes in a large open economy. They assume that there is only one
country that is large enough to affect the world interest rate, all other countries
take the interest rate as given. Their findings are very similar to those of Pers-
son (1985), as an increase in the size of the PAYG scheme is comparable to a rise
of government debt. Higher PAYG pensions reduce savings and crowd out the
capital stock (just like government debt) and the world interest rate will rise.
Breyer and Wildasin (1993) show that a large open economy that finds itself on
the Golden Rule path and is a net lender on the international capital market
can increase steady state welfare by increasing the size of its PAYG pension
scheme. The reason for this result is that a net lender benefits from the rise
in the world interest rate. For a country that is a net borrower exactly the op-
posite result holds true; steady state welfare is increased if it reduces PAYG
contributions below the Golden Rule level. In contrast to Breyer and Wildasin
(1993), this thesis considers an open-economy overlapping-generations model
consisting of two large countries.
Casarico (2001) analyses the effects of the integration of capital markets of
two countries that differ in the degree of funding of their pension systems.
One country relies on a PAYG pension scheme, while the other country has a
fully-funded pension scheme. This difference in pension systems implies that
the capital-labour ratios in the two countries differ under autarky. The PAYG
country will have a lower per capita capital stock than the funded country,
therefore capital will flow from the funded country to the PAYG country in
case of integration. Although the source of capital flows between the two
countries (differences in pension schemes) differs from the one in Buiter (1981)
(different rates of time preferences), the mechanisms behind the results are
more or less the same. The PAYG country can be compared to the high-time-
preference country and therefore people in this country are better off in the
open-economy equilibrium in case of dynamic efficiency. As was the case
for the low-time-preference country, long-run welfare can either increase or
decrease in the funded country. We follow Casarico (2001) and use a two-
country two-period overlapping-generations model where one country uses a
PAYG scheme and in the other country pensions are fully funded. In contrast
to Casarico (2001) we study the international spillover effects of population
ageing and pension reform given that the countries already have a common
capital market, but differ in the pension arrangements they use.
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1.2.2 Ageing
There is an extensive literature that considers the open economy aspects of
population ageing focusing on the fact that differences in the extent and the
timing of ageing will lead to capital flows between countries. Cutler et al.
(1990) were one of the first to point out that demographic changes in other
countries should be taken into account, given the fact that international capi-
tal markets are getting more and more integrated. They first explain that the
consumption possibilities in an economy are affected in two ways when the
population ages. First, the rise in the old-age dependency ratio (see Figure
1.4) implies that the number of working people that can produce falls com-
pared to the number of inactive elderly, so that output per person falls. This
dependency-ratio effect lowers consumption per capita. Second, the fall in fertil-
ity rates lowers the population growth rate and leads to a decreasing labour
force. In a standard optimal growth model a decline in the growth rate of the
labour force implies that less investment is needed to equip each worker with
a certain capital stock. This so-called capital-thickening effect reduces the need
for saving and increases consumption per capita. Using a Ramsey growth
model, Cutler et al. (1990) find that for the United States the positive capital-
thickening effect dominates the negative dependency-ratio effect. The optimal
response to the upcoming ageing of the population would therefore be to de-
crease savings and increase consumption. Moreover, the fact that the US ages
more slowly than other OECD nations, implies that the capital-labour ratio
increases even more in other OECD countries and capital will flow into the
US. These capital inflows reinforce the initial positive capital-thickening effect
and further increase optimal consumption.
The main drawback of the analysis of Cutler et al. (1990) is that they use a
Ramsey growth model where individuals are assumed to live infinitely long
and there is no distinction between different generations. This implies that the
effects of ageing on intergenerational redistribution and the subsequent effects
on savings cannot be taken into account. The fact that agents have an infinite
life also means that a Ramsey model is not suitable for studying the effects of
a rise in life expectancy, which is the other main determinant of population
ageing. Moreover, it is not possible to explicitly model an intergenerational
transfer scheme, like a pay-as-you-go pension system and analyse the savings
effects of such a pension scheme. To capture these effects it is necessary to use
an overlapping-generations (OLG) model. There is a large number of papers,
e.g., Attanasio et al. (2006), Börsch-Supan et al. (2006), Brooks (2003), Domeij
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and Flodén (2006), Fehr et al. (2005) presenting simulation experiments with
large multi-country overlapping-generations (OLG) models to study the (in-
ternational) effects of ageing. The rise in the old-age dependency ratio will
have an extra effect on savings when a PAYG pension system is in place. A
defined-benefit (DB) PAYG pension scheme implies higher PAYG contribu-
tions, which will decrease saving rates. The effect will be opposite in case of
a defined-contribution (DC) PAYG system. Fehr et al. (2005) argue that the
increase in taxes needed to finance the retirement benefits is so large that the
capital-thickening effect is dominated by the negative effect of savings and
the capital-labour ratio actually falls when the population is ageing. There-
fore they forecast that capital will flow from slowly ageing countries like the
US to rapidly ageing regions like the EU and Japan. Most other studies that
use multi-country general equilibrium OLG models, however, find that ageing
increases the capital stock per worker, see for example Attanasio et al. (2006),
Börsch-Supan et al. (2006), Brooks (2003), Domeij and Flodén (2006). It ap-
pears that the results of Fehr et al. (2005) are mainly driven by the fact that the
effective labour supply is rising due to labour-augmenting technical progress,
which more than offsets the relative reduction in the labour force when the
population is ageing. But it is not obvious at all whether technical progress
will be able to offset the negative effects on the supply of labour. Börsch-Supan
et al. (2006) and Brooks (2003) point out that the international capital flows in-
duced by differential ageing processes across countries will change over time.
Initially, rapidly ageing regions will export capital, while economies less af-
fected by ageing will be capital importers. This pattern is reversed when the
baby boom generation dissave during retirement and countries most affected
by ageing will be capital importers.
Less attention, however, has been paid to a second possible reason for inter-
national spillover effects in case of ageing, i.e., differences in pension systems
between countries. This thesis will focus on this channel. Moreover, an im-
portant drawback of these large-scale general equilibrium models is that the
underlying mechanisms of the results are not clear because analytical solu-
tions are not feasible. By keeping our models relatively simple, we are able to
derive an analytical solution of the transition path after a shock has occurred.
This allows us to gain insight into the underlying mechanisms of the results.
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1.2.3 Pension reform
In many developed countries ageing has led to a debate on reforming un-
funded pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social-security systems. One of the most dis-
cussed reform proposals is to switch to a more funded system where people
save for their own pensions, and realise a higher expected rate of return on
their contributions4. This switch to funding increases savings and will in-
crease welfare in the long run in a dynamically efficient economy. The prob-
lem is, however, that there will be one transition generation that paid into the
PAYG system, but will not receive a PAYG pension benefit anymore. The ques-
tion is whether it is possible to compensate this transition generation in such a
way that no generation is hurt by the pension reform and at least one genera-
tion gains. In other words, can a pension reform where (part of) the PAYG sys-
tem is abolished be Pareto improving? To answer this question a distinction
has to be made between the case where collecting PAYG contributions does
not involve any distortions and the case where the PAYG scheme leads to dis-
tortions in the economy. In the first case the PAYG system is Pareto efficient,
as proved by Verbon (1989) for the small open economy and Breyer (1989) for
the closed economy. This means that it is not possible that some generations
gain from the conversion policy without hurting other generations. The best
thing a government in a reforming country can do is to implement the pension
reform in such a way that no generation gains or loses.
In case a PAYG scheme is distortionary, that is, when the PAYG tax implies an
excess burden, a Pareto-improving pension reform is possible, however. This is
shown by Homburg (1990) for a small open economy and Breyer and Straub
(1993) for the closed economy. The idea is that if the contribution rate is de-
creased net welfare gains result after the compensation of the older genera-
tions alive at the time of the abolishment of the PAYG system. In that way
future generations gain from the switch to more funded pensions, which offer
a higher rate of return and do not negatively affect savings, while the transi-
tion generation is compensated.
In Chapter 3, where we consider the international spillover effects of pension
reform, we distinguish between the case where a reform potentially leads to a
Pareto improvement in the reforming country, and where this is not possible.
4This is the case when the economy is dynamically efficient. Dynamic efficiency implies
that the implicit return on PAYG contributions (the growth rate of the economy) is lower than
the return on savings (the real rate of interest).
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1.2.4 Pensions and macroeconomic risk
Based on the discussion in the previous section one would argue that abol-
ishing a PAYG pension system is a good idea when PAYG contributions in-
duce an excess burden. There is a strand of literature, however, that focuses
on another aspect of PAYG pension systems that makes them useful; pension
schemes that redistribute among generations can be used to enhance the shar-
ing of aggregate risks between generations. The idea is that financial markets
are incomplete because there cannot be trade with unborn generations and
human capital is not traded. As a result of these missing markets the young
are too much exposed to wage risk and the old bear too much financial market
risk. In case financial market returns are imperfectly correlated with wages,
this results in suboptimal diversification. By linking PAYG pension benefits to
wages, retired households obtain a claim to human capital which is not traded
on financial markets. In this way PAYG pension schemes can contribute to bet-
ter intergenerational risk sharing and diversification. So although a PAYG sys-
tem has a lower return and may decrease savings, it provides opportunities
for intergenerational risk sharing and diversification.
There are several studies that investigate what the optimal size of a PAYG
pension system would be, given that there is a trade-off between the provi-
sion of risk sharing and the reduction of saving incentives. The first strand
of literature uses a partial equilibrium approach, where the rates of return are
exogenous and constant, see for example Thøgersen (1998), Dutta et al. (2000),
Wagener (2003), Matsen and Thøgersen (2004) and Miles and Černý (2006). All
these partial equilibrium studies find that the risk sharing benefits outweigh
the negative effects of reduced saving incentives, so that it is optimal to finance
the pensions of the elderly at least partly on a PAYG basis. In partial equilib-
rium, however, one does not take into account the capital crowding-out effect
of private savings. A PAYG system leads to lower savings and in general equi-
librium, this leads to a smaller capital stock, which reduces steady state wel-
fare in case of dynamic efficiency. Most papers that analyse the risk-sharing
aspects of a PAYG system in a general equilibrium framework, like Storeslet-
ten et al. (1999), Sánchez-Marcos and Sánchez-Martin (2006), and Krueger and
Kubler (2006), find that for standard parameter values the crowding-out effect
of savings is larger than the risk-sharing benefits, which implies that it is op-
timal to abolish the PAYG system5.
5These papers do not consider the transition effects of pension reform, however. As ex-
CHAPTER 1 21
In contrast to this literature, this thesis does not consider optimal PAYG
schemes, but takes the PAYG system as given. The model used in Chap-
ters 4 and 5, however, is comparable to the models used in these papers. In
these two chapters we develop a stochastic overlapping-generations general
equilibrium model with safe PAYG pensions. The above-mentioned papers
that study the intergenerational risk-sharing properties of PAYG pensions in
stochastic general equilibrium OLG models use computable models. The ma-
jor advantage of the stochastic general equilibrium model in Chapters 4 and 5
is that it is fairly simple so that analytical solutions are still feasible. There are
a few papers that develop an anaytical stochastic general equilibrium OLG
model. Bohn (1998, 2001, 2003) studies intergenerational risk sharing of de-
mographic and macroeconomic risk in a stochastic OLG model using govern-
ment debt or social security and derives a quasi-analytical condition for ex
ante efficient intergenerational risk sharing. Beetsma and Bovenberg (2007)
investigate intergenerational risk sharing in a two-pillar system with a pay-
as-you-go pillar and a funded pillar. By keeping the model relatively simple
they obtain analytical expressions for the optimal pension scheme. These pa-
pers do not, however, derive the optimal conditions for savings- and portfolio
decisions of consumers as we do in our model.
We use the approach of Campbell and Viceira (2002) to obtain an explicit ex-
pression for the optimal portfolio share. In this approach it is assumed that
asset returns are lognormally distributed, i.e., the logarithms of gross asset re-
turns are normal. By taking logs of the Euler condition for optimal consump-
tion choice one can derive an equation that can be used to explain the risk
premia of assets or consumers’ portfolio choice. The finance literature keeps
the stochastic discount rate (i.e, the marginal value of financial wealth in the
next period) exogenous in case they want to study asset pricing, see Campbell
(2003) for an overview. For the explanation of portfolio choice, on the other
hand, asset returns are taken as exogenous, see for example Campbell and
Viceira (1999). The main advantage of our model is that it is a general equilib-
rium model where we can derive optimal portfolio choice and the equity pre-
mium at the same time. The difficulty with the lognormal consumption-based
model is that the intertemporal budget constraint and the portfolio return are
not loglinear. Campbell and Viceira solve this problem by taking Taylor ap-
proximations of the nonlinear functions, this is also the approach we take in
plained in Section 1.2.3, abolishing a PAYG system can be advantageous for future genera-
tions without hurting some current generations when PAYG contributions imply an excess
burden.
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the model of Chapters 4 and 5.
1.3 Outline of thesis
As explained at the beginning of this chapter the main aim of this thesis is
to analyse the international spillover effects of ageing when countries rely to
a different extent on PAYG pension schemes. The models used in this thesis
differ along two dimensions, this is shown in Figure 1.5.
Figure 1.5: Model characteristics
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The models in Chapters 2 and 3 are completely deterministic, that is, con-
sumers do not face any uncertainty about the return on their investments.
Moreover, the model contains two countries where one country relies on PAYG
pensions and the other country has a fully-funded pension system. This model
is used in Chapter 2 to analyse the international spillover effects of ageing,
where the PAYG country keeps its pension system balanced when the pop-
ulation is ageing. This means that PAYG contributions or pension benefits
adjust accordingly. Chapter 3 examines the spillover effects of pension re-
forms in PAYG countries where part of the PAYG scheme is abolished. This
is an often proposed solution to improve the sustainability of public pension
schemes. In Chapter 4 we develop a closed-economy stochastic overlapping-
generations model with safe PAYG pensions. In this model the rates of return
on investments are risky. In that case PAYG pensions do not only provide in-
come during retirement, but also offer the possibility to transfer income from
the working period to retirement at a non-stochastic rate of return. Chapter 5
combines the open-economy model of Chapter 2 with the stochastic model of
Chapter 4. In this chapter we investigate the international spillover effects of
ageing when the PAYG country uses government debt to cope with the costs
of ageing, which may lead to unexpected inflation or more inflation risk.
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The link between chapters 2, 3 and 5 is depicted in Figure 1.6. The remainder
of this section gives an overview of the contents and the main conclusions of
each chapter.












Chapter 2 addresses the question how, in case of population ageing, a coun-
try with an extensive funded pension scheme (e.g., the Netherlands) is af-
fected by the fact that other EMU countries (like Italy) rely to a relatively large
extent on unfunded pensions, and vice versa. Differences in pension schemes
cause savings in the various countries to react differently to the ageing of the
population. In a common capital market, these differences in savings lead
to capital flows between the countries and in that way induce international
spillover effects.
One of the aims of this chapter is to gain insight into the underlying mech-
anisms of the results and therefore we keep the model as simple as possible.
We use a two-country two-period overlapping-generations model where one
country uses a PAYG pension system and the other country has a fully-funded
retirement scheme. The countries are identical in all other respects. There is
perfect capital mobility between the two regions, but labour is immobile. In
the initial steady state, the funded country is a net lender on the international
capital market as savings are higher than in the PAYG country.
The countries are hit by a symmetric ageing shock, that is, the size and the
timing of the ageing shock is the same in both regions. We distinguish be-
tween two causes of population ageing, namely an increase in longevity and a
decrease in fertility. A rise in longevity is modelled as an increase in the proba-
bility that people live throughout old age, while a fall in fertility is reflected by
a decrease in the population growth rate. Both a higher longevity and lower
fertility rates result in an increase in the relative number of elderly people, i.e.,
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a rise in the so-called old-age dependency ratio. This dependency-ratio effect
will put a PAYG pension scheme under pressure as the number of contribu-
tors falls and the number of recipients rises. In this chapter it is assumed that
the PAYG country keeps its PAYG system balanced. This means that either
contributions to the PAYG scheme or pension benefits have to adjust in re-
sponse to ageing. The first case is referred to as a defined-benefit scheme and
in that case the working generation bears the burden of an ageing population
by paying higher taxes. In the latter case the burden of ageing lies with the
elderly and the PAYG scheme is characterised by defined contributions. Both
variants are considered in this chapter. The international spillover effects are
derived by comparing the utility effects of ageing in case each country adopts
a different pension scheme (one PAYG, one funded) to the utility effects in
case both countries have the same type of pension system (both PAYG or both
funded), which implies that there are no international capital flows. In that
way we can deduce how a funded country is affected by the fact that the other
country uses a PAYG pension scheme instead of a fully-funded pension sys-
tem, and vice versa.
The utility effect of ageing in the different cases can be derived as soon as we
know the change in the capital-labour ratio, the central variable in the model.
The capital-labour ratio is determined by savings in the previous period and
the number of working people. A rise in longevity implies that the probabil-
ity of reaching the second period of life is higher and the expected lifespan
of people is longer. This induces people to save more, which increases the
capital-labour ratio. A fall in the fertility rate lowers the population growth
rate and leads to a shrinking labour force. This implies that less investment
is needed to equip each worker with a certain capital stock. This so-called
capital-thickening effect implies that for a given amount of per capita savings
a higher capital-labour ratio can be maintained. So both types of ageing af-
fect the capital-labour ratio positively, however, due to the capital-thickening
effect, the rise in the capital-labour ratio is much larger after a fall in fertility
compared to an increase in longevity.
The rise in the old-age dependency ratio has an extra effect on savings when
a PAYG pension system is in place, however. In case of a defined-benefit
PAYG pension system contributions have to go up to keep the pension sys-
tem balanced, which will decrease savings and weakens the direct positive
effect on the capital-labour ratio. The effect will be opposite in case of a
fixed-contribution PAYG scheme; pension benefits are reduced due to a higher
dependency-ratio, which increases savings and the capital-labour ratio.
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We show that for realistic parameter values the capital-labour ratio increases
in all considered cases. Moreover, savings in the funded country rise more
than in the PAYG country, which leads to capital flows from the funded coun-
try to the PAYG country. This results in long-run positive spillover effects
for the PAYG country as it benefits both from the higher capital stock and
the resulting lower interest rate on its borrowings from abroad. The funded
country, on the other hand, is negatively affected by the lower capital stock
but gains from the resulting higher interest rate as it is a lender on the inter-
national capital market. We find that for realistic parameter values the first
effect dominates and therefore a country with funded pensions is in the long
run adversely affected by the existence of a PAYG scheme in the other coun-
try. The short-run spillovers, however, are opposite to the spillovers in the
long run. This means that the initial generations in the funded country gain
from the fact that the other country uses a PAYG scheme, whereas these initial
generations in the PAYG country are negatively affected by the funded system
in the other country.
We show that these results are quite robust for modifications to the basic
model. This chapter therefore shows that in the long run countries with funded
retirement schemes are negatively affected by the fact that other countries
have PAYG pensions, even when the government of the PAYG country keeps
its pension system balanced.
Population ageing puts pension schemes financed on a PAYG basis under
pressure as the rise in the old-age dependency ratio implies that either con-
tributions to the scheme have to rise to high levels or pension benefits have
to fall to a large extent. One of the most discussed proposals to increase the
sustainability of the pension system is to reform the PAYG scheme and switch
to a more funded scheme. In a multicountry world with integrated capital
markets, such a switch to funding will engender spillover effects to other
countries. The aim of Chapter 3 is to look at these international spillover ef-
fects of pension reform. More specifically, this chapter analyses how countries
with funded pension systems are affected when countries with PAYG pension
schemes reform their pension system and finance a larger part of the future
pension benefits by accumulated funds.
The model used is comparable to the model in the previous chapter, but
some additional features are added. The most important adjustment is that we
allow for the fact that the PAYG scheme leads to distortions in the economy,
which implies that the PAYG tax induces an excess burden. The existence of
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an excess burden offers the scope for introducing a Pareto-improving pension
reform.
We first investigate the spillover effects of a pension reform in the PAYG
country under the assumption that taxes are non-distortionary. This implies
that the PAYG system is Pareto efficient and there is a trade-off between the
utility of different generations in implementing the reform. That means that,
if some generations are allowed to gain from the conversion policy, it is un-
avoidable that other generations incur a loss. So, in the reforming country a
choice has to be made which generations are allowed to gain from the reform
and which not. It is shown that in a common capital market this choice spills
over to the funded country. In particular, if the reforming country decides
that future generations will gain from the reform, future generations in the
funded country will gain as well. But these long-run welfare gains come at
the cost of lower utility in the short run and these initial losses will also be
transmitted to the funded country via the capital market. If the government
in the PAYG country, on the other hand, decides that the reform should be
welfare-improving for a majority of its current population (the young and old
generation alive at the time of the reform), the initial generations in the funded
country also gain from the pension reform in the PAYG country. Under this
reform policy the future generations in the PAYG country will bear the costs of
the reform and the future generations in the funded country will lose as well.
We then proceed by assuming excess burdens in tax collection, which en-
ables the PAYG country to implement a Pareto-improving pension reform.
When such a policy is implemented in our two-country world, the long-run
gains in the PAYG country are again transferred to the funded country. How-
ever, although in the PAYG country the policy is carefully shaped such that no
generation loses in both the short run and the long run, in the funded coun-
try some generations might lose in the short run. In other words, a reform
policy that appears to be Pareto improving for the PAYG country considered
separately, does not have to be Pareto improving after taking into account the
international spillover effects.
The central conclusion that emerges from this chapter is that in a common
capital market the effects of pension reform in PAYG countries spills over
to countries with a fully-funded pension system. In the EU, for example,
there is a large group of countries that have extensive PAYG-financed parts
in their pension system, while a much smaller group of countries have size-
able funded pensions. The message of this chapter is that the latter countries
cannot insulate themselves from the effects of reform measures in the former
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countries. The policy conclusion from this chapter is, therefore, that in a com-
mon market like the EU, decisions on pension reform in the countries with
a large PAYG scheme should not be taken without considering the effects for
non-reforming (funded) countries. In particular, dependent on the type and
size of reform in the PAYG countries, compensation for the non-reforming
countries might be necessary.
In Chapters 2 and 3 consumers do not face any uncertainty about the re-
turn on their savings, i.e., the models used are completely deterministic. In
Chapters 4 and 5 we take a different approach and develop a stochastic two-
period overlapping-generations general equilibrium model with government
debt and safe PAYG pensions. People can invest in two types of assets, stocks
and government bonds, where the total amount of bonds is determined by
the exogenous level of government debt. Both assets are risky, productivity
risk makes the return on stocks uncertain and there is inflation risk on gov-
ernment bonds. The fact that stocks and bonds differ in their riskiness makes
that they earn a different rate of return, which allows us to analyse the eq-
uity premium and portfolio choice. The function of safe PAYG pensions in
our stochastic economy is twofold. First, it provides retirees with a certain
minimum amount of income. Second, as people cannot invest in any risk-
free asset, safe PAYG pensions will partly fill the gap of this missing market.
Chapter 4 analyses a closed-economy version of this model, while in Chapter
5 the model is extended to a two-country model where one country uses a
PAYG scheme and the other country relies on funded pensions. This chapter
analyses the international spillover effects of ageing in case the PAYG country
uses government debt to cope with the costs of ageing, where high levels of
government debt may go along with high inflation (risk).
Chapter 4 links the last chapter of this thesis with Chapters 2 and 3 and
the main purpose of this chapter is to gain insight into the workings of the
stochastic model. We study three shocks that all affect the portfolio decision of
households directly; more risk aversion, the introduction of a PAYG pension
scheme and higher inflation risk. We examine the effects of the shocks on
portfolio choice, savings and the equity premium.
To contrast the results in a general equilibrium model with the partial equi-
librium approach typically taken in the finance literature, we first consider the
effects on portfolio- and savings decisions in case the rates of return are taken
as exogenous. First, we address the effects of more risk aversion. The main
reason why this shock is considered is to contrast the results with the effects
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of introducing safe PAYG pensions, which is the second analysed shock. Safe
PAYG pensions reduce the variance of old-age consumption and will therefore
affect the investment decisions of consumers. Comparing the effects of PAYG
pensions to the effects of higher risk aversion shows that safe PAYG pensions
make individuals act like less risk-averse agents. This implies that they save
less and have a more risky investment portfolio, i.e., invest a larger part of
their savings in stocks. Finally, we also study the effects of an increase in
the riskiness of government bonds, i.e., a rise in inflation risk, to address the
impact of uncertainty on consumer behaviour. Higher inflation risk makes
government bonds less attractive to hold and consumers reoptimise their in-
vestment portfolio and invest a larger part of their savings in stocks.
In partial equilibrium, only the effects on individual decisions are consid-
ered. The macroeconomic effects all these individual choices together may
have, are not incorporated. We show that it matters whether these macroe-
conomic effects are taken into account or not. In particular, it turns out that
in general equilibrium portfolio choice is affected in exactly the opposite way
as in partial equilibrium. Individually, consumers would like to adjust their
portfolio in a certain direction after a shock. However, as all people in the
economy have the same incentive, this would mean that the capital market
does not clear anymore. In general equilibrium the rates of return adjust in
such a way that both the government debt and the capital stock are financed,
and portfolio choice moves in the same direction as savings. In partial equilib-
rium financing government debt or the capital stock is not a problem as bonds
and stocks can be supplied on the international capital market for given rates
of return.
Consider for example the effects of introducing safe PAYG pensions. In par-
tial equilibrium individuals increase the riskiness of their investment portfo-
lio when they receive a safe PAYG pension benefit. In general equilibrium,
however, this cannot occur because the lower investment in government debt
would lead to an oversupply of government bonds. Actually, the fall in sav-
ings induced by PAYG pensions implies that the part of savings invested in
government bonds has to rise, i.e., people have to move to the less risky asset,
to make sure that the government debt is financed. To persuade consumers
to invest more in government bonds, the return on government bonds has to
rise to a larger extent than the return on stocks, i.e., the risk premium of stocks
over bonds has to fall. The effect on the equity premium is opposite in case
people become more risk averse, the rise in savings causes the risk premium
of stocks over bonds to rise to clear the capital market.
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For a rise in inflation risk we have the same result, that is, the effect on port-
folio choice in general equilibrium is opposite to the effect in partial equilib-
rium. Higher inflation risk makes government bonds less attractive to hold
and consumers prefer to switch to stocks. In general equilibrium, however,
this cannot occur as government debt will not be completely financed in that
case. In order to induce people to invest in the given amount of government
bonds, the return on bonds has to rise relative to the return on stocks. The
higher interest rate on government debt increases the so-called debt tax, i.e.,
the tax to pay the interest obligations on the government debt in order to keep
the debt dynamics stable, and savings will fall. Lower savings imply that a
larger part of savings has to be invested in government bonds to have a clear-
ing capital market and the equity premium will fall to make this happen.
These opposing results in partial- and general equilibrium imply that it mat-
ters whether one studies portfolio choice in a small open economy or in a large
(closed) economy, like the US or the EU. In the first case a partial equilibrium
approach would suffice, while a general equilibrium framework is more ap-
propriate in the latter case. Moreover, this result is also relevant in case one
would like to analyse the effects of ’global’ shocks, like population ageing,
where the change of rates of return have to be taken into account.
Chapter 5 investigates the international spillover effects of ageing and pen-
sions when the PAYG country uses government debt to cope with the costs
of ageing. This scenario may occur when governments in PAYG countries do
not reform their pension system (like in Chapter 3) and do not adjust PAYG
contributions or -benefits immediately (like in Chapter 2) to spare the initial
generations that suffer most from ageing. This will benefit these initial genera-
tions, but future generations will lose as government debt crowds out capital.
The utility effects spill over to the funded country that does not use govern-
ment debt. The initial generations gain from the higher rates of return, while
later generations are affected negatively because wage levels fall. This implies
that the use of government debt by the PAYG country increases both the posi-
tive short-run spillovers and the negative long-run spillovers of ageing for the
funded country.
High levels of government debt may give governments an incentive to lobby
for surprise inflation at the central bank as this will reduce the fiscal burden
of debt service. The question is of course whether the central bank will give in
and create unexpected inflation. We assume that the decision-making process
about monetary policy is not completely transparent. In that case the mone-
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tary authority might not be completely independent and may have an incen-
tive to inflate away nominal debt. We show that in a closed-economy setting
unexpected inflation is a zero-sum game. On the one hand, the government
gains from unexpected inflation as it decreases the real value of government
debt and the real return on government bonds. On the other hand, the peo-
ple that invested in government bonds lose from the unexpected fall of the
real return on government bonds. In a closed economy the gain for the gov-
ernment is exactly high enough to compensate the people who lose from the
unexpected inflation shock. In a two-country model where one country relies
on PAYG pensions and the other country has a fully-funded pension scheme,
however, the PAYG country gains from unexpected inflation at the cost of the
funded country. This means that there may be a conflict of interest on mone-
tary policy when countries with different pension schemes form a monetary
union. The reason for this result is that residents of the funded country hold
a relatively large share of the total amount of government bonds because they
save more and have a more conservative portfolio than people in the PAYG
country. This implies that the PAYG country can export part of the inflationary
tax on debt holders to the funded country, while it still receives the full gain of
a lower debt burden and a net gain results. So when a PAYG country forms a
monetary union with a funded country it has an incentive to put pressure on
the central bank to increase inflation unexpectedly. This gain of unexpected
inflation for a PAYG country rises with the amount of nominal government
debt. In the coming decades the ageing of the population will put the public
finances more under pressure. In case PAYG countries finance their increased
pension obligations by issuing more debt, the incentive of PAYG governments
to lobby for surprise inflation will rise. On the other hand will unexpected
inflation harm funded countries more if PAYG countries issue large amounts
of nominal government debt. The conflicts of interest on monetary policy be-
tween PAYG- and funded countries may therefore be reinforced if population
ageing raises government debt in PAYG countries.
If the decision-making process of the central bank is not completely trans-
parent, it is not clear how the central bank will react to these conflicting inter-
ests about the creation of inflation between PAYG- and funded countries. As
a consequence, there will be more uncertainty about what the final outcome
for inflation will be and inflation risk may rise with the level of government
debt in PAYG countries. Higher inflation risk makes government bonds less
attractive to hold and the rate of return on bonds will rise relative to the return
on equity (i.e., the equity premium falls) to induce people to buy the existing
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stock of government bonds. This increases the debt tax and lowers savings
and the capital-labour ratio, and both countries experience negative utility ef-
fects from the rise in inflation risk. Actually, the PAYG country experiences
negative spillover effects from the fact that they form a monetary union with
a funded country in case inflation risk increases. This result arises because the
funded country owns a relatively large part the government bonds and people
in the funded country are more risk averse as they do not receive a safe PAYG
pension benefit. This implies that these people need to be compensated more
in order to hold the more risky government bonds, that is, the rate of return
on government bonds has to rise to a larger extent when a funded pension
scheme is in place. The rise in the debt tax and its negative consequences will
therefore be larger in the PAYG country when it forms a monetary union with
a country that uses a fully-funded pension scheme instead of a PAYG pension
system.
All the scenarios analysed in this chapter show that in the long run funded
countries are affected even more negatively by the fact that other countries in
the monetary union rely on PAYG-financed pensions when these countries use
government debt to cope with the ageing costs. The use of government debt
itself has negative long-run spillover effects for funded countries. Moreover,
a high debt burden may lead to unexpected inflation or a rise in inflation risk,
which both increase the negative spillover effects even more. In the coming
decades it will therefore be important for funded countries that the rules of the
Stability and Growth Pact are met, so that debt levels of PAYG countries do
not rise to too high levels. The use of government debt by PAYG countries to
cope with the costs of ageing benefits the initial generations in these countries
that suffer most from ageing. Future generations, however, are harmed by the
larger debt burden. In a monetary union part of this burden can be shifted to
the funded country and the debt burden can be reduced by an unexpected rise
in inflation when the PAYG country successfully lobbies at the central bank. If
this lobbying only raises perceived inflation risk, the negative effects of a rise
in the riskiness of government bonds in response to a higher level of public
debt cannot be shared with the funded country, however. It may therefore
also be in the interest of PAYG countries to obey the fiscal constraints stated in
the Stability and Growth Pact to prevent large increases in government debt,
which may raise inflation risk. Moreover, it is important for all countries that
a central bank like the ECB is independent, credible and transparent, so that it
is clear how monetary policy is determined and the risk of inflation does not
rise when debt levels are high.

CHAPTER 2
INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERS OF PENSIONS
UNDER AGEING1
2.1 Introduction
In the coming decades, differences in the extent and the timing of ageing in the
developed world will lead to international spillover effects through the capi-
tal market. This has been established in an extensive literature, starting with a
seminal paper by Cutler et al. (1990), followed by a number of papers present-
ing simulation experiments with large multi-country overlapping-generations
models (see for example Attanasio et al., 2006, Börsch-Supan et al., 2006, Brooks,
2003, Domeij and Flodén, 2006, Fehr et al., 2005).
Less attention, however, has been paid to a second possible reason for inter-
national spillover effects in case of ageing, i.e., differences in pension systems
between countries. Within the EMU, for example, there are large differences in
pension arrangements. Some countries, such as the Netherlands, have large
funded schemes, while other countries, e.g., Italy and Germany, rely almost
completely on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems. Together with differences in
the institutional set-up of PAYG schemes this causes savings in the various
countries to react differently to the ageing of the population, even if the pat-
tern of ageing is identical across countries. In a common capital market, these
1This chapter is based on Adema et al. (2008a).
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differences in savings will spill over to other countries.
The aim of this chapter is to explore the international spillover effects of a
symmetric ageing shock when countries in a common capital market have
different pension systems. In other words, we want to shed light on the ques-
tion how, in case of population ageing, a country with an extensive funded
pension scheme (e.g., the Netherlands) is affected by the fact that other EMU
countries (such as Italy) rely to a relatively large extent on unfunded pensions,
and vice versa.
Some studies (for example Casarico, 2001, van Groezen, 2003, Jousten and
Legros, 2002) investigate what happens with capital flows when two coun-
tries that differ in the degree of funding of their pension systems integrate
their capital markets. Casarico (2001) finds that the young and the future gen-
erations in the PAYG country are better off in the open economy equilibrium.
In the funded country, however, welfare can either increase or decrease for
the young and future generations. So it is not necessarily true, as one might
expect, that both countries gain from the integration of capital markets. In
contrast to the above-mentioned papers, we study the consequences of ageing
given that countries have an integrated capital market but different pension
arrangements. To our knowledge this chapter is one of the first studies taking
this approach. One exception is the paper by Börsch-Supan et al. (2006) who
also allow for differences in the generosity of public PAYG pension schemes.
In contrast to that paper, we develop a simple model that enables us to derive
an analytical solution of the transition path, in order to gain insight into the
underlying mechanisms of the results.
We use a two-country two-period overlapping-generations model where one
country has a PAYG pension system and the other country has a fully-funded
retirement scheme. The countries are identical in all other respects and are
hit by an identical demographic shock. Two typical variants of the PAYG
scheme are distinguished: a defined-benefit scheme where the working gener-
ation bears the burden of an ageing population by paying higher taxes, and a
defined-contribution scheme where the burden of ageing lies with the elderly.
Moreover, we consider two forms of population ageing, namely an increase in
longevity and a decrease in fertility.
We find that, in general, a country with funded pensions is in the long run
adversely affected by the existence of a PAYG scheme in the other country.
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This means that a country using a funded system is more vulnerable to an
ageing shock when it has a common capital market with a country relying on
PAYG pensions. In the short run, however, the spillover effects may be oppo-
site: generations born in the country with the funded pension scheme around
the time of the demographic shock may gain from the fact that the other coun-
try has a PAYG scheme. The reason for this is that the rise in the capital-labour
ratio, resulting from the ageing shock, is smaller in case the funded coun-
try has integrated capital markets with a country that uses a PAYG pension
scheme instead of a funded system. As a result the fall in the interest rate,
which especially harms these initial generations, is less.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents the
benchmark model. In Section 2.3 we discuss the spillover effects when age-
ing is modelled as an increase in longevity, first in case of a defined-benefit
PAYG scheme and then shortly for the case of defined contributions. Section
2.4 deals with modifications of the model. We analyse the spillover effects
with a decline of fertility instead of an increase in longevity (2.4.1) and with
a more general type of utility function (2.4.2). Moreover, we discuss how the
results would change in case of some other modifications, like proportional
taxation and endogenous labour supply (2.4.3). The final section concludes.
2.2 The model
Following Buiter (1981), we use a two-period overlapping-generations model
of an open economy. The world consists of two countries, country P and
country F, and the only difference between the two countries is the way the
pensions are financed. Country P uses a PAYG system and country F has a
fully-funded retirement scheme.
2.2.1 Demographics
Both economies are populated with non-altruistic, identical individuals who
live for at most two periods. So in each period both a young and old genera-
tion are alive. We assume that an agent born at t lives throughout old age with
probability εt+1. εt can be interpreted as average longevity; when εt rises, the
expected lifespan of people is longer.
The active population, Lit, is supposed to increase at the same exogenous rate
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(1 + nj) (2.1)
where Li0 is the initial population size in country i, i = P, F. A decrease in
nt can be interpreted as a fall in the fertility rate. As the countries may differ
in their initial population size, the model allows for scale differences between




= ν, so if LP0 is normalised to 1, then ν tells us the
relative size of LF0 .
2.2.2 Production
All variables in the model are expressed as the amount per young individual
in the country. For example, kit stands for the amount of capital per young
individual in period t in country i. Production per young individual is de-
scribed by a standard neoclassical constant-returns-to-scale production func-
tion, f (kit). Perfect competition among producers results in the usual equi-
librium conditions, rit = f
′(kit)− δ and wit = f (kit)− kit f ′(kit), where rit is the
interest rate, wit denotes the real wage, and δ is the depreciation rate of cap-
ital. There is perfect capital mobility between the two countries, but labour
is immobile. Since capital can freely move across countries, the interest rates
will be equalised, i.e., rPt = r
F
t = rt, ∀t. As both countries are endowed with
the same production technology, we have kPt = k
F





The government in country P runs a PAYG pension system, that is, the pension
benefits of the elderly (zPt ) are covered by lump-sum taxes of the young (τ
P
t ).
Since, at time t, there are εtLPt−1 old agents and L
P






In country F, the government invests the contributions of the young (τFt )
and returns them with interest in the next period in the form of transfers to
2Throughout this chapter, both economies are assumed to be dynamically efficient, i.e.,
rt > nt, ∀t.
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the then old agents (zFt+1). As only a fraction of εt+1 of young people born at
t survives to period t + 1, the contributions of those who deceased will fall to


























where ρ > 0 stands for the (constant) pure rate of time preference of an indi-
vidual, cy,it is consumption when young, and c
o,i
t+1 is consumption in the second
period of life.
Young agents inelastically supply one unit of labour. We assume perfect
annuity markets, which implies that the assets of those who deceased are dis-
tributed among the people who survived. The total return on savings is there-










Maximising lifetime utility with respect to the lifetime budget constraint gives
the following expressions for individual optimal savings in both countries:
sPt =
εt+1




− 1 + ρ








1 + ρ + εt+1
wt (2.7)
Note that optimal savings in country F do not depend on the interest rate. The
reason is that, given a logarithmic utility function, the intertemporal substitu-
tion elasticity is equal to one. For the same reason, optimal savings in country
P only react to the interest rate because it changes the net present value of the
pension benefit.
2.2.5 Equilibrium international capital market
Individuals invest their savings either in the home country or abroad. Their
portfolios will be composed such that interest rates are equalised. Equilibrium
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= (1 + ν)(1 + nt+1)kt+1 (2.8)
From equations (2.6) and (2.7), it can be seen that country F has higher savings
than country P, implying that country F exports capital abroad.
2.3 Increase in longevity
One of the causes of population ageing is that people live longer. Therefore,
in this section, we analyse the international spillover effects when longevity
increases permanently at t = 0. The demographic shock is unexpected, i.e.,
people do not adjust their behaviour in the period before the shock. More-
over, the size and the timing of the ageing shock is the same in both countries.
As a result, ageing will induce capital flows between the two countries only
because the pension systems differ.
We employ the method of comparative dynamics, adopted from Judd (1982),
to calculate the effect of the longevity shock analytically. The probability of
reaching the second period of life at time t is given by:
εt = ε + πht (2.9)
where ε denotes the initial steady-state value3, ht describes the time pattern of
a perturbation of this steady-state value and π reflects the magnitude of this
perturbation. Ageing is reflected by a positive value of ht4. To focus solely
on the effects of an increase in longevity we assume that there is no popula-
tion growth, i.e., nt ≡ 0 ∀t. The effects of an ageing shock can be traced by
linearising the capital-accumulation equation (2.8) with respect to π around
the initial steady state. The resulting first-order difference equation for kt de-
scribes the capital-labour ratio changes over time and the determining factors.
Given the change in the capital-labour ratio we can derive the changes in all
other variables.
First, we explain the effects of an increase in longevity when the PAYG sys-
tem is characterised by defined benefits. After that we shortly describe what
3Throughout the chapter, we omit time subscripts to denote the (initial) steady-state value
of the respective variable.
4Because we assume that longevity increases permanently, this means that h0 = h1 = . . . =
h∞ > 0. However, as people do not anticipate the rise in longevity we have that Et=−1(h0) =
0.
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changes when the PAYG system is characterised by defined contributions in-
stead.
2.3.1 Defined benefits
This section analyses the international spillover effects of population ageing
in case the PAYG scheme is characterised by defined benefits. In terms of the
model this means that the pension benefit in country P is fixed at zP (zPt =
zP ∀t). This implies that in response to a longer expected lifespan taxes have
to increase to keep the PAYG scheme balanced. So the burden of ageing is
entirely borne by the working population.
The change in the capital-labour ratio
Using the method described above we obtain the following first-order differ-
ence equation for the evolution of the capital-labour ratio5:
∂kFPt+1
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where Ψ ≡ (1 + ρ + ε)− (1+ρ)εz
P f ′′(k)
(1+ν)(1+r)2 > 0.
Equation (2.10) shows the change in the capital-labour ratio after an increase
in longevity when the two economies have different pension schemes. To
analyse the international spillover effects we derive the same kind of equa-
tions for the situation where the two economies use the same pension system.
The first-order difference equation for the case where both countries have a
PAYG scheme is given by:
∂kPPt+1
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5In Appendix 2.A we show the derivation of this expression.
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while the expression for the change in kt+1 in case both economies use a
funded system is given by:
∂kFFt+1
∂π








ΨF(1 + ρ + ε)
ht+1 (2.12)
with ΨP ≡ (1 + ρ + ε)− (1+ρ)εz
P f ′′(k)
(1+r)2 > 0 and Ψ
F ≡ (1 + ρ + ε) > 0.
By comparing the capital-labour ratio changes in case the two countries have
the same pension system (equations (2.11) and (2.12)) with the change in the
capital-labour ratio when the two countries have different pension schemes
(equation (2.10)), we derive the pure spillover effects of pensions and ageing
in a common capital market6,7.
As the increase in longevity at t = 0 is not anticipated, savings at t = −1
do not adjust and, as a result, the capital stock per worker does not change
at the time of the shock, that is, ∂k0∂π = 0. At t = 0, there are several effects
that influence optimal savings in both countries in different directions. First
of all, people have more incentives to save because the chance of reaching
the second period of life is higher (this effect is indicated by a 1 in the first-
order difference equations). In country P, however, the existence of PAYG
pension benefits has a depressing effect on savings when longevity goes up.
The reason for this effect (indicated by a 2) is that the present value of the
pension benefit rises, which raises lifetime income and thus consumption in
both periods of life. For a given net wage income, the increase in consumption
when young implies lower savings. Moreover, with a defined-benefit PAYG
pension scheme, savings decrease as contributions have to go up to keep the
PAYG system balanced (this is the so-called dependency-ratio effect, indicated by
a 3). So the effect on total savings, and the capital-labour ratio, is ambiguous.
From equation (2.10) it follows that, given that ht = ht+1, the capital-labour




(1 + ρ)(1 + r) w
ε(1 + ρ)(1 + r) + (1 + ρ)2 + ε(1 + ρ + ε)(1 + r)
(2.13)
6To exclude the effects of integration it is assumed that the initial steady state is the same
in all cases.
7Assuming that both countries have the same type of pension system and comparing this
to the situation where each adopts a different scheme is the same as comparing the open
equilibrium to the closed-economy outcome: when both countries have the same pension
design and when they are subject to the same ageing shock, there are no international capital
flows and therefore it is as if the countries were closed.
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As shown in Appendix 2.B.1 this condition holds in the benchmark case (see
footnote 9) as long as τP < 0.6w. For other parameter values the PAYG system
can be even larger. Therefore, we can say that for realistic parameter values,
the capital-labour ratio increases after a rise in longevity when one country
has a PAYG scheme and the other country uses a funded system8.
The increase in the common capital-labour ratio at t = 1 leads to higher
wages, which engenders higher savings in both countries (this is the first term
in the three equations). Due to these higher savings the capital-labour ratio
continues to rise.
Savings unambiguously rise more in the funded country than in the PAYG
country, as effects 2 and 3 do not appear in equation (2.12). When the funded
country has a common capital market with a PAYG country, part of its extra
savings flow to country P. To illustrate the mechanics of the model we also
show some numerical simulation experiments9. The change in the capital-
labour ratio for the three different cases can be seen in Figure 2.1. In the steady
Figure 2.1: Change in kt
















8The appendix also shows, however, that in case both countries have a PAYG scheme the
contribution rate does not have to be unrealistically high for the capital-labour ratio to decrease
after a longevity shock. This would not change the international spillover effects qualitatively,
however.
9The graphs are based on simulations with f (kt) = k0.3t , ν = 1,
τP
w = 0.2, ε = 0.94 and
ht = 0.05. Capital depreciates at 5% per year and assuming that one period is 30 years this
means that δ = 1− (0.95)30 = 0.7854. Agents are relatively patient with a time preference
rate of 1% per year, so that ρ = (1.01)30 − 1 = 0.3478. We also derived numerically the non-
linear transition path and compared the numerical results with those found with the method
of comparative dynamics. The relative error of the linearised path was one percent at most.
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state k = 0.12, which implies that the capital-labour ratio rises by about 3.6%
in the benchmark case where one country uses a PAYG scheme and the other
country relies on fully-funded pensions (dkPF).
The change in utility
To infer whether a country gains or loses from being in an integrated capital
market with a country that has another pension system, we compare the utility
effects of ageing in the different cases. In Appendix 2.C we derive the long-run


















The last term indicates that for a given production capacity, an increase in
longevity leads to a lower utility as individuals have to share total life-time
consumption with more people10. As explained in Appendix 2.C.1 the whole
term in front of ∂k∞∂ε∞ is positive, which implies that a rise in the capital-labour
ratio, resulting from an increase in longevity, has positive utility effects. There
are two reasons for this result. First, a higher capital-labour ratio leads to a
lower interest rate, which is good for the country that borrows money on the
international capital market (the PAYG country). Second, a lower interest rate
means that the economy is closer to the Golden Rule point (r = n). This means
that the rise in the capital-labour ratio after an increase in longevity reduces
the direct negative utility effects. However, this indirect positive effect on
utility is a second-order effect and, therefore, not large enough to compensate
for the negative utility effects, as can also be seen in Figure 2.2.
The rise in the capital-labour ratio is larger in case the PAYG country is in a
common capital market with a funded country instead of with a PAYG coun-
try. As a result, in the long run the PAYG country gains from having a common
capital market with a country that has a fully-funded pension scheme. Notice,
however, that the spillovers are exactly opposite for the generation born at the
time of the ageing shock (t = 0). The reason for this is that the fall in the in-
terest rate resulting from the rise in the capital-labour ratio, which especially
harms this initial generation, is less in case both countries use a PAYG system.
10In order to compare lifetime utility before and after ageing properly, we take the value of
εt constant at unity. So we do not take into account that a higher life expectancy is actually
something that is nice for people. If this is taken into account the overall utility effects of an
increase in longevity are still negative, however. An increase in longevity only results in a
higher utility if people can work longer. We leave this for future research.
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As these initial generations do not enjoy the gains that result from a larger
increase in wages when the economies have different pension schemes, the
negative utility effects of the lower interest rate are smaller in case the PAYG
country does not have a common capital market with a country using a funded
pension system.
Figure 2.2: Change in UPt











Figure 2.3: Change in UFt


























Again there is the direct negative effect on utility because consumption has to
be shared with more people. For the funded country, however, it is not nec-
essarily true that a higher capital-labour ratio results in a higher utility. As
explained in Appendix 2.C.2, there are two opposing mechanisms that can
make the whole expression in front of ∂k∞∂ε∞ either negative or positive. First,
we have the positive Golden Rule effect we also had for the PAYG country:
a higher capital-labour ratio is good for the funded country because a lower
interest rate causes the economy to be closer to its Golden Rule point. On the
other hand, a lower interest rate is bad for the funded country as it is a lender
on the international capital market. In Appendix 2.C.2 we show that for realis-
tic values of the various parameters the positive Golden Rule effect dominates
the negative interest rate effect, implying that a rise in the capital-labour ratio
has positive utility effects in the funded country. Because the capital-labour
ratio increases less in case the funded country has a common capital market
with a PAYG country rather than with a funded-pension country, the fall in
utility in country F is larger in the former case. So the funded country expe-
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riences negative spillover effects from the PAYG country in the long run, as
shown in Figure 2.3.
As was the case for the PAYG country, the short-run spillovers are opposite
to the spillovers in the long run. The reason is that the initial generations only
incur the losses that result from a falling interest rate, they do not have the
gains from the higher wages. As the fall in the interest rate is larger in case
both countries use a fully-funded system these generations experience a larger
utility loss. Notice that the effect of interest rate decreases have more impact in
the funded country than in the PAYG country, as households save more in the
funded country. As a result, it takes more generations to invert the spillover
effects.
In these simulation graphs we assumed that the two economies have the
same size, that is, ν = 1. However, as most EMU countries mainly use PAYG
pension schemes, a country like the Netherlands, relying to a relatively large
extent on funded pensions, can be considered as relatively small. In case the
funded country is smaller than the PAYG country, that is, when ν < 1, the
negative spillover effects for the funded country become larger.
2.3.2 Defined contributions
If the PAYG pension system is characterised by defined contributions, the
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The only difference with equation (2.10) is the dependency-ratio effect (in-
dicated by a 3 in both equations). In case of defined benefits, the higher de-
pendency ratio led to less savings because contributions had to rise to keep
the PAYG system balanced. With a fixed PAYG tax, however, pension benefits
are reduced due to a higher dependency-ratio, which increases savings. This
implies that the capital-labour ratio increases more in case the PAYG scheme
is characterised by defined contributions, resulting in a smaller decrease in
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utility after a longevity shock. However, as shown formally in Appendix 2.D,
savings in country F still increase more than in country P, so that the rise in
the capital-labour ratio is smaller when country F has integrated capital mar-
kets with a country that uses a PAYG pension system. This can also be seen
in Figure 2.411. In the long run, this results in positive spillover effects for the
Figure 2.4: Change in kt
















PAYG country and negative spillovers for the funded country. It should be
noticed, however, that the spillovers are smaller than in the defined-benefits
case.
Our main findings can be summarised as follows:
Result 2.1 In case ageing is characterised by an unexpected increase in longevity:
1. Savings in the funded country unambiguously rise more than in the PAYG
country, which leads to capital flows from the funded country to the PAYG
country.
2. In the long run, the funded country experiences negative spillover effects from
the PAYG scheme in the other country.
3. The short-run spillovers are opposite to the spillovers in the long run.
4. The spillovers are smaller in case the PAYG pension system is characterised by
defined contributions compared to a defined-benefit PAYG scheme.
11The capital-labour ratio now rises by about 5.4% due to the larger increase of savings in
the PAYG country.
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2.4 Modifications
In this section the analysis presented above is modified in several ways to
investigate the robustness of our results. First, we study the international
spillover effects in case population ageing is caused by a lower fertility rate.
Second, we consider a more general type of utility function. More precisely,
we analyse whether the spillover effects change when preferences are rep-
resented by a CES utility function instead of a logarithmic utility function.
Finally, we briefly discuss some other modifications.
2.4.1 Decrease in fertility
The ageing of the population in the industrialised world is not only caused by
the fact that people live longer. Another important reason is that women give
birth to a smaller number of children, that is, the fertility rate is declining.
In this section, we analyse the spillover effects of pensions and population
ageing in case of an unanticipated permanent decrease in fertility at t = 0.
As before, we employ the method of comparative dynamics. Let the fertility
rate at time t be given by nt = n + πgt. Ageing is reflected by a negative
value of gt12. To isolate the effects of a fertility decline, it is assumed that
agents live throughout their old-age with certainty, i.e., εt ≡ 1 ∀t. And again
we distinguish between a defined-benefit and a defined-contribution PAYG
scheme.
The main difference with a longevity shock is that a decline in the rate of
population growth leads to a shrinking labour force, so that less investment
is needed to keep the capital-labour ratio constant. This so-called capital-
thickening effect has a direct positive effect on the capital-labour ratio. As a
result of this capital-thickening effect, a fall in fertility can actually have posi-
tive utility effects for individuals.
12A permanent fall in fertility implies that g0 = g1 = . . . = g∞ < 0, but as the decline in
fertility is not anticipated Et=−1(g0) = 0.
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Defined benefits

















with ∆ ≡ (2 + ρ)− (1+ρ)z
P f ′′(k)
(1+ν)(1+r)2 > 0.
The just described capital-thickening effect is indicated by a 4 in equation
(2.17). As before the fall in fertility has a dependency-ratio effect in the PAYG
country (effect 3), which affects savings negatively in case of a defined-benefit
system13. Because the country with the funded pension system does not have
the negative dependency-ratio effect, the capital-labour ratio increases more
when this country is not integrated with country P. Figure 2.5 confirms these
results14. Note that, due to the capital-thickening effect, the rise in the capital-
labour ratio is much larger after a fall in fertility compared to an increase in
longevity. In particular, in the steady state k = 0.13, which implies that the
capital-labour ratio rises by about 12.6% in the benchmark case where one
country uses a PAYG scheme and the other country relies on fully-funded pen-
sion (dkPF).
Figure 2.5: Change in kt











13As in section 2.3.1 we can derive a condition that has to hold for the capital-labour ratio
to rise after an ageing shock. From equation (2.17) it follows that, given gt = gt+1, kt rises
after a permanent decline in the fertility rate if z
P
1+ν < (2 + ρ)k. As shown in Appendix 2.B.2
this condition holds for a large range of parameter values.
14In these simulation graphs it is assumed that the population size is constant in the initial
steady state (n = 0). Assuming a positive population growth rate in the original steady state
does not qualitatively change our results. We take gt = −0.1.
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Figures 2.6 and 2.7 illustrate the effects of the decrease in fertility on utility
in the PAYG country and the funded country respectively. Notice that lifetime
utility is higher in the funded country in the long run as compared to the initial
steady state, which is due to the capital-thickening effect. In the PAYG country
the long-run utility effects are negative however, as in our benchmark simu-
lation the dependency-ratio effect dominates the capital-thickening effect. In
case the PAYG system is not too large, that is, when the dependency-ratio ef-
fect is not too large, people in country P also experience positive utility effects
of a fall in fertility in the long run. From simulations it follows that this is the
case if τP < 0.13w.
Figure 2.6: Change in UPt












Figure 2.7: Change in UFt












The international spillover effects of a fertility shock can also be seen from
these graphs. Figure 2.7 shows that in the long run, individuals in country
F experience negative spillover effects from the PAYG scheme in the other
country. That is, utility rises more in the long run if country F has a common
capital market with a country that also has funded pensions. People in the
PAYG country, however, gain in the long run from having integrated capital
markets with a country that uses a funded pension system (Figure 2.6). In
the short run the spillovers are opposite to the effects in the long run as was
the case in Section 2.3.1. So the international spillover effects do not change
qualitatively compared to the effects of the longevity shock.
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Defined contributions
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 gt+1 (2.18)
As in Section 2.3.2, the dependency-ratio effect (effect 3) works in the opposite
direction as in the defined-benefit case, i.e., leads to higher savings as pension
benefits have to decrease after a fall in fertility15. As a result, this effect intensi-
fies the capital-thickening effect, so that individuals in the PAYG country now
also experience positive long-run utility effects of a fertility decline. Moreover,
because the funded country has no dependency-ratio effect, the capital-labour
ratio actually rises less in this country. This means that the spillover effects
turn around, this holds both for the short run and the long run, so that in the
long run citizens in country P suffer and those living in country F gain from
having an integrated capital market with a country that uses another pension
scheme. Figure 2.8, however, shows that the difference between the change in
kt in the two countries is very small, especially in the long run. This implies
that these opposite spillovers are also very small. Moreover, the next section
shows that these spillovers are not robust to changes in the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution.
Figure 2.8: Change in kt











15This implies that the rise in the capital-labour ratio is larger, i.e., the long-run rise of kFPt
is about 16%.
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2.4.2 CES utility function
The results presented until now are based on a logarithmic utility function,
which means that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ) is equal to




that our assumption of σ = 1 is probably not very realistic. Therefore, we also
simulated the model for smaller values of σ17. If σ < 1 the income effect is
larger than the substitution effect, and a falling interest rate leads to higher
savings. This positive effect on savings is largest in the funded country, be-
cause it has the highest savings in the initial steady state. Consequently, the
negative spillover effects for the funded country in case σ = 1 will only be
reinforced if σ < 1. This gives the following result:
Result 2.2 The findings stated in Result 1 do not change if the intertemporal elastic-
ity of substitution is smaller than one.
In the previous subsection it was shown that in case of a fertility shock and
a defined-contributions PAYG scheme, savings in country P increased more
than in country F when σ = 1, resulting in small positive spillover effects for
the funded country. For a small enough value of σ, however, the interest-
rate effect of σ < 1 dominates the dependency-ratio effect, so that savings in
country F increase more than in country P. This is illustrated below, where
the change in kt for σ = 14 is shown
18. This means that the funded country
experiences negative spillover effects of the PAYG scheme as in the other cases.
So we can conclude that for smaller and probably more realistic values for the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution the long-run spillovers for the funded
country are negative in all considered cases.
The main result of a fertility decline is:
Result 2.3 In case ageing is characterised by an unexpected decrease in fertility, for
realistic values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution the PAYG scheme causes
negative spillovers to the funded country in the long run, while in the short run the
spillovers are positive. So the spillovers do not differ qualitatively from those in case
of an increase in longevity.
16Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) for example assume a value of 14 .
17For expositional clarity, we do not show the analytical expressions for the case of a CES
utility function.
18Note that rise in kt is much larger due to the fact that savings rise in response to lower
interest rates in case σ < 1. In particular, the rise of kPFt is about 30% in the long run (k = 0.12).
CHAPTER 2 51
Figure 2.9: Change in kt















2.4.3 Possible other modifications
In this subsection we discuss the effects of some other possible modifications
to our model. We contend that, in general, these modifications do not qualita-
tively affect our results.
Anticipated and asymmetric shocks
So far we have only analysed unexpected demographic shocks. It is often
argued, however, that the demographic changes that characterise population
ageing are largely anticipated. Therefore, we also studied the results of an
increase in longevity and a decrease in fertility that is anticipated one period
before the shock actually takes place. Only the short-run effects of the shocks
are slightly different in this case, the long-run results are identical to the ones
presented in the previous sections. Differences are largest in case of an antici-
pated increase in longevity and a defined-benefits PAYG scheme. In that case
savings already adjust in the period before the shock, which leads to a rise
in the capital-labour ratio at t = 0 as a net result of effects 1 and 2 in equa-
tions (2.10)-(2.12). Just as with an unexpected shock, from t = 0 on there is
a dependency-ratio effect which negatively affects the capital-labour ratio in
the next period. As a result of this, in case both countries use a PAYG system,
the increase in kt at t = 1 is smaller than at t = 0. The spillover effects are not
qualitatively different, however.
A further robustness check is to assume asymmetric ageing, i.e., longevity
or fertility may change more in one country than in the other. The model can
easily be extended to allow for this. Let us consider two extreme cases: ageing
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only in country F and ageing only in country P. In the former case, savings
will only increase in the funded country which obviously leads to a large capi-
tal flow from country F to country P and thus reinforces our results. In the lat-
ter case, savings will only increase in the PAYG country. This clearly reverses
the spillover effect: capital now flows from the ageing unfunded country to
the funded country. Due to the PAYG pensions, the capital flow in this case
is smaller than in the opposite one. Therefore, when both extremes cases are
combined as we did in our model, a net capital flow from country F to country
P results.
Proportional taxes
Our basic model assumes lump-sum taxes, but of course, it would be more re-
alistic to assume proportional taxes. Given the assumption of inelastic labour
supply, it can easily be shown, however, that proportional taxes would only
complicate the analytical expressions but do not qualitatively change our re-
sults. In particular, assuming proportional taxes would result in a smaller
dependency-ratio effect because the rise in taxes can be less as a result of the
increase in wages. This, in turn, would imply smaller spillover effects.
Endogenous labour supply
At first sight, one might presume that allowing for proportional taxes in
combination with endogenous labour supply could qualitatively change the
spillover effects. We argue, however, that endogenous labour supply may re-
duce but most likely not reverse the international spillover effects derived in
our basic model.
It should first be noted that, given the assumption of perfect capital mobility,
gross wages are always equal in both countries. Thus, as labour supply reacts
to changes in net wages, there can only be differences in the spillovers via
the capital market (compared to the situation with fixed labour supply) when
PAYG contributions change. Hence, endogenous labour supply can only affect
our results in case the pension scheme in the PAYG country is characterised
by defined benefits. In case of defined contributions, the results of our basic
model remain in full force also when labour supply is elastic.
Now let us look at the case of defined benefits and assume that labour sup-
ply in a country rises when net wages rise. In that case, after an increase
in longevity, labour supply rises in the funded country relative to the PAYG
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country, the reason being that gross wages are equal and PAYG contributions
rise in country P. The relative increase in labour supply in the funded coun-
try has two effects. Firstly, as especially in the funded country a large part
of wage income is saved, the relative increase in labour supply in country F
will increase savings in this country even more than with fixed labour supply,
thus reinforcing the capital flow from country F to country P. On the other
hand, the increase in relative labour supply tends to increase the return on
capital in this country which will reduce the capital flow to the PAYG coun-
try as compared to the situation with fixed labour supply. Given these two
opposing effects, it is unlikely that the change in relative labour supply will
offset the primary effect on the capital flow due to the differences in savings
in both countries. This can only happen if the elasticity of labour supply is
high and changes in relative labour supply lead to large changes in the return
on capital, i.e., capital and labour are weak substitutes. This seems not very
likely. Empirical studies find that the labour supply elasticity is fairly small for
the principle earner of a household, see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for an
overview. Moreover, papers simulating large general equilibrium models of-
ten assume a Cobb-Douglas production function, i.e., a substitution elasticity
between capital and labour of one, see for example Altig et al. (2001).
One could also allow for the fact that a rise in longevity induces people to
work longer, i.e., increases the retirement age. The rise in savings after an in-
crease in longevity will be smaller in both countries in that case. Moreover,
the adjustment of PAYG contributions or PAYG pension benefits can be less
because the increase in the dependency ratio will be smaller. The spillover ef-
fects will not change qualitatively, however, as savings in the funded country
still rise more than in the PAYG country.
Imperfect annuity markets
Our basic model assumes perfect annuity markets. Although all savings in
our model are pension savings that in principle could be organised in pension
funds, this may be considered a strong assumption. However, relaxing this
assumption would probably only reinforce our results. In the absence of per-
fect annuity markets, households will have a stronger incentive to save for old
age. This especially holds true in the funded country where there is no other
source of old-age income than private savings. It is therefore likely that with
imperfect annuity markets the capital flows from the funded to the unfunded
country will be larger.
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Bequests
In case of bequests, it is important to distinguish between intentional and un-
intentional bequests. Unintentional bequests are the result of the individual’s
uncertainty about his/her longevity. In our model, the individual is uncertain
whether (s)he will die at the end of period one or will live on in the second pe-
riod. It is assumed that this "risk" can be insured via perfect annuity markets,
so that there are no unintentional bequests. As argued above, unintentional
bequests, i.e., the absence of perfect annuity markets will reinforce our results.
Intentional bequests are deliberate transfers from one generation to the next
one at the end of life. Our basic model does not allow for such bequests. Intro-
ducing them will not qualitatively change our conclusions, but may reinforce
the spillover effects from the funded to the unfunded country. The latter will
happen when bequests and thus savings are smaller in the PAYG country be-
cause households in this country have a lower lifetime income as (assuming
dynamic efficiency) the return on the PAYG contribution is lower than that on
private savings.
2.5 Concluding remarks
In the coming decades, most European countries will have an ageing popu-
lation. These countries differ in the degree of funding of their pension sys-
tems. On the one hand there are countries like the UK and the Netherlands,
that have an extensive funded pension system. Most other countries, on the
other hand, mainly rely on unfunded pensions. These differences in pension
schemes engender different saving responses when the population is ageing,
which leads to capital flows. This chapter focuses on the question how, in
case of population ageing, countries are affected by the fact that other coun-
tries use other pension systems. We find that in the long run a PAYG country
gains from having a common capital market with a country relying on funded
pensions, the main reason being that in the funded country savings increase
more in response to ageing. A country using a funded retirement scheme, on
the other hand, experiences long-run negative spillover effects from the PAYG
system in the other country. The short-run spillovers, however, are opposite
to the spillovers in the long run. In other words, the initial generations in the
funded country gain from the fact that the other country uses a PAYG scheme,
whereas these initial generations in the PAYG country are negatively affected
by the funded system in the other country.
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We have shown that our results are quite robust for modifications to the basic
model used in this chapter. Extensions of the analysis that we leave for future
research would, for example, be to allow for endogenous labour supply and
the fact that an increase in longevity can also lengthen the working period of
people. Moreover, this chapter considers balanced PAYG pension systems, that
is, in response to population ageing contributions or pension benefits adjust
in such a way so that the PAYG scheme does not run a deficit. Governments in
funded countries, however, are mainly concerned about the negative effects of
unbalanced PAYG schemes. In other words, they worry how their country will
be affected when countries with PAYG schemes use government debt to cope
with the costs of ageing. In Chapter 5 we extend the model presented in this
chapter to allow for government debt. Moreover, by including inflation, it is
also possible to analyse the spillover effects in case governments put pressure
on the central bank to accommodate, so that their debt burden is reduced.
This chapter, however, already shows that countries with funded pensions are
mostly negatively affected by the fact that other countries have PAYG pension
schemes, even when the government of the PAYG country keeps its pension
system balanced.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
2.A Derivation first-order difference equation kt+1
In this appendix we derive the first-order difference equation for the evolution
of the capital-labour ratio given in equation (2.10). Linearising the capital-
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with Ψ ≡ (1 + ρ + ε)− (1+ρ)εz
P f ′′(k)
(1+ν)(1+r)2 .










Substituting these last two expressions into equation (2.24) we obtain equation
(2.10).
2.B Conditions for a long-run increase in k
2.B.1 Longevity shock
As explained in Section 2.3.1 the capital-labour ratio rises after a permanent




(1 + ρ)(1 + r) w
ε(1 + ρ)(1 + r) + (1 + ρ)2 + ε(1 + ρ + ε)(1 + r)
(2.27)
In the same way we can obtain a condition for the case where the PAYG coun-
try does not have a common capital market with a country that uses a funded
system:
zP <
(1 + ρ)(1 + r) w
ε(1 + ρ)(1 + r) + (1 + ρ)2 + ε(1 + ρ + ε)(1 + r)
(2.28)
Figures 2.10 and 2.11 show how the sign of these two conditions changes
for different parameter values19. For positive values on the vertical axis the
above conditions hold, and an increase in longevity leads to an increase in the
capital-labour ratio. The horizontal axis shows the relative size of the lump-
sum PAYG tax compared to the wage. As can be seen from Figure 2.10, con-
19The standard case is characterised by α = 0.3, ε = 0.94, ν = 1, δ = 0.7854, and ρ = 0.3478.
See also footnote 9 in the main text.
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Figure 2.10: Condition (2.27)














Figure 2.11: Condition (2.28)














dition (2.27) holds in the standard case as long as τP < 0.6w. For other pa-
rameter values the PAYG system can be even larger. Therefore we can say that
for realistic parameter values the capital-labour ratio increases after a rise in
longevity when one country has a PAYG scheme and the other country uses a
funded system.
In case both countries use a PAYG system (see Figure 2.11), the capital-labour
ratio only rises after a permanent increase in longevity as long as τP < 0.28w.
This is not an unrealistically high value for the contribution rate of the PAYG
system, especially when expenditures on medical care are included, implying
that the capital-labour ratio may actually fall after a rise in longevity when
both countries use a PAYG scheme. This is the point Fehr et al. (2005) make.
They argue that the increase in taxes needed to finance the benefits is so large
that the capital-labour ratio falls after an ageing shock. Most other studies that
use multi-country general equilibrium models, however, find that ageing in-
creases the capital stock per worker, see Attanasio et al. (2006), Börsch-Supan
et al. (2006), Brooks (2003), Domeij and Flodén (2006), McMorrow and Röger
(2004), Miles (2001). It appears, however, that the results of Fehr et al. (2005)
are mainly driven by the fact that the effective labour supply is rising due to
labour-augmenting technical progress, which more than offsets the reduction
in the labour force when the economy is ageing. But it is not obvious at all
whether technical progress will be able to offset the negative effects on the
supply of labour. Therefore, we follow the other studies and assume that an
increase in longevity results in a higher capital-labour ratio if both countries
rely on PAYG pensions when we present the simulation graphs in the main
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text20. The spillovers do not change qualitatively when kPPt falls instead, the
reason being that the spillovers depend on the relative change of kFFt to k
PP
t .
As the dependency-ratio effect is absent when both countries use funded pen-
sions, the capital-labour ratio unambiguously increases more in that case, that




As explained in footnote 13 the capital-labour ratio rises after a permanent
decline in fertility if:
zP
1 + ν
< (2 + ρ)k (2.29)
while this condition in case both countries have a PAYG pension scheme is
equal to:
zP < (2 + ρ)k (2.30)
As before we produce graphs that show how the sign of these two conditions
changes for different parameter values. Figure 2.12 shows that condition (2.29)
Figure 2.12: Condition (2.29)














Figure 2.13: Condition (2.30)














holds in the standard case as long as τP < 0.8w, while we can see from Figure
2.13 that condition (2.30) holds if τP < 0.55w. This means that in case ageing
is characterised by a fall in the fertility rate, the capital-labour ratio only falls
when the PAYG system is unrealistically large.
20The simulation graphs are based on the assumption that τP = 0.2w.
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2.C Effects on utility
In this appendix we derive the expressions for the long-run change of utility
in both countries. From these equations we can infer the relationship between
the change in the capital-labour ratio and utility.
2.C.1 PAYG country
First we derive the change of long-run utility in country P. Therefore we first






















































































































































21This equation shows the change in utility for a person living for two periods with cer-
tainty, i.e., ε = 1.
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∂π = 0, so that this




















Dividing this expression by ∂ε∞∂π , we get an expression for the change in U
P in


















The following things can be said about the terms in front of ∂k∞∂ε∞ :
1. f
′′(k)
cy,P(1+r) < 0, because f
′′(k) < 0.
2. sP − k(1 + r) < 0, because we know that sP < k(1 + n): country P is
a capital importer in the initial steady state. And because we assumed
dynamic efficiency (r > n), we know that k(1 + n) < k(1 + r). So that
sP < k(1 + r).
These two points imply that an increase in the capital-labour ratio, after an
increase in longevity, has positive utility effects. There are two reasons for this
result:
1. A higher capital-labour ratio leads to a lower interest rate, which is good
for the country that borrows money (the PAYG country).
2. Moreover, a lower interest rate means that the economy is closer to the
Golden Rule point (r = n).
As the rise in the capital-labour ratio is larger in case the PAYG country has
integrated capital markets with a country that uses a funded system instead
of PAYG system, utility is also higher in that case.
2.C.2 Funded country
Unfortunately it is not possible to draw such a clear conclusion for the country
that uses a funded pension system. The main intuition for this is as follows.
Again we have that a higher capital-labour ratio is good for the funded coun-
try, because a lower interest rate causes the economy to be closer to its Golden
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Rule point. On the other hand, a lower interest rate is bad for the funded
country because it is a lender of money. This can be shown more formally as
follows (using the same kind of technique used above for the PAYG country).













































Substituting the equations for consumption (2.39) and (2.40) into the equation
for utility (2.41), and using the same expressions for ∂w∞∂π and
∂r∞
∂π as before, the
































which is comparable to equation (2.38) for the PAYG country. As before we





is negative. But we cannot say anything
about the sign of the second term
(
(sF + τF)− k(1 + r)
)
. Firstly, we know
that in the initial steady state country F is a capital exporter, which means that
sF + τF > k(1 + n). Secondly, it holds that r > n, because we assume dy-
namic efficiency, implying that k(1 + r) > k(1 + n). So there are two opposing
mechanisms, meaning that we do not know whether sF + τF − k(1 + r) will
be negative or positive. The first effect reflects the fact that a lower interest
rate is bad for a country that is a lender on the international capital market,
the second effect is the Golden Rule effect. In case the first effect dominates
the second, sF + τF − k(1 + r) is positive and the whole term in front of ∂k∞∂ε∞
is negative, implying that an increase in the capital-labour ratio after an in-
crease in longevity actually affects utility negatively. On the other hand, when
the second effect dominates the first, we have the same result as for the PAYG
country: a higher capital-labour ratio leads to a higher utility in the funded
country. This is the same conclusion as in Casarico (2001). Below we present a
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graph that shows how the sign of sF + τF − k(1 + r) (vertical axis) changes for
various parameter values22. The horizontal axis shows the depreciation rate
(δ). This graph shows that sF + τF − k(1 + r) < 0 for different values of the
Figure 2.14: sF + τF − k(1 + r)














parameters, which means that the Golden Rule effect dominates the interest
rate effect. This in turn implies that for realistic parameter values, a rise in
the capital-labour ratio has positive utility effects in the funded country23. As
the capital-labour ratio increases more in case the funded country has a com-
mon capital market with a country that also uses a funded pension scheme,
opposed to a PAYG system, utility is higher in that case.
2.D Appendix to Section 2.3.2
In this appendix we prove that savings in the funded country still increase
more than in the PAYG country after a rise in longevity when the PAYG
scheme is characterised by defined contributions. This implies that the capital-
labour ratio in the funded country increases less in case it has a common cap-
ital market with a country using a PAYG pension system.
Savings in the funded country increase more than in the PAYG country after
22In the standard case we have the following parameter values: ρ = 0.3478, τ
P
w = 0.2, ν = 1,
α = 0.3, and ε = 0.94.
23It is actually possible to have sF + τF − k(1 + r) > 0. This is for example the case when
ρ = 0 and δ > 0.87. A time preference rate of zero is not very realistic, however. Therefore we
conclude that for realistic parameter values it holds that sF + τF − k(1 + r) < 0.
CHAPTER 2 65
an increase in longevity in case the following condition holds:
(1 + ρ)(w− τP)
ΨP(1 + ρ + ε)
− (1 + ρ)
2zP
ΨP(1 + ρ + ε)(1 + r)
+
(1 + ρ)τP
ΨP(1 + r) ε
<
(1 + ρ) w
ΨF(1 + ρ + ε)
(2.44)
which can written as:
ε(1 + ρ)(1 + r)(w− τP)− ε(1 + ρ)2 zP + (1 + ρ)(1 + ρ + ε) τP
ΨP(1 + ρ + ε)(1 + r) ε
<
(1 + ρ) w
ΨF(1 + ρ + ε)
(2.45)
where:




ΨF ≡ (1 + ρ + ε) > 0
and ΨP > ΨF.















ΨP , so that the right-hand side is always positive. This implies that equa-
tion (2.46) always holds and that the positive dependency-ratio effect in case
of defined contributions is not large enough to compensate for the negative
effects a PAYG system has in general, so that savings in the funded country
increase more than in the PAYG country.

CHAPTER 3
INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERS OF PENSION REFORM1
3.1 Introduction
In many developed countries ageing has led to a debate on reforming un-
funded pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social-security systems. One of the most dis-
cussed reform proposals is to switch to a more funded pension system where
people save for their own pensions, and realise a higher expected rate of re-
turn on their contributions (see for example Feldstein (2005) and Bovenberg
(2003)). Many countries with PAYG-financed pension schemes actually (are
planning to) implement such pension reforms. In a multicountry world with
integrated capital markets, such a switch to funding will engender spillover
effects to other countries. The aim of this chapter is to look at these interna-
tional spillover effects of pension reform. More specifically, we will analyse
how countries with funded pension systems are affected when countries with
PAYG pension schemes reform their pension system.
Some papers (e.g. Fehr et al. (2005), Börsch-Supan et al. (2006) and IN-
GENUE (2001)) that address pension reform issues in an open-economy
framework develop large multi-country overlapping-generation models to
study the effects of pension reform. These large-scale general equilibrium
models are particularly useful in case one wants to obtain reliable forecasts
1This chapter is based on Adema et al. (2008b).
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on several key economic variables. An important drawback of these models
is, however, that analytical solutions are not feasible and the underlying mech-
anisms of the results are not clear. We use a simple two-country two-period
overlapping-generations model with an integrated capital market, where one
country has a PAYG pension system and the other country has a fully-funded
retirement scheme. By keeping the model this simple, we are able to derive an
analytical solution for the transition path of the common capital-labour ratio,
and to derive the spillover effects of pension reform.
There are some other papers that study the open-economy aspects of pen-
sion schemes using smaller models. Pestieau et al. (2006) consider the issue of
the optimal PAYG scheme in a setting where the number of symmetric coun-
tries changes. They show that a rise in the number of countries implies larger
PAYG systems and less capital accumulation. Bräuninger (1999) focuses on
the optimal degree of social security funding in a two-country framework,
given that the two countries have identical social security systems in the ini-
tial steady state. He concludes that the optimal level of social security funding
is below the golden rule level. We, however, assume that the two countries use
different pension schemes in the initial steady state. Moreover, we do not con-
sider optimality issues, but investigate how pension reform in a PAYG country
affects a country with a fully-funded retirement scheme.
Casarico (2001) concentrates on the effects of the integration of capital mar-
kets of two countries that differ in the degree of funding of their pension sys-
tems. She finds that a country with a PAYG system gains from the switch to
perfect capital mobility. In contrast, we assume that the two countries already
have a common capital market. Casarico (2001) also shortly touches upon the
issue of pension reform in an open economy. We, however, consider different
pension reform scenarios, derive the full dynamic path for the capital-labour
ratio, show simulation graphs to clarify the mechanisms of the model further,
and distinguish between the case where PAYG contributions are distorting
and the case where the PAYG taxes do not lead to distortions.
In analysing the effects of a pension reform in the PAYG country, we first as-
sume that collecting contributions in the PAYG country does not involve any
distortions. It is well-known that in such a case the PAYG system is Pareto
efficient, see Verbon (1989) and Breyer (1989)2. That means that, if some gen-
2Actually, we already know from the classic papers of Samuelson (1958) and Gale (1973)
that if the economy is dynamically efficient no intergenerational redistribution can be Pareto
improving.
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erations are allowed to gain from the conversion policy, it is unavoidable that
other generations incur a loss. So, in the reforming country a choice has to be
made which generations are allowed to gain from the reform and which not.
In general, future generations in the PAYG country gain if the reform implies
an increase in the capital-labour ratio, the reason being that the PAYG country
is a borrower on the common capital market, and therefore gains from both the
lower interest rate that goes along with an increase in the capital-labour ratio
and from the higher wages. As the funded country is a lender on the common
capital market, the increasing capital-labour ratio does not necessarily imply
welfare gains for future generations in the funded country. However, we can
show that under plausible parameter configurations the reforming country’s
choice spills positively over to the funded country in a common capital mar-
ket. In particular, if the reforming country decides that future generations will
gain from the reform, future generations in the non-reforming country will
gain as well. But, just like in the reforming country, this long-run welfare gain
may come at the cost of lower utility in the short run as, due to the rising
capital-labour ratio, the increase in wages for initial generations is relatively
small compared to the decrease in the interest rate.
We then proceed by assuming excess burdens in tax collection. It has been
shown that in that case in a closed economy a Pareto-improving pension re-
form is possible (Homburg (1990)). The idea is that if the contribution rate is
decreased net welfare gains result which make it possible to compensate the
elderly for the loss of their benefits. When a Pareto-improving policy is im-
plemented in our two-country world, the long-run gains in the PAYG country
are again transferred to the funded country. However, although in the PAYG
country the policy is carefully shaped such that no generation loses in both
the short run and the long run, in the funded country some generations might
lose in the short run. The reason for this is that in the open capital market
the additional savings that emerge during the conversion policy in the PAYG
country will depress the interest rate, which especially harms the generations
that are alive in the funded country when the PAYG country starts the con-
version policy. As these generations do not, or do not fully, receive the gains
that result from increasing wages, they are not compensated for the negative
utility effects of the lower interest rate.
In principle, replacing a PAYG-financed public pension scheme by a funded
pension scheme implies that pension claims of the current retired are no
longer honored. In this respect the switch to funding is comparable to im-
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posing a lump-sum tax on the current old generations in order to decrease
the size of the government debt. Exactly the reverse of this policy scenario,
i.e., granting a lump-sum tax decrease to older generations financed by in-
creasing the government debt, was already analysed by Diamond (1965) in
a one-country model and by Persson (1985) in a two-country model3. Based
on this similarity, this chapter can be seen as a merger between the pension
reform literature, where international spillover effects received relatively lit-
tle attention, and the literature on the effects of government debt, where the
international externalities did not remain unnoticed. Some of our results are
closely linked to the conclusions of Persson (1985). For example, the spillover
effects of reforming a Pareto-efficient PAYG scheme without compensating the
initial generation of elderly are qualitatively the same as those of a decrease
in government debt: both lead to a decrease in the interest rate on the interna-
tional capital market. However, other reform scenarios that we discuss, and
especially the Pareto-improving reform, do not fit into Persson’s set up and
therefore extend his analysis.
Steigum and Raffelhüschen (1994) find in a calibrated two-country model,
with North America and the rest of the OECD taken as the two countries of in-
terest, that the welfare effects of debt changes in one country are relatively mi-
nor. The reason for this result is that the change in debt in one country is small
compared to the total capital stock in the common capital market4. We allow
for differences in the size of the two countries by introducing a parameter that
measures the relative size of the funded country. The analysis presented in
this chapter can then be applied to the case where a group of countries shifts
to more funded pensions, while a small number of countries do not reform
their pension system. An interesting example of this can be observed in the
EU where, broadly speaking, two groups of countries can be distinguished: a
large group of countries with extensive PAYG schemes but almost no funded
pensions, and a much smaller group of countries having sizeable funded pen-
3Other papers that analyse public debt in an international setting are, for example Fried
and Howitt (1988) and Homburg and Richter (1993). These papers use models based on as-
sumptions that essentially differ from ours. The former abstracts from capital accumulation
and examines the effect of government debt on capital gains and losses, the latter analyses the
problem of harmonising debt and public pension schemes when labour is perfectly mobile.
4Another reason is that Steigum and Raffelhüschen (1994) assume endogenous labour sup-
ply. In that case a tax decrease, due to pension reform, stimulates labour supply which damp-
ens the savings, and thereby the general-equilibrium effect of the reform. Empirical estimates
of labour-supply elasticities for the principal earner of a household, however, generate rela-
tively low values, see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for an overview.
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sions (see Table 3.1). Many of the countries in the first group are discussing
(or have already started) a transition to more funded pensions. This reform
will lead to sizeable changes in the capital stock in the long run, irrespective
of whether the reform is gradually implemented or not, and therefore have
important consequences for the countries that already have more elaborate
funded pension schemes, especially because this group of countries is small
compared to the group of reforming countries.
Table 3.1: Composition of retirement incomes in 2003 (%)
First pillar Second pillar Third pillar
Greece 98 1.5 0.5
France 97 1.5 1.5
Spain 97 1.5 1.5
Italy 96 2 2
Austria 95 3 2
Germany 94 4 2
Denmark 76 20 4
Sweden 75 20 5
Switzerland 72 26 2
Netherlands 56 37 7
Source: Boeri et al. (2006)
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents the
benchmark model and shows how the pension reform is modelled. In Sec-
tion 3.3 we analyse different types of reform scenarios under the assumption
that the PAYG scheme is Pareto efficient, while Section 3.4 considers the effects
in case the reform is Pareto improving in the PAYG country. In these sections
we illustrate the effects of the reform by numerical simulation examples using
Cobb-Douglas specifications. Analytical derivations of the results using more
general utility and production functions are presented in the Appendix. The
chapter winds up with a concluding section.
3.2 The model
We will use a two-period overlapping-generations model of an open econ-
omy. Following Buiter (1981) and Persson (1985), the world consists of two
countries, country P and country F. Countries differ in the way the pensions
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are financed. Country P uses a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system and country F
has a fully-funded retirement scheme. We assume a constant population size
and dynamic efficiency in both countries. Countries may, however, differ in
population size. In this way we allow for scale differences between the two
countries. When we define L
F
LP = ν and normalise L
P to 1, then ν tells us the
relative size of LF. The countries are identical in all other respects.
3.2.1 Production
Production per young individual is described by a standard neoclassical
constant-returns-to-scale production function, f (kit), where k
i
t stands for the
amount of capital per young individual in period t in country i, i = P, F.
Perfect competition among producers gives the usual equilibrium conditions,
rit = f
′(kit)− δ and wit = f (kit)− kit f ′(kit), where rit is the interest rate, wit de-
notes the real wage, and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. There is perfect
capital mobility between the two countries, but labour is immobile. Since cap-
ital can freely move across countries, the interest rates will be equalised, i.e.,
rPt = r
F
t = rt, ∀t. And because both countries are endowed with the same pro-
duction technology, we have kPt = k
F





3.2.2 Modelling pensions and reform
Initially the government in country P runs a balanced PAYG pension system,
that is, taxes of the young (τPt ) are used to finance the pension benefits of
the elderly (zPt ). As explained in the introduction we distinguish between the
case where the PAYG system is efficient and the case where the PAYG scheme
leads to distortions in the economy. In the latter case the PAYG tax implies
an excess burden. This has been modelled in various ways in the literature.
Homburg (1990) and Breyer and Straub (1993) assume that taxes distort the
labour-leisure decision so that a decrease in the contribution rate for the PAYG
system will increase labour supply, and, therefore, restrict the loss in revenue
for financing the pension benefits. Pemberton (2000), however, considers the
case where a conversion policy goes along with an income tax being replaced
by a consumption tax. Then young individuals under the conversion policy
have an incentive to save more than under the income tax, which provides the
means to compensate the older generations when the PAYG system is abol-
ished. Analogously, Belan et al. (1998) offer the first generation a subsidy on
the return on their savings. Yet another way of modelling can be found in
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Köthenbürger and Poutvaara (2006) who assume that a decrease of taxation
goes along with an increase in the value of a fixed factor. Let us note that we
merely conclude that the existence of an excess burden offers the scope for in-
troducing a Pareto-improving reform. However, we do not go into the issue
here whether this is a ’good’ or ’bad’ reason for reform5.
Instead of explicitly specifying how behaviour is affected when the excess
burden of the premium contributions is lifted, we assume that the tax base is
constant and independent of the size of the contribution. The existence of an
excess burden under the PAYG system is modelled by assuming a so-called
’iceberg’ formulation of tax distortions (as in e.g., Casamatta et al. (2000) and
Perotti (2001)), that is, for a given tax imposed on young individuals, only
τPt − (τPt )2 can be redistributed, so (τPt )2 is ’wasted’. For a tax on elderly
individuals, however, such a waste does not occur. This specification of the
excess burden of the tax is a short cut for the labour-supply interpretation.
Regarding this interpretation, it should be the case, as we assume, that taxing
the young leads to tax revenue losses if the young curtail their labour-supply
efforts as a result of the tax. But, when the elderly are retired, taxes cannot
have an effect on their labour-supply behaviour, and so, there is no excess
burden6.
In general, in the initial steady state the pension benefit of an old individual
is equal to7:
zP = τP − ξ(τP)2 (3.1)
where ξ = 1 implies that the PAYG tax leads to an excess burden, and where
ξ = 0 refers to the situation where the financing of the PAYG scheme is not
5It should be noted here that the existence of excess burdens in taxation cannot be the
prime motive for converting the PAYG system into a fully-funded system. The excess burden
arises because the individual link between pension benefits and contributions is broken. The
reason for this is that the pension system is also used for intragenerational redistribution. As
proved by Fenge (1995) and Brunner (1996), in a PAYG system in which such a link exists
the system is Pareto efficient, even if contributions are a proportional tax on labour income.
Such PAYG systems exist. For instance, as noted by Sinn (2000), Germany has had a PAYG
system since 1957 where benefits are proportional to contributions, and so a Pareto improving
transition to a funded system is not possible in Germany. Sinn (2000) and Belan and Pestieau
(1999) give overviews of the issue. Their conclusion in the words of the last authors is that
"reduced distortions can be achieved without privatization".
6The tax on the elderly can be seen, for example, as a short-cut for a tax on old-age con-
sumption that is non-distortionary.
7By omitting time subscripts we denote the initial steady state value of the respective vari-
able.
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distortionary. For the moment we develop the model in the absence of distor-
tions so that ξ = 0 and zP = τP in the initial steady state. In Section 3.4 we
consider the case where ξ = 1.
At t = −1 the government in country P announces that it will reform its
pension system in the next period (t = 0). Individuals take the economic
consequences of the reform into account when they make their optimising
decisions in period t = −1. A pension reform leads to a lower contribution
level and lower benefits. We model this as follows:
τPt = µt τ
P (3.2)
zPt = λt τ
P (3.3)
where µt < 1 and λt ≤ 1.
One of the crucial issues in pension reform is whether or not the (partial or
complete) switch to funding is accompanied by a compensation for the older
generations. We consider both possibilities. In the first case there is no com-
pensation: benefits and contributions simultaneously decrease by the same
amount. The elderly individuals at the time of the reform lose as a conse-
quence, while the current and future young individuals fully gain from the
higher rate of return on their contributions under the funded system.
In the second case the elderly are compensated, implying that µt < λt will
hold during the initial periods of the reform. We assume that public debt,
(bPt ), is used to finance the shortfall in contributions. It is assumed that the
government issues one-period debt, which yields the same rate of interest as
capital. At a later stage, additional contributions (τBt ) are raised to finance
the interest obligations on the debt, so as to keep debt per worker constant.
With debt, therefore, the budget constraint of the government (public debt
dynamics) in per capita terms is:




t − τPt − τBt (3.4)
If part of the benefits are financed by government debt, we assume that at
a certain point in time benefits match contributions again, i.e., the benefits
should have decreased as: λt = µt < 1. So the PAYG system is balanced
again, but at a permanently lower level. At the moment that contributions
and benefits are equal again, the government introduces τBt , such that debt
per worker is stabilised from then on. Furthermore, we assume that there is
no government debt in the initial steady state (bP = 0), so that τB is zero too.
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In country F the government invests the contributions of the young and re-
turns them with interest in the next period in the form of transfers to the then
old agents. The funded scheme has fixed contributions, which implies that the
system is actuarially fair for every individual and contributions to the pen-
sion scheme are exactly offset by an equal reduction in private savings. This
means that the funded pension system is neutral and the economy behaves in
exactly the same way as if there were no pension scheme. Therefore we do not
distinguish between contributions to the funded pension scheme and private
savings, that is, pension contributions are included in total savings sFt .
3.2.3 Households
Lifetime utility of a representative individual born at t is given by the follow-


















(i = P, F) (3.5)
where ρ > 0 stands for the (constant) pure rate of time preference of an indi-
vidual, cy,it is consumption when young, and c
o,i
t+1 is consumption in the second
period of life.
Young agents inelastically supply one unit of labour. The budget constraints
in the PAYG country are as follows:
cy,Pt = wt − τ
P
t − sPt (3.6a)




t+1 − τBt+1 (3.6b)
cy,Pt = wt − τ
P
t − τBt − sPt (3.7a)





The government in country P can either levy the additional tax to stabilise
government debt (τBt ) on the elderly (eq. (3.6b)) or on the working people (eq.






Maximising lifetime utility subject to the budget constraints gives the fol-












(i = P, F) (3.8)
8We assume that the felicity functions u(cy,it ) and v(c
o,i
t+1) satisfy the Inada conditions.
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where u′(cy,it ) =
du(cy,it )
dcy,it




is the marginal utility of old-age consumption. For future





, i = F, P with v′′(co,it ) the
second-order derivative of felicity when old. The value of these elasticities
in the steady state is important for the effects of a reform. In particular, we
exclude extremely low values of σ as these imply large increases in savings in
reaction to a decrease in the interest rate.
3.2.4 Equilibrium international capital market
Individuals invest their savings either in the home country or abroad. Their
portfolios will be composed such that interest rates are equalised. Equilibrium
in the international capital market is given by:
sPt + νs
F
t = (1 + ν)kt+1 + b
P
t+1 (3.9)
As old-age consumption in country P is partly financed by a transfer from
the young, while in country F old-age consumption has to be completely fi-
nanced by own savings, the latter country has higher savings than country P,
implying that country F exports capital abroad.
3.3 Pension reform under Pareto efficiency
This section investigates the spillover effects of a pension reform in the PAYG
country, under the assumption that the PAYG system is Pareto efficient, i.e.,
taxes are non-distortionary. This means that there is a trade-off between the
utility of different generations in implementing the reform. We consider three
different types of reforms. In the first reform, the government in the PAYG
country does not compensate the elderly at the time of the reform (Section
3.3.1). In the second and third reform we analyse the effects in case the gov-
ernment fully compensates the current old (Section 3.3.2). In that case govern-
ment debt is created and the extra tax needed to pay the interest obligations
on the debt can either be levied on the pensioners or on the workers.
For all cases considered we are able to calculate analytically the effect of
a pension reform on the common capital stock. We employ the method of
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comparative dynamics, adopted from Judd (1982). The processes for µt and
λt are given by:
µt = 1 + πgt (3.10)
λt = 1 + π ft (3.11)
where gt < 0 and ft ≤ 0 describe the time pattern of a perturbation of µt and
λt from their steady-state values and π reflects the magnitude of this pertur-
bation. The effects of a pension reform can be traced by linearising the capital-
accumulation equation (3.9) with respect to π around the initial steady state.
The resulting first-order difference equations for kt describe the capital-labour
ratio changes over time and the determining factors. Moreover, we produce
numerical simulations in order to illustrate the mechanics of the model. The
qualitative results of these simulations are robust for changes in the adopted
values of the parameters9.
3.3.1 No compensation for the current old
At t = −1 the government announces that it will decrease both the contribu-
tions to the PAYG system (τPt ) and the pension benefits (z
P
t ) permanently in
the next period (t = 0)10. So the old at t = 0 bear all the costs of the reform.
The change in the capital-labour ratio
To analyse the international spillover effects we compare the effects of reform
when the two economies have a joint capital market (indicated by superscript
PF) to the situation where the two economies are closed (indicated by super-
scripts P and F, respectively). Obviously, in country F nothing happens when
it is a closed economy, as there is no need for reform.
Using the method described above we obtain the following first-order dif-
ference equation for the evolution of the capital-labour ratio when the two
9We derived numerically the non-linear transition path, and compared the numerical re-
sults with those found with the method of comparative dynamics. The accuracy of the lin-
earised path was quite satisfactory with a relative error of one percent at most. This is in line
with the findings by Meijdam and Verhoeven (1998). They conclude that using comparative
dynamics in a dynamic model is just as accurate as using comparative statics in a static model.
10This means that g0 = g1 = . . . = g∞ < 0 and ft = gt < 0. This could either be a full
privatisation (gt = ft = −1) or a partial privatisation (−1 < gt = ft < 0).
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, and λi ≡ 1 + 1+ρ(1+r)2
u′′(cy,i)
v′′(co,i) > 1, i =
F, P. Note that 1
λi
< 1 can be interpreted as the propensity to consume out of
lifetime income when young (for a given interest rate). The β’s indicate the
effect of a change in the interest rate on consumption when young (and thus





(1+r)2 . Note that
in case of logarithmic utility functions λi = 2+ρ1+ρ , β
F = 0 and βP = −z
P
(1+r)2 ,


























with ∆P ≡ 1 + f ′′(k) β
P
λP
. We assume12 0 < ∆P < ∆. By comparing the capital-
labour ratio changes in the closed-economies case (eq. (3.13)) with the change
in the capital-labour ratio when the two countries have integrated capital mar-
kets (eq. (3.12)), we derive the pure spillover effects of pension reform in a
common capital market13.
At the time of the announcement (t = −1), young individuals living in coun-
try P increase their savings because they know they will receive a lower pen-
sion benefit, i.e., f0 < 0. As a result, the reform leads to a positive change in





λP∆(1+r) f0 > 0 (eq. (3.12)). Note
that (given that ∆ > ∆P) this effect is larger in case of a closed economy (see
eq. (3.13)). The increase in the common capital-labour ratio at t = 0 leads to
higher wages, which engenders higher savings in both countries. Due to these
higher savings the capital-labour ratio continues to rise (the first term in eq.
(3.12) > 0). Citizens in the PAYG country have an additional incentive to save
11In Appendix 3.A.1 we show the derivation of this expression.
12In case of logarithmic utility this condition always holds. For the more general case this
condition holds for a wide range of parameter values.
13To exclude the effects of integration it is assumed that the initial steady state is the same
in all cases.
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more, because, as of t = 0 contributions to the PAYG system fall (second term
in eq. (3.12) > 0), and they will receive lower benefits. So, we have the gen-
eral result (see also Figure 3.1 where we show the change in the capital-labour
ratio for the different cases)14:
Result 3.1 In case the elderly are not compensated at the time of a given pension
reform, the capital-labour ratio in country P increases less in case it has a common
capital market with a funded country compared to the case where it is closed, as part
of the extra savings flow to country F.
Figure 3.1: Change in kt
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In Figure 1 the two economies have the same size (ν = 1). However, as
most EU countries mainly use PAYG pension schemes, the group of countries
that has sizeable funded pensions can be considered as relatively small. If the
group of funded countries is relatively small (i.e., ν < 1) and a large group
of countries with extensive PAYG schemes reform their pension system, the
spillover effects for the funded countries will be larger. For the PAYG coun-
tries, however, it holds that the larger they are relative to the funded countries,
the more the effects of the reform resemble the effects of a closed economy.
14The graphs are based on simulations with logarithmic utility functions and countries of
equal size (ν = 1). The initial value of the tax rate is 0.2. It is assumed that half of the PAYG
system is privatised, that is, from t = 1 onwards both the contributions and the benefits fall
by 50% permanently. The results do not qualitatively change when the PAYG system is totally
privatised, however. Moreover, we used the following production function, f (kt) = k0.3t .
Capital depreciates at 5% per year, and assuming that one period is 30 years, this means that
δ = 1− (0.95)30 = 0.7854. Agents are relatively patient with a time preference of 1.2% per
year, so that ρ = (1.012)30 − 1 = 0.4303. In the steady state k = 0.12, which implies that the
capital-labour ratio rises by about 17% in the open economy case.
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The change in consumption and utility
When we know the change in the capital-labour ratio we can derive the
changes in all other variables. The analytical derivations are presented in Ap-
pendix 3.A.2 for the consumption and utility effects in country F. Here we
only show simulation graphs. The change in consumption when young and
old in the two countries is displayed in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. The
spillover effects for consumption are summarised in the following results:
Result 3.2 In case there is no compensation for the current old:
(a) The reform in country P implies an increasing capital-labour ratio and higher
wages, which enhances the consumption possibilities for the young in country
F.15
(b) The fall in the interest rate, however, lowers the return of the savings of old
people living in country F, which has a negative effect on their consumption.
Savings in country F do not rise sufficiently to offset the negative effects of the
lower interest rate in the long run, so that the consumption of the elderly in the
non-reforming country decreases due to the reform.16
The changes in lifetime utility are shown in Figure 3.4, lifetime utility rises
in the long run. However, this type of pension reform, in which benefits are
decreased without compensation, will obviously hurt the elderly in country P
at the time of the reform. It is, however, interesting to note that this loss spills
over to the elderly in country F as well. In particular, we have17:
15This is the case if βF < k, see Appendix 3.A.2 for details. Simulations show that this
condition holds for realistic parameter values. In case of a logarithmic utility function this
condition always holds as βF = 0. In the benchmark simulation of footnote 14, cy,F = 0.22
in the initial steady state. This implies that as a result of the reform in the PAYG country,
consumption during young age in the funded country increases by about 5.18% in the long
run.




show that this condition holds for realistic parameter values. The condition reduces to sF >
k(1+r)
2+ρ in case of logarithmic utility, which holds as long as the production elasticity of capital
is not too large (< 0.5). co,F = 0.23 in the benchmark simulation of footnote 14, which implies
that the long-run decrease of old-age consumption in the funded country is about 5.21%.
17As shown in Appendix 3.A.2 utility in the funded country rises in the long run if
sF < k(1 + r). Figure 3.13 in Appendix 3.A.2 shows that this condition holds for a wide
range of parameter values. The utility in the funded country decreases initially if the posi-
tive wage effect when young is outweighed by the negative effect on the interest rate (which
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Result 3.3 In case the current elderly in country P are not compensated, the genera-
tion in country F born at the time of the reform (t = 0) may experience a loss, while
this is not the case for the same generation in country P. Later generations in country
F gain from the pension reform in country P, but the consumption gap between young
and old people has increased18.
Figure 3.2: Change in cy,it

















Figure 3.3: Change in co,it














Figure 3.4: Change in Uit





















−1)]k f ′′(k)/∆ . This condition holds as long as the production elastic-
ity of capital is not too large (≤ 0.5).
18If the government in the funded country compensates the first two generations that ex-
perience negative spillovers from the reform in the PAYG country, later generations will lose.
See Appendix 3.A.2 for details.
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The latter result is noteworthy. An important motive for introducing a re-
form is to get higher rates of return on pension contributions and, as a result,
a higher retirement income. In the funded country, however, the result is just
the opposite: the pensioners in the funded country will achieve lower incomes
than if the PAYG country had not implemented a reform. The reason for this
counterintuitive result is that the higher savings in the PAYG country, gen-
erated by the reform, lead to a fall in the interest rate and, therefore, lower
returns on the pension contributions paid in the funded country.
3.3.2 Compensation
In the pension reform described in the previous section the current elderly
bear all the costs of the reform. It is probably more realistic to assume that
the government compensates the current old, so that individuals have more
time to adjust their behaviour to the smaller PAYG system. Political economy
arguments could also play a role for implementing such a reform policy. Coo-
ley and Soares (1999), for example, argue that privatising a PAYG system is
only politically feasible in case a transition policy uses debt to finance the ben-
efits during the transition period, shifting at least part of the cost to future
generations. Therefore, in this and the next subsection we assume that while
contributions to the PAYG scheme fall permanently at t = 0, benefits are kept
constant in that period. This is again communicated one period before the re-
form actually takes place (at t = −1). The government also announces that at
t = 1 pension benefits will fall as much as the contributions, so that the PAYG
system is balanced again from then on19. Since taxes are lower than the bene-
fits during one period (t = 0), there will be government debt in country P at
t = 1. At the moment that contributions and benefits are equal again (t = 1),
the government introduces an extra tax (τBt ) to pay the interest obligations on
its debt, such that debt per worker is stabilised from then on. This extra tax
can either be levied on the working people or on the elderly.
Tax levied on the future old
When τBt is levied on the elderly, starting at t = 1, the pension reform is Pareto
neutral, that is, there is no generation that gains or loses from the pension
reform. The reason for this result is that savings in the PAYG country increase
just as much as government debt increases. All that has happened is that the
19This means that g0 = g1 = . . . = g∞ < 0 and f0 = 0, ft = gt < 0 for t > 0.
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implicit debt inherent to the PAYG system has been made explicit. This is a
standard result in the pension reform literature, see for example Verbon (1989),
Breyer (1989) and Homburg (1990). So we have20:
Result 3.4 In case the old at the time of the reform are fully compensated and the
tax to finance the debt is levied on the future elderly, the capital-labour ratio remains
constant over time.
A constant capital-labour ratio implies that consumption and utility also
do not change. Moreover, there are no international spillover effects for the
funded country.
Tax levied on the future young
Instead of imposing τBt on the elderly, the government can also levy the tax
on the working people, starting at t = 1. So the first young generation under
the reform, born at t = 0, does not have to pay the debt tax, i.e., τB0 = 0,
as bP0 = 0. Like the future young generations, they get the lower PAYG tax,
but, unlike the future young generations, they do not have to contribute to the
compensation the elderly at t = 0 receive. The young generation at t = 0,
therefore, will get a windfall gain21. This gives the following result22:
Result 3.5 In case there is full compensation for the elderly at the time of the reform
and the debt tax is levied on the future workers, the capital-labour ratio will start
decreasing in the period after the reform in country P. This in turn leads to capital
flows from country F to country P.
The intuition for this result is obvious. The first young generation under the
reform consumes part of its gain in the first period, and saves part of it. As the
gain this generation receives equals the created debt, the increase in savings
at t = 0 is lower than the created debt. In other words, the public debt crowds
out part of the capital stock.
Future working generations get the lower PAYG tax, but also pay a debt tax
τBt . Moreover, they inherit a lower capital-labour ratio, which leads to lower
20More information and a formal proof of this result can be found in Appendix 3.B.1.
21The government in the PAYG country may decide to implement the pension reform in this
way for political economy reasons. For example, when it is assumed, as in Cooley and Soares
(1999), that a reform is only implementable in case it is welfare-improving for a majority of
the current population.
22More details and a formal proof of this result are given in Appendix 3.B.2.
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wages. Therefore savings are lower and, as a result, the capital-labour ratio
continues to decline. Because country P can finance part of its government
debt with savings of country F, the capital-labour ratio falls more when coun-
try P does not have an integrated capital market with country F. This can be
seen in Figure 3.5. Notice that the results of this reform are exactly the oppo-
Figure 3.5: Change in kt











site of the pension reform described in Section 3.3.1: the capital-labour ratio
falls over time instead of rises. This implies that the effect on the other endoge-
nous variables is also reversed. Actually, all simulation graphs are almost the
mirror images of those of the pension reform in Section 3.3.1, the peaks are
only one period later, because young individuals in the PAYG country do not
adjust their behaviour at t = −1. The main findings are as follows (see also
Figures 3.6 - 3.8)23:
Result 3.6 In case the elderly are fully compensated at the time of the reform and the
tax to finance the debt is levied on the future workers:
(a) The pension reform in country P leads to less consumption possibilities for the
young in country F, while the elderly in this country gain.
(b) In the period after the reform both the elderly and the working people in the
funded country gain from the pension reform in the PAYG country. In the long
run, however, people in the funded country experience negative spillover effects.
23The analytical framework of Appendix 3.A.2 still applies, as all the expressions for the
change in consumption and utility are expressed as a function of the capital-labour ratio.
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Figure 3.6: Change in cy,it













Figure 3.7: Change in co,it











Figure 3.8: Change in Uit















So the fact that they have a common capital market with country F protects
the generations living in country P to some extent, as part of the burden of
this reform policy is transmitted to country F via the capital market24.
24Of course the government in the PAYG country could decide to stabilise the debt and
levy τBt in a later period, so that even more generations get a windfall gain. Government
debt would crowd out a larger part of the capital stock and the long-term losses would be
larger. However, our central result that the funded country shares in the gains and losses of
the reform in the PAYG country, would not change.
86 INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERS OF PENSION REFORM
3.3.3 Concluding remarks
In general we conclude the following: In case the PAYG system is Pareto ef-
ficient and the government in the PAYG country implements a reform that
leads to losses for at least one generation, these losses will be transmitted to
the funded country via the capital market. It should be noted that the pension
reforms analysed in this section are extreme, in the sense that no compensa-
tion at all or full compensation is granted at the time of the reform. Of course
it is possible to have pension reforms where the elderly are partly compen-
sated. However, such scenarios will not change the general conclusion from
our analysis that a reform policy in one country unavoidably spills over to
other countries.
3.4 Pareto-improving pension reform
In this section we analyse the international spillover effects of a pension re-
form in the PAYG country in case there is scope for a Pareto improvement,
due to a distortionary PAYG tax. As explained in Section 3.2.2, we model the
excess burden as a (quadratic) loss of tax revenue. This corresponds to ξ = 1
in equation (3.1), i.e., zP = τP − (τP)2, so (τPt )2 is wasted. We start from the
Pareto neutral pension reform scenario of the previous section. So the govern-
ment compensates the elderly at the time of the reform completely, and then
from t = 1 onwards imposes an extra tax on the pensioners to pay the interest
obligations on the debt in order to keep debt per capita constant. The budget
constraint of the government (eq. (3.4)) changes to:




t − (τPt − (τPt )2)− τBt (3.14)
As argued earlier, we assume that the debt tax on the elderly, τBt , does not
imply an excess burden, given the labour-supply motivation for the excess
burden. Now we can state the following25:
Result 3.7 In case the PAYG tax implies an excess burden, a pension reform in the
PAYG country where the elderly are compensated and the debt tax is levied on the
pensioners leads to an increase in the capital-labour ratio in the period after the reform.
A higher capital-labour ratio in turn leads to higher wages and savings, so that the
capital-labour ratio continues to increase.
25In Appendix 3.C this is formally derived.
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We also show this in Figure 3.9. The intuition behind this result is that when
PAYG taxes induce an excess burden, abolishing (part of) the PAYG system
leads to efficiency gains, so that the capital-labour ratio actually rises, instead
of staying constant (as was the case in Result 3.4). It is then obvious that this
Figure 3.9: Change in kt











reform leads to a Pareto improvement in the PAYG country. This can indeed be
seen in Figure 3.12, all generations get a higher utility. In the funded country26,
however, only consumption of the working people increases (see Figure 3.10).
The elderly in the non-reforming country get less consumption possibilities
(see Figure 3.11), mainly because the interest rate decreases after an increase
in kt. For the generation born at the time of the reform consumption when
young does not change, while they can consume less at their old-age. This
necessarily implies that this generation loses from the pension reform in the
other country (see Figure 3.12). All later generations in country F gain from
the pension reform in country P. So we have the following main result:
Result 3.8 A Pareto-improving pension reform in country P does not necessarily
lead to a Pareto improvement in the funded country: the generation born at the time
of the reform is hurt by the pension reform in the PAYG country.
26Appendix 3.A.2 shows the analytical framework for the change in consumption and util-
ity.
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Figure 3.10: Change in cy,it











Figure 3.11: Change in co,it















Figure 3.12: Change in Uit















Currently, in many countries with an extensive pay-as-you-go (PAYG) fi-
nanced public pension system reforms are considered to finance a larger part
of the future pension benefits by accumulated funds. A central conclusion
emerging from this chapter is that in a common capital market the effects of
such a pension reform in a PAYG country spills over to countries with a fully-
funded pension system. In Europe, e.g., differences in financing methods of
pension systems abound. For instance, countries like Germany and Italy have
extensive PAYG-financed parts in their pension system, while in the UK and
the Netherlands the larger part of the pension benefits are financed out of
accumulated assets. The message of this chapter is that the latter countries
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cannot insulate themselves from the effects of reform measures in the former
countries. In the European pension debate these spillover effects of pension re-
form have not been an issue till now, as far as we know. Yet, the consequences
of pension reform in a PAYG country can be rather adverse for a funded coun-
try as we have shown in this chapter. Some key results illustrate this.
First, consider the case where the PAYG country compensates the elderly
during the transition phase, and the PAYG system is Pareto efficient. The in-
troduction of public debt, necessary to finance the compensation during the
transition phase of the reform, will lead to crowding out of the capital stock in
both the PAYG and the funded country, as soon as one generation is allowed
to gain during the transition. As a result, future generations in both types of
countries will lose under this reform policy.
Second, if a PAYG country reforms its public pension system such that its
own future generations gain, then, although future generations in the funded
country gain as well, the distribution of consumption between young and old
individuals at a certain time will change at the expense of old individuals. In
the funded country the elderly will even consume less in absolute amounts af-
ter the reform. Although the deterioration of old-age consumption is the result
of free choice by individuals in the funded country, the resulting consumption
allocation between young and old individuals might not be desirable from a
societal point of view.
Third, we have shown that if excess burdens in tax collection enable a Pareto-
improving pension reform in the PAYG country, during the transition phase
some initial generations in the funded country might suffer a loss under the
reform nevertheless. In other words, a reform policy that appears to be Pareto
improving for the PAYG country considered separately, does not have to be
Pareto improving after taking into account the international spillover effects.
Obviously, our model has oversimplified the real world in many ways, and
the issue of spillover effects of pension reform merits further study in espe-
cially larger and more applied models. Yet, we think that our central result,
i.e., that pension reform in PAYG countries can have adverse effects on the
welfare of some generations, or some type of individuals in funded countries
will remain to stand out in a more general model. The obvious policy conclu-
sion from our model is, therefore, that in a common market like the EU, deci-
sions on pension reform in the countries with a large PAYG scheme cannot be
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taken without considering the effects for non-reforming (funded) countries.
In particular, dependent on the type and size of reform in the PAYG countries,
compensation for the non-reforming countries might be necessary.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
3.A Appendix to Section 3.3.1
3.A.1 Derivation first-order difference equation kt+1
In this appendix we derive the first-order difference equation for the evolution
of the capital-labour ratio given in equation (3.12). Linearising the capital-











where we used the fact that
∂bPt+1
∂π = 0 in case the current old are not compen-





∂π , using equations (3.6)-(3.8)











































where λi ≡ 1 + 1+ρ(1+r)2
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∂π are given by:
∂wt
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. Using equations (3.2)-(3.3) and (3.10)-






= τP ft+1 (3.22)
Substituting these two last expressions into equation (3.20) gives equation
(3.12).
3.A.2 Derivation Results 3.2 and 3.3
In this appendix we derive analytical expressions for the change in consump-
tion and utility in the funded country. From these equations we can infer the
relationship between the change in the capital-labour ratio and consumption
and utility. The framework also applies to the pension reform scenarios dis-
cussed in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.4.
Result 3.2a: Change in consumption when young














The first term between the brackets shows the effect of the lower interest rate
resulting for the higher capital-labour ratio, which affects consumption when
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young negatively in case σF < 1. The second term represents the positive















which is positive as long as βF < k, implying that σF should not be extremely
low so that the positive wage effect dominates the negative interest rate effect
in case σF < 1. Simulations show that for realistic parameter values βF < k.
In case of a logarithmic utility function σF = 1 and βF = 0, so that only the
wage effect occurs and young-age consumption always rises.
Result 3.2b: Change in old-age consumption
Linearising the second-period budget constraint gives:
∂co,Ft+1
∂π
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The first term between the brackets shows the positive effect of higher sav-
ings, the second term shows the negative effects of the lower interest rate. As
∂k∞
∂π > 0 and f
′′(k) < 0, ∂c
o,F
∞




show that this condition holds for realistic parameter values. Note that this
condition reduces to k(1+r)2+ρ < s
F in case of logarithmic utility. In that case sim-
ulations show that the condition does not hold in case the production elasticity
of capital is relatively large (≥ 0.5).
Result 3.3: Change in utility
Long-run change in utility
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which is positive if sF < k(1 + r). A rise in the capital-labour ratio has two
opposing effects on the utility of individuals living in the funded country:
1. Country F is a lender in the international capital market, which means
that sF > k(1 + n). This implies that the lower interest rate that results
for a higher capital-labour ratio hurts people living in the funded coun-
try.
2. A lower interest rate also implies, however, that the economy is closer to
the Golden Rule point (r = n), which has positive utility effects in case
of dynamic efficiency (r > n).
If sF > k(1 + r), the first effect dominates the second, implying that an increase
in the capital-labour ratio affects utility negatively. On the other hand, when
sF < k(1 + r), the second effect dominates the first and a higher capital-labour
ratio leads to a higher utility in the funded country.
Figure 3.13: sF − k(1 + r)














In Figure 3.13 we present a graph that shows how the sign of sF − k(1 + r)
(vertical axis) changes for different parameter values27. The horizontal axis
shows the depreciation rate (δ). This graph shows that sF − k(1 + r) < 0 for
27In the standard case, we have the following parameter values: ρ = 0.4303, τ
P
w = 0.2,
ν = 1, σi = 1, i = P, F and f (kt) = kαt where α = 0.3.
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various values of the parameters, which means that the Golden Rule effect
dominates the interest rate effect. This in turn implies that, for realistic pa-
rameter values, a rise in the capital-labour ratio has positive utility effects in
the funded country28.
Short-run change in utility
For t = 0 we can substitute the difference equation for the capital stock (equa-
tion (3.20)) in equation (3.27) and use the fact that k−1∂π = 0 to find:
∂UF0
∂π
= u′(cy,F) f ′′(k)
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Utility of people living in the funded country born at the time of the reform













(< (1 + r)k). This
condition holds as long as the production elasticity of capital is not too large
(≤ 0.5).
Compensation first two generations
The government in the funded country can also decide to compensate the two
generations that are negatively affected by the pension reform in the PAYG
country (generations -1 and 0). This means that in those two periods gov-
ernment debt is created. Future generations will lose from this policy because
they suffer from the higher debt burden and have to pay an extra tax to pay the
interest obligations on the debt to keep the debt dynamics sustainable. This
scenario is shown in Figure 3.14. This graph shows that the funded country
experiences negative spillovers from a pension reform in the PAYG country in
the long run if it compensates the generations that are initially harmed by the
reform.
28It is actually possible to have sF − k(1 + r) > 0. This is the case, for example, when ρ = 0
and δ > 0.87. A time preference rate of zero is not very realistic however. Therefore, we
conclude that, for realistic parameter values, it holds that sF − k(1 + r) < 0.
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Figure 3.14: Change in Uit













3.B Appendix to Section 3.3.2
3.B.1 Tax levied on the future old
With government debt, linearising the capital-accumulation equation (3.9)













From this we can derive the following first-order difference equation for the





































where ∆ has the same definition as in Section 3.3.1. Comparing this equation





because of the government debt created to compensate the old at t = 0. As can
be seen debt has a direct negative impact on the change in the capital-labour
ratio. However, because τBt is levied on the pensioners, they will increase their
savings when young which has a positive effect on the capital-labour ratio.
Below we show formally that savings increase exactly by the same amount
as the government debt, so that the capital-labour stays constant with this
pension reform scenario:
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∂π = 0. Then, using

















− 1)) τP∆ g0 −
1
λP∆(1+r)(τ
P f1 + rτPg0) +
τP g0
∆ Noting that
f1 = g0, it is easy to verify that
∂kPF1
∂π = 0. And when this is the case for t = 1,
this holds for all following periods.
3.B.2 Tax levied on the future young

































As can be seen this equation looks almost the same as equation (3.31), the only
difference is that now τBt has a negative impact on the change in the capital-
labour ratio.
















∆λP(1+r) g0 < 0. So we know that as soon τ
B
t is levied on the future young, the
capital-labour ratio decreases at t = 1.
3.C Appendix to Section 3.4
Proof Result 3.7 Using equation (3.14), we know that the change in govern-
ment debt at t = 1 is equal to ∂b
P
1




∂π = −(1 − 2 τ
P) τPg0.
Moreover, from t = 1 onwards we have that ∂z
P
t





that f1 = (1 − 2τP)g0, where we used the fact that g1 = g0. Then, noting













(1− 2τP) τPg0 + r(1− 2τP) τPg0
]
+ 1∆ (1−




λP∆ g0 > 0.

CHAPTER 4
PENSIONS, INFLATION RISK AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE
4.1 Introduction
This chapter connects the last chapter of this thesis with the previous two
chapters. In the models used in Chapters 2 and 3 consumers did not face any
uncertainty about the return on their savings, the models were completely de-
terministic. In this chapter we develop a stochastic two-period overlapping-
generations general equilibrium model with safe pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pen-
sions. People can invest in two types of assets, stocks and government bonds.
Both assets are risky, productivity risk makes the return on stocks uncertain
and there is inflation risk on government bonds. The fact that stocks and
bonds differ in their riskiness makes that they earn a different rate of return,
so that this model can be used to analyse the equity premium and portfolio
choice. We can infer, for example, what happens with the equity premium
in case the population ages and how people are affected when inflation risk
goes up after large increases of government debt. This will be done in Chap-
ter 5 where we extend the closed-economy model of this chapter to an open-
economy version to analyse the spillover effects of population ageing in case
the PAYG country uses government debt to cope with the costs of ageing,
which may increase inflation (risk). The main purpose of this chapter is to
gain insight into the workings of the model. We consider three shocks that all
affect portfolio choice directly; more risk aversion, the introduction of a PAYG
99
100 PENSIONS, INFLATION RISK AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE
pension scheme and higher inflation risk. We concentrate on the effects on
portfolio choice, savings and the equity premium.
The function of safe PAYG pensions in our stochastic model is twofold. First,
it provides retirees with a certain minimum amount of income. Second, as
people cannot invest in any risk-free asset, safe PAYG pensions partly remove
this market incompleteness, as the system offers the possibility to transfer in-
come from the working period to retirement at a non-stochastic rate of return.
In that respect the PAYG pension scheme has a comparable role as in the liter-
ature that focuses on the intergenerational risk-sharing properties of pension
schemes. The idea of this literature is that financial markets are incomplete be-
cause there cannot be trade with unborn generations and human capital is not
traded. As a result of these missing markets the young are too much exposed
to wage risk and the old bear too much financial market risk. In case finan-
cial market returns are imperfectly correlated with wages, this results in sub-
optimal diversification. By linking PAYG pension benefits to wages, retired
households obtain a claim to human capital which is not traded on financial
markets. In this way PAYG pension schemes can contribute to better inter-
generational risk sharing and diversification. There are several studies that
investigate how the optimal pension scheme should look like using stochastic
OLG models. In contrast to this literature we do not consider optimal pen-
sion schemes, but we take the pension scheme as given. Moreover, we do
not link pension benefits to wages because in our model wages are perfectly
correlated with stock market returns and therefore wage-linked pension bene-
fits will not improve diversification opportunities. PAYG pension benefits are
modelled as safe lump-sum benefits and in this way pension benefits are im-
perfectly correlated with financial market returns and therefore contribute to
better diversification. Our model, however, is comparable to the models used
in these papers and therefore we discuss the main differences below.
Matsen and Thøgersen (2004) develop a partial equilibrium model where
they treat the PAYG system as a ’quasi-asset’ and derive the optimal share in-
vested in this PAYG asset. They use the approach of Campbell and Viceira
(2002) to obtain explicit expressions for the optimal portfolio shares. This ap-
proach will also be used in this chapter. They assume that people only con-
sume in the second period of life, so that the complete net labour income re-
ceived in the first period of life is saved. In contrast to Matsen and Thøgersen
(2004) we model the savings decisions of individuals and more importantly,
we develop a general equilibrium model where the effects on the rates of re-
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turn are taken into account.
Most papers that analyse the risk-sharing aspects of a PAYG system in a
general equilibrium framework, like Storesletten et al. (1999), Sánchez-Marcos
and Sánchez-Martin (2006), and Krueger and Kubler (2006), use computable
models. The major advantage of our general equilibrium model is that it is
fairly simple so that analytical solutions are still feasible. This allows us to
interpret the various shocks in a very intuitive way as we are able to derive
analytical expressions for the time path of the various variables after a shock
has occurred.
There are a few papers that develop an analytical stochastic general equilib-
rium OLG model. Bohn (1998, 2001, 2003) studies intergenerational risk shar-
ing of demographic and macroeconomic risk in a stochastic OLG model using
government debt or social security. He log-linearises the budget constraints
and first-order conditions and in that way he derives a quasi-analytical condi-
tion for ex ante efficient intergenerational risk sharing. He does not, however,
obtain explicit solutions for portfolio choice, savings and the risk premium
as we do in our model. Beetsma and Bovenberg (2007) investigate intergen-
erational risk sharing in a two-pillar system with a pay-as-you-go pillar and
a funded pillar. By keeping the model relatively simple they obtain analyt-
ical expressions for the optimal pension scheme. Their model only contains
two periods with two generations that overlap during one period. In the first
period the generation is born that is old in the second period, while in the sec-
ond period the young generation is born. Our model, however, has an infinite
horizon and can be used to derive the whole transition path of the predeter-
mined variables to study the effects of various shocks. Moreover, Beetsma and
Bovenberg (2007) also do not derive the optimal conditions for savings- and
portfolio decisions of consumers.
In contrast to the above-mentioned papers, a recent paper by Campbell and
Nosbusch (2007) does not consider the welfare implications of risk-sharing
social security systems, but concentrates on the effects of these schemes on
equilibrium asset prices. They use a Blanchard model where agents face a
constant death probability in each period, while we use a two-period OLG
model. They assume a fixed supply of physical capital which implies that the
effects of a PAYG pension scheme on asset prices are quite extreme as the ef-
fects on capital accumulation are not taken into account. We do model produc-
tion and capital accumulation so that the capital crowding-out effects of PAYG
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pensions are accounted for. Moreover, in our model individuals can invest in
government bonds besides stocks, while in Campbell and Nosbusch (2007)
physical capital is the only asset in positive net supply so that agents have to
invest all their savings in the risky asset and there is no portfolio choice. Fi-
nally, they have to rely on numerical simulations to infer the effect of social
security on the risk premium, whereas our model gives unambiguous results.
We analyse three shocks that affect the portfolio decision of households di-
rectly and examine the effects of these shocks on portfolio choice, savings and
the risk premium of stocks over bonds. First, we address the effects of more
risk aversion. The main reason why this shock is considered is to being able to
contrast the results with the effects of introducing safe PAYG pensions, which
is the second analysed shock. As explained, the fact that there is no risk-free
asset in our economy implies that markets are incomplete. Safe PAYG pen-
sions will partly fill the gap of this missing market and will therefore affect
the investment decisions of consumers. Comparing the effects of introducing
PAYG pensions to the effects of higher risk aversion shows that consumers be-
have like less risk averse individuals when they receive a safe PAYG pension
benefit. Finally, we also consider the effects of an increase in inflation risk to
address the impact of uncertainty on consumer behaviour and asset returns.
To contrast the results in a general equilibrium model with the partial equi-
librium approach typically taken in the finance literature, we first consider the
effects on portfolio- and savings decisions in case the rates of return are taken
as exogenous. It turns out that the effects on portfolio choice in general equi-
librium are opposite to the effects in partial equilibrium. The intuition for this
result is that in general equilibrium portfolio choice has to be such that the
capital market clears. The rate of return on government bonds adjusts in such
a way that enough savings are invested in government bonds to make sure
that the government debt is financed. In partial equilibrium, financing the
government debt is not a problem as the government can supply the bonds
on the international capital market, without effect on the rate of return that
has to be granted to those who invest in the bonds. This result implies that
it matters whether you study portfolio choice in a small open economy or in
a (large) closed economy, like the US or the EU. Moreover, this result is also
relevant in case one would like to analyse the effects of ’global’ shocks, like
population ageing.
In the model of this chapter government debt and the PAYG pension system
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differ in their degree of risk. Government debt is denominated in nominal
terms and therefore contains inflation risk, while the PAYG pension scheme is
totally risk-free. This assumption may look strange as a PAYG system is often
seen as implicit debt and it is not obvious a priori why PAYG pension benefits
will not be guaranteed in nominal terms and therefore also contain inflation
risk. We make this assumption, however, to incorporate the fact that a PAYG
pension scheme also serves as a risk-sharing and diversification device. Gov-
ernment debt, on the other hand, provides an extra investment opportunity
for people besides the investment in physical capital. We also discuss whether
the results would change if we relax this assumption about the difference in
riskiness between government bonds and PAYG pension benefits and contend
that this will not qualitatively change our main results.
The chapter is organised as follows. First, we present a stochastic version
of the standard two-period overlapping-generations model with government
debt and PAYG pensions. We use the method of Campbell and Viceira (2002)
to derive an explicit solution for portfolio choice. This model is used to anal-
yse the effects of risk aversion, PAYG pensions, and inflation risk on portfolio
choice and savings, both in partial equilibrium (Section 4.3) and general equi-
librium (Section 4.4). In general equilibrium we also obtain the effects on the
excess return. Section 4.5 discusses whether the results would change if we
relax the assumption that government debt and PAYG pensions differ in their
riskiness. The main findings of the chapter are summarised in Section 4.6.
4.2 Model
In order to analyse the effects of PAYG pensions and inflation risk on port-
folio choice and the excess return we develop a two-period overlapping-
generations (OLG) model of a closed economy with a PAYG pension scheme
and government debt. We use the framework of Campbell and Viceira (2002)
to derive an explicit solution for the portfolio choice of consumers. All vari-
ables in the model are expressed as the amount per young individual in the
country and small letters refer to the logarithm of the respective variable.
4.2.1 Risk factors
There are two risk factors, there is productivity risk on stocks and inflation
risk on government bonds.
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Production
Production per worker is described by a standard neoclassical constant-
returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function:
F(At, Kt) = AtKαt (4.1)
where At denotes productivity at time t, α the production elasticity, and Kt
the amount of capital per young individual at time t. Profit maximisation and
perfect competition among producers results in the usual equilibrium condi-
tions:
Wt = (1− α)AtKαt (4.2)
Rk,t + δ = αAtKα−1t (4.3)
where Wt is the real wage, Rk,t the return to capital and δ the depreciation rate
of capital. We adopt the Campbell and Viceira (2002) approach and assume
that the gross return on capital (1 + Rk,t) is lognormal distributed1. To achieve
this we have to assume that At is lognormal distributed and that there is 100%
depreciation, i.e., δ = 1. This implies that both Wt and Rk,t are stochastic.
People do not have to form expectations about Wt, however, as At is already
known before Wt is paid (see Figure 4.1). People base their saving- and port-
folio decisions on the future return of capital, so they do have to form expec-
tations about this variable. In Appendix 4.A.1 we derive that the variance
of the log of the gross return on capital is equal to the variance of the log of
productivity, i.e.,




1In case a variable X is lognormally distributed, this means that:




The expectation and variance of X are equal to:











Government debt is denominated in nominal terms and therefore there is in-
flation risk on the return on government bonds. The real return on govern-
ment bonds is equal to:




where RNb,t is the nominal return on government bonds and πt the inflation
rate between t− 1 and t. The nominal return RNb,t is a predetermined variable
and we assume that the inflation factor ( 11+πt ) is lognormally distributed. In
Appendix 4.A.2 we derive that:










The risk on government bonds could also be interpreted as default risk. There
are no risk-free indexed bonds, which implies that there is a missing market.
Safe income in the second period of life, like PAYG pensions or defined-benefit
funded pensions, would (partly) fill this gap.
4.2.2 Timing
The sequence of events is shown in Figure 4.1. At the beginning of period t,
the capital stock Kt and the nominal interest rate on government bonds RNb,t are
inherited from the last period, as they are determined by the savings and port-
folio decisions made in the previous period. Then, productivity and inflation
are revealed. With this knowledge firms choose factor employment and the
real return on government bonds is determined. Subsequently, households
make their portfolio choice γt and saving decisions St (and thereby consump-
tion decisions), which are also based on the expected future asset returns. This
implies that consumers only face uncertainty about the return on their sav-
ings.
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4.2.3 Consumers
Expected lifetime utility of a representative individual born at t is given by the














where CYt is consumption when young at time t, C
O
t+1 is consumption in the
second period of life, θ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ρ > 0 stands
for the rate of time preference and εt+1 is the probability that an agent born at
t lives throughout old age. Only consumption in the second period of life is
uncertain because the rates of return depend on the realisations of At+1 and
πt+1, which are unknown at t when decisions about savings St are made (see
Figure 4.1).
People can either invest in firm stocks which yield the stochastic return
Rk,t+1 or in government bonds with the stochastic return Rb,t+12. The part
of savings that is invested in equities is denoted by γt, so that the return on
the portfolio can be defined as:
Rp,t+1 ≡ γtRk,t+1 + (1− γt)Rb,t+1 (4.10)
Young agents inelastically supply one unit of labour. We assume perfect an-
nuity markets, which implies that the assets of those who deceased are dis-




. The consolidated lifetime budget constraint is:







where TPt are lump-sum PAYG pension contributions and T
B
t are taxes to fi-
nance the interest obligations on the government debt, so as to keep debt per
capita constant. Individuals receive a pension benefit ZPt+1 when old
3. Max-
imising lifetime utility with respect to the lifetime budget constraint gives the
2We assume that individuals or firms do not issue bonds. In a two-period OLG model
individuals can only issue bonds if agents are heterogenous. Moreover, if firms can issue
bonds besides stocks the decision-making process about the financing structure of firms has
to be modelled. Both extensions will complicate the analysis to a large extent and therefore
we leave these for future research.
3Now we assumed a lump-sum PAYG scheme, but as soon as the PAYG pension benefits
















where j = p, k, b. To derive an explicit solution for the portfolio choice γt, we
follow the approach of Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Campbell and Viceira
(2002) and assume that the joint distribution of consumption and returns is
lognormal. In Appendix 4.B.1 we show the derivation of the optimal solution
for portfolio choice, which is given by:
γt =





where σ2k−b,t is the variance of the excess return of stocks over bonds, σk−b,bt
is the covariance between the excess return and the return on bonds, and zt is
the part of expected old-age consumption financed by PAYG pensions:
zt =
ZPt+1






Appendix 4.B.2 derives the optimal conditions for consumption when young
and savings in the general case. For later reference we show here the optimal
conditions for savings in three special cases. First, consider the case where
there is no PAYG scheme, i.e., z = TP = ZP = 0, we refer to this as the funded
case. This means that we assume that people treat funded pension savings
the same as their private savings and the pension scheme does not affect the











θ−1 εt+1 + (1 + ρ)
1
θ
(Wt− TB,Ft ) (4.15)
It is also useful to show the optimal conditions in case θ = 1, that is, when the
case one wants to analyse the risk-sharing properties of PAYG pension schemes. Wage-linked
PAYG pension benefits will only result in better diversification when wages are imperfectly
correlated with stock market returns. This is not the case in our model, however, as productiv-
ity risk affects both wages and the rate of return on capital. To allow for imperfect correlation
between labour and capital income an often-used trick is to assume that there is depreciation
risk besides productivity risk. We leave this for future research as this would complicate the
analysis to a large extent.
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Notice that as soon people have a logarithmic utility function and there are no
PAYG pensions, they do not react to changes in uncertainty or rates of return
(see equation (4.17)).
4.2.4 Government
The government budget constraint is given by:
(1 + nt+1)Bt+1 = (1 + Rb,t)Bt +
εt
1 + nt
ZPt − TPt − TBt (4.18)
where public debt per young individual at time t is denoted by Bt and nt is
the population growth rate between t − 1 and t. The government can accu-
mulate debt for a certain period of time, but on a given moment it has to raise
additional contributions so as to keep debt per worker constant. These taxes






they have to be equal to:
TBt = (Rb,t − nt+1) B (4.19)
Note that Rb,t is known at time t as both RNb,t and πt are already known at the
beginning of period t (see Figure 4.1).
4.2.5 Capital market equilibrium
The capital market is in equilibrium when savings at time t finance the capital
stock and the government debt in the next period:
St = (1 + nt+1) (Bt+1 + Kt+1) (4.20)
Moreover, portfolio choice has to be such that the right part of savings goes to
the capital stock and the government debt:
γtSt = (1 + nt+1)Kt+1 (4.21)
(1− γt)St = (1 + nt+1)Bt+1 (4.22)
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As soon equation (4.20) and equation (4.21) (equation (4.22)) hold, equation
(4.22) (equation (4.21)) also holds. This implies that there are two equilibrium
conditions and Kt+1 and RNb,t+1 adjust to make sure that these equilibrium
conditions hold. In Appendix 4.C we discuss the stability of the model.
4.3 Partial equilibrium
We consider three shocks that affect the portfolio decision of households di-
rectly; more risk aversion, the introduction of a PAYG pension scheme and
higher inflation risk. Our model can be used to analyse these shocks in a
general equilibrium framework. First, however, we consider what happens if
we take a partial equilibrium approach, the approach normally taken in the
finance literature. This is done in order to gain insight into the differences
between the two approaches. In partial equilibrium one only considers the
effects on individual choices and does not take into account that these indi-
vidual choices together may have macroeconomic consequences and change
the rates of return. In other words, in partial equilibrium the capital stock and
the rates of return are exogenous and fixed.
We use the method of comparative dynamics, adopted from Judd (1982), to
calculate the effects of various shocks analytically. The process of the variable
that changes (xt) is given by:
xt = x + ζhxt (4.23)
where x is the steady state value of xt, hxt is the time pattern of a perturba-
tion of this steady-state value and ζ is the magnitude of this perturbation. By
taking the derivative with respect to ζ, we derive the changes of the various
variables. A rise in variable xt in reflected by hxt > 0.
4.3.1 Risk aversion
In this subsection we address the effects of higher risk aversion by analysing
the move from a utility function where θ = 1 to a utility function where θ > 1.
We mainly do this to compare it to the effects of the second shock, the effects
of introducing safe PAYG pensions, which shows that PAYG pensions make
people less risk averse. Moreover, the effect of higher risk-aversion on savings
are not very straightforward. We obtain a simple expression for the change in
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savings where the various effects can easily be distinguished. To focus solely
on the effects of higher risk aversion, we assume that there is no PAYG scheme
in place, that is, z = TP = ZP = 0. The time pattern of this shock is:
θt = 1 + ζhθt (4.24)
where hθt > 0.




−[log E(1 + Rk)− log E(1 + Rb)]
σ2k−b
hθt < 0 (4.25)
which shows that people invest a smaller part of their savings in stocks when
they become more risk averse. The fall in γt results in a lower variance and
expected return on the portfolio:
∂σ2pt
∂ζ










where the term between the brackets in equation (4.26) is positive as long as
the hedge term (σk−b,b) is not too negative.
Since θ represents both the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the in-















(1 + ρ + ε)2
(W − TB) hθt (4.28)
Savings are affected in two ways when there is uncertainty (see also Sandmo
(1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971)). First, higher riskiness makes it nec-
essary to save more in order to protect oneself against very low levels of future
consumption, this is the income effect. Secondly, there is a substitution effect;
an increase in the degree of risk makes the consumer less inclined to expose
his/her resources to the possibility of loss, so that savings fall. Or in the words
of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971): "Increased uncertainty in the return on sav-
ings will lower savings because ’a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush’"
(p. 69). In case θ > 1, the income effect dominates the substitution effect,
so that uncertainty leads to higher savings. This is the precautionary savings
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motive and is represented by the first term between the brackets: for a given
level of uncertainty σ2p a rise of the coefficient of relative risk aversion from the
point θ = 1 increases savings.
The second term between the brackets shows the consumption smoothing
motive. A higher θ also implies a lower intertemporal substitution elasticity,
which means that individuals find it more important to smooth consumption.
The sign of this effect depends on the relative size of the rate of time prefer-
ence ρ compared to the expected portfolio return E(Rp). In case ρ > E(Rp), the
rate of time preference is relatively high and consumption when young will
be relatively high. But when θ increases this means that an individual would
like to smooth consumption more, which implies that the consumer increases
his/her savings, so that consumption when young and old-age consumption
will be closer to each other. In that case the consumption smoothing effect of
a higher θ reinforces the precautionary savings effect, so that savings unam-
biguously rise when θ rises. In case ρ < E(Rp), however, the consumption
smoothing effect is opposite to the precautionary savings effect, the reason
being that consumption when young will be relatively low as the rate of time
preference is relatively low, which implies that savings fall when θ rises. We
assume that savings rise when a consumer becomes more risk averse, which is
the case when ρ > E(Rp)4 or when the precautionary savings effect dominates
the consumption smoothing effect in case ρ < E(Rp).
4.3.2 PAYG pensions
In this subsection we analyse the effects of introducing safe PAYG pensions
and take θ = 1. It turns out that in that case consumers act in the exact oppo-
site way as a consumer that becomes more risk averse. Safe PAYG pensions
make people less risk averse and they act as someone with 0 < θ < 1 who
does not get a PAYG pension. We assume that there is no PAYG system in the
initial steady state, i.e., TP = ZP = z = 0, and there is a marginal increase in




where hzt+1 > 0.
4This assumption is supported by the fact that the estimates for the rate of time preference
are normally quite high, see Frederick et al. (2002) for an overview of various studies.
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E(1 + Rp) exp(−12 σ2p)S/ε[
E(1 + Rp) exp(−12 σ2p)S/ε + ZP
]2 hzt+1 > 0 (4.30)
A rise of zt induces people to invest a larger part of their savings in stocks.









The variance of the log portfolio return σ2pt and the expected return on the port-
folio EtRp,t+1 rise because γt goes up (see equations (4.26) and (4.27) in the pre-
vious subsection). This result shows that for a marginal increase of the PAYG
pension benefit, where there was no PAYG system in the initial steady state,
people will take more risk and increase their relative holdings of stocks. We
cannot prove this for the general case when there already is a PAYG scheme
in place, the reason being that in that case we have feedback effects from σ2pt,
EtRp,t+1, and St to zt, see equation (4.14). Simulations show5, however, that
the direct effect via ZPt+1 dominates, and that the other effects are of a second-
order nature. Moreover, only the effect via EtRp,t+1 weakens the direct effect
of higher PAYG pension benefit. A higher σ2pt and lower savings (see below)
reinforce the initial effect on zt.
Actually what happens is that a safe PAYG pension benefit gives retired peo-
ple a source of income that is non-stochastic, so that the variance of old-age
consumption is reduced. This can be seen very clearly from equation (4.77) in
Appendix 4.B.1. This induces people to reoptimise their portfolio when PAYG
benefits increase.
The PAYG pension scheme lowers savings, that is, when people know they
will receive a safe PAYG pension benefit when they are retired and have to
















The last shock we analyse that directly affects the portfolio decision of con-
sumers is an increase in the riskiness of government bonds, i.e, inflation risk
5See Section 4.3.4 for more details.
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goes up. This shows how people react to more uncertainty. A rise in inflation






where hσπt > 0.
In case inflation risk rises this implies that the risk on bonds increases and






hσπt > 0 (4.34)
Taking the derivative of equation (4.69) in Appendix 4.B.1 with respect to ζ










< 0 when σk−b,b< 0
]
hσπt (4.35)
A rise in inflation risk affects portfolio risk in three ways. First, a rise in infla-
tion risk increases the risk on the portfolio directly. Second, as people move to
the more risky asset the risk on the portfolio increases even more. Third, when
inflation risk rises, the hedge term (σk−b,bt = σkb,t − σ2bt) falls, which decreases
portfolio risk. As long as the third effect is not too strong, the riskiness of the
portfolio σ2pt will rise after a rise in the variance of the log benchmark return,
not only because this increases portfolio risk directly, but also because people
invest a larger part of their savings in stocks. The rise in γt also increases the
expected return on the portfolio (see equation (4.27)).
For the effect on savings we distinguish three cases. In the first case we
analyse the effects when there is no PAYG scheme (the funded case) and the
coefficient of relative risk aversion is equal to one. In the second case there is
still no PAYG scheme, but θ > 1 and the third case analyses the effects when
people have PAYG pension benefits, but θ = 1.
Equation (4.17) shows that people do not react to changes in risk or return
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Savings are affected in two ways when inflation risk rises. On the one hand
there is an upward pressure on savings because portfolio risk rises (see equa-
tion (4.35)). People with θ > 1 will have more precautionary savings when
the risk on the portfolio increases. On the other hand, savings fall because the
expected return on the portfolio rises. To know which effect dominates we
rewrite equation (4.15) to:
SFt =
exp[12(1− θ)(γ2t σ2k−b,t − σ2bt)][Et(1 + Rb,t+1)]
1
θ−1εt+1
exp[12(1− θ)(γ2t σ2k−b,t − σ2bt)][Et(1 + Rb,t+1)]
1
θ−1εt+1 + (1 + ρ)
1
θ
(Wt − TB,Ft )
(4.38)
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tion (4.37) dominates and savings rise when inflation risk increases.
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To analyse the effect of a rise in inflation risk in case of a PAYG pension
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The third line shows that the net present value of the PAYG pension benefit,
i.e.,
εt+1ZPt+1
Et(1+Rp,t+1) exp(− 12 σ2pt)
, is affected in two ways. First, the rise in the expected
portfolio return decreases the net present value of the pension benefit, which
affects savings positively (effect 1). Second, the increase of the variance of
the log portfolio return affects savings negatively (effect 2). This second ef-
fect is in line with the reasoning of Section 4.3.2 where we noticed that people
with a PAYG pension and θ = 1 act as consumers with 0 < θ < 1 without
a PAYG pension. In that case the substitution effect of uncertainty dominates
the income effect (see Section 4.3.1), so that savings fall when the risk on the
portfolio rises. Moreover, on the basis of equation (4.39) we expect that the
effect of the increase in the riskiness of the portfolio (σ2pt) dominates the effect
of the higher expected portfolio return (EtRp,t+1) and savings fall when infla-
tion risk rises. There is, however, an extra effect of PAYG pensions, which is
shown in the second line of equation (4.40) and is denoted by a 3. This effect
shows that when part of old-age consumption is safe, that is, when people re-
ceive a safe PAYG pension benefit (i.e., z > 0), a rise in the level of uncertainty
(σ2pt rises) induces people to save more. The intuition is that a (higher) PAYG
pension benefit increases safe income in the second period of life, which in-
crease savings as the substitution effect of uncertainty dominates. This effect
will become more important when the level of uncertainty increases. The ul-
timate effect of inflation risk on individual savings is therefore ambiguous. In
the baseline simulation of Section 4.3.4 savings fall after a rise in inflation risk,
which implies that effect 2 is dominant. A consumer with a PAYG pension
benefit and θ = 1 indeed acts as someone with 0 < θ < 1.
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4.3.4 Summary partial equilibrium effects
To make the comparison with the effects in general equilibrium relatively easy
we summarise the main findings of this section in Table 4.1. The first col-
umn shows the effects of a marginal increase of the coefficient of relative risk
aversion from θ = 1 to θ > 1 as discussed in Section 4.3.1. The second col-
umn summarises the effects of safe PAYG pensions as described in Section
4.3.2. Comparing these two columns shows that safe PAYG pensions have ex-
actly the opposite effects as higher risk aversion, which demonstrates that safe
PAYG pensions make individuals act like less risk averse agents. This implies
that they save less and invest a larger part of their savings in stocks. The last
three columns show the effects of a rise in the riskiness of the benchmark as-
set, i.e., more inflation risk (Section 4.3.3). This induces people to reoptimise
their investment portfolio and invest a larger part of their savings in stocks.
The saving effects of an increase in the overall amount of risk in the economy
depend on whether a PAYG pension scheme is in place and the value of the
coefficient of relative risk aversion. In case retirees do not receive a safe PAYG
pension benefit and θ = 1 (funded case, third column) savings does not react
to changes in risk. Savings rise in case θ > 1 (and no PAYG pension scheme
is in place, fourth column) as precautionary savings will be higher when the
level of uncertainty rises. Safe PAYG pensions in combination with a coeffi-
cient of relative risk aversion of one make people behave like less risk averse
individuals, so that savings fall after a rise in inflation risk.
Table 4.1: Partial equilibrium effects
σ2π
θ > 1 PAYG Funded θ > 1 PAYG
γ - + + + +
σ2p - + + + +
E(Rp) - + + + +
S + - 0 + -
Table 4.1 shows the qualitative effects of the various experiments analysed
in this section. The analytical derivations in this section are based on spe-
cific experiments and serve to disentangle the various mechanisms behind
the results. To infer whether the results also hold in more general cases we
have to resort to numerical simulations. For the baseline simulation we took
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F(At, Kt) = K0.3t so we take E(A) = 1, ε = 0.94, n = 0, δ = 1 and E(π) = 0.
Agents are relatively patient with a time preference rate of 1% per year and
we assume that one period is 30 years so that ρ = (1.01)30− 1 = 0.3478. There
is no PAYG pension scheme in place and θ = 1. Moreover, the level of gov-
ernment debt is equal to 0.025, which implies that there is still an equilibrium
(see also Appendix 4.C). We take σ2a = 0.2 and σ2π = 0.01, which roughly cor-
responds to an annual standard deviation of 8.2% for stock returns and 1.8%
for bond returns, assuming that the returns are serially uncorrelated6. In this
baseline scenario γ = 0.84. To test the sensitivity of the results we ran many
simulation experiments with various parameter values. This did not change
our qualitative findings, however.
To get some feeling for the size of the effects, Table 4.2 shows the effect on
portfolio choice with some other parameter configurations. A rise of the coef-
ficient of relative risk aversion to 5 results in a more realistic value of 0.21 for
γ (see Guiso et al., 2001). The introduction of a (safe) PAYG pension scheme
where TP = 0.2W increases γ to 1.49 in case θ = 1 and to 0.32 when θ = 5,
implying that safe PAYG pension benefits have a significant effect on portfolio
choice. A rise in inflation risk to σ2π = 0.05, on the other hand, increases γ
from 0.84 to 0.87 when θ = 1 and from 0.21 to 0.33 when θ = 5, showing that
more risk averse people respond much more strongly to a rise in uncertainty.
Table 4.2: Portfolio choice (γ)
θ = 1 θ = 5
Funded (TP = 0) 0.84 0.21
PAYG (TP = 0.2W) 1.49 0.32
σ2π = 0.05 0.87 0.33
4.4 General equilibrium
In general equilibrium the capital stock and the rates of return are endoge-
nously determined, which implies that we can also analyse the effects of the
various shocks on the excess return. It turns out that in general equilibrium
the portfolio effects of the shocks analysed in the previous section are oppo-
6Here we follow Campbell and Viceira (2005) who show that returns on stocks are signifi-
cantly less volatile when the investment horizon is long and inflation risk on nominal bonds
increases with the investment horizon.
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site to the partial equilibrium effects. In Appendix 4.D we derive a general
framework to analyse the effects of the different shocks.
4.4.1 Risk aversion
We analyse the same shock as in partial equilibrium, that is, we analyse the
effect of a marginal increase of θ from the point θ = 1 and the time pattern
of this shock is given in equation (4.24). We use the framework in Appendix
4.D to derive the first-order conditions for Kt+1 and RNb,t+1. Notice that in case
of a rise of θ, the PAYG contributions and benefits do not change, this also
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These two equations can be used to analyse the effects of a higher θ over time.
Risk aversion rises permanently at time t, i.e., hθt = h
θ
t+1 = . . . = h
θ
∞ > 0.
There are two partial equilibrium effects. First, as people become more risk
averse they would like to have a more conservative portfolio and move from
stocks to government bonds. In that case, however, too much savings go
to the government debt and because the level of government debt is given,
RNb,t+1 will fall to make sure that γ does not fall. This effect is denoted by a
1 in equation (4.42). Second, we have the direct effect on savings, see equa-
tion (4.28). As explained in Section 4.3.1 the effect of a higher θ depends on
the sign of ρ − E(Rp), but we assume that a higher θ results in higher sav-
ings7. For a given level of government debt, higher savings result in a higher
capital-labour ratio, this is effect 2. Moreover, higher savings combined with
7In case ρ < E(Rp) and this consumption smoothing effect is large enough to dominate the
precautionary savings effect, so that savings actually fall after a rise of θ, the effects described
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a constant level of government debt have to result in a higher γt, to make this
happen RNb,t+1 will fall. This effect is captured by the first term in equation
(4.42); when Kt+1 increases, the nominal interest rate on government debt will
fall. Effects 1 and 2 are the initial effects of a rise of θ on Kt+1 and RNb,t+1.
What happens over time? The fall of RNb,t+1 results in a lower debt tax, which
implies that people can spend more and increase their savings. As explained
above, higher savings result in a higher capital-labour ratio (Kt+2 goes up,
effect 3) and a lower interest rate on the government debt, i.e., RNb,t+2 falls. The
rise in the capital-labour ratio at time t + 1 results in higher wages, so that
savings at t + 1 increase even more. This reinforces the effect via RNb,t+1, i.e.,
Kt+2 increases (effect 4) and RNb,t+2 decreases. This process continues until the
economy reaches a new steady state.









This equation shows very clearly that, with a constant level of government
debt, a larger capital stock has to lead to a higher γ. This is even more clear
when you look at equation (4.22), which we repeat here for convenience:
(1− γt)St = (1 + nt+1)Bt+1 (4.44)
As savings rise and the right-hand side does not change, γ has to increase to
make sure that the capital market is in equilibrium. The rise of γ also leads to a
higher variance of the log portfolio return. The rate of return on stocks falls as
a result of the higher capital-labour ratio and the rate of return on bonds falls
as well, so that the expected return on the portfolio would decrease. A higher
γ, on the other hand, results in an upward pressure on the portfolio return.
From equation (4.118) in Appendix 4.D.2 we deduce that it is most likely that
the expected return on the portfolio falls after a rise of θ, which means that the
effects of the lower rates of return dominate the effect of a higher γ. A general
equilibrium framework also allows us to analyse the effect on the excess return
of stocks over bonds. From equation (4.120) in Appendix 5.D we can infer that
in the main text will be opposite. That is, in the long run, K will fall, RNb rises and γ falls. This
is the case, for example, when the PAYG system is large enough. The reason for this is that a
PAYG system leads to crowding out of capital, which result in higher rates of return. In the
baseline simulation of Section 4.3.4, E(Rp) is larger than ρ when TP = 0.15W.
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the log excess return of stocks over bonds rises. More risk averse investors will
demand a higher risk premium.
There are two points of interest when θ > 1 in a general equilibrium model.
First, higher values for the coefficient of relative risk aversion do not lead
to more realistic values for γt. In a general equilibrium framework portfo-
lio choice has to be such that the capital market is in equilibrium. In case θ
rises there is a downward pressure on γt. The number of government bonds
is given, however, so that the nominal return on government bonds adjusts to
make sure that γt does not fall. A fall in RNb,t+1 means that the debt tax falls and
savings rise. Higher savings with a constant level of government debt imply
a higher γt. So in general equilibrium higher risk aversion leads to a higher
γt instead of a lower γt. This implies that assuming a high value for θ will
not give more realistic values for γt in general equilibrium. In general equi-
librium portfolio choice is determined by the relative size of the capital stock
compared to the government debt, which implies that γt is always relatively
high8.
Second, savings rise with the level of θ and the economy may become dy-
namically inefficient when θ > 1. The problem is, however, that it is diffi-
cult to determine whether the economy is dynamically inefficient or not in a
stochastic OLG model. As shown by Demange (2002) a stochastic economy
with overlapping-generations is Pareto efficient in case there does not exist
a Pareto improving allocation in the market. This has to be the case for all
states of nature, which makes the verification quite difficult. A solution for
this problem could be to use Epstein-Zin preferences (Epstein and Zin (1989,
1991)), where the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is not necessarily the
inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. This implies that portfolio
choice and saving decisions can be separated from each other. Risk aversion
is the main determinant of portfolio choice, while the intertemporal substitu-
tion elasticity is more important for savings decisions. In that case one could
analyse the effects of higher risk aversion without changing the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution, so that savings are hardly affected and the economy
stays dynamically efficient. With Epstein-Zin preferences the model would
lose its analytical tractability, however, and we leave this possibility for future
research.
8This result may change in case individuals and firms also issue bonds. This would com-
plicate the analysis to a large extent, however, see footnote 2.
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4.4.2 PAYG pensions
The time pattern of the shock is given in equation (4.29), so we analyse the
effects of a marginal increase of the PAYG pension benefit in case there is no
PAYG scheme in the initial steady state. We use the framework in Appendix
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Substituting equation (4.30) from Section 4.3.2 into equation (4.115) from Ap-



















We use equations (4.47) and (4.48) to analyse what happens over time when
the government announces at time t that it will introduce a PAYG pension
scheme in the next period, that is, at time t + 19. People that are young at time
t know they will receive a safe PAYG pension benefit when they are retired,
which makes them less risk averse. This implies that young people would
like to take more risk with the investment of their savings and increase their




t+2 = . . . = h
z
∞ > 0.
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holdings of stocks. In that case, however, the given stock of government debt
cannot be financed, so that RNb,t+1 will rise to make sure that γt does not rise.
This effect is denoted by a 1 in equation (4.48). Young people at time t will also
decrease their savings as they know they will receive a safe pension benefit
when they are old. Lower savings imply that less money is available for the
capital stock, so that the capital-labour ratio falls, this is effect 2 in equation
(4.47). Moreover, lower savings with a given level of government debt imply
that γt has to fall, to make sure that enough savings go to the government debt.
To attract a larger part of the savings the nominal rate of return on government
debt (RNb,t+1) will rise. This effect reinforces effect 1.
At the time of the implementation, i.e., at t + 1, we have the same effects as
at time t, but the working people at t + 1 also have to pay PAYG contributions.
Therefore savings of young people at t + 1 decrease even more, which means
that Kt+2 falls even more (effect 3) and RNb,t+2 rises even more. Moreover, as
savings already fell in t, we had that RNb,t+1 went up and Kt+1 went down,
resulting in a higher debt tax and lower wages. This implies that people have
less to spend and savings continue to decrease, so that K continues to decrease
(effects 4 and 5) and RNb continues to rise. This process continues until the
economy reaches a new steady state.
Note that effects 2 and 3 are the direct negative savings effects of PAYG pen-
sions that were also present in partial equilibrium, see equation (4.32). These
affect the capital-labour ratio negatively. Using equations (4.43) and (4.44)
from the previous subsection we know that γ has to decrease to make sure
that the capital market is in equilibrium. The fall of γ also leads to a smaller
variance of the log portfolio return. Equation (4.118) in Appendix 4.D.2 shows
that the expected return on the portfolio probably rises when the government
introduces a PAYG pension scheme. As noted before, a safe PAYG pension
benefit makes consumers less risk averse, this will reduce the risk premium
of stocks over bonds. Using equation (4.120) in Appendix 5.D, we can in-
deed conclude that the log excess return falls after the introduction of a PAYG
scheme. This is in line with the findings of Campbell and Nosbusch (2007).
They have to rely on numerical simulations, however, and assume that phys-
ical capital is in fixed supply.
In partial equilibrium as well as in general equilibrium a PAYG pension sys-
tem leads to lower savings. In partial equilibrium, moreover, a PAYG system
induces individuals to take more risk, i.e., γ will increase. In general equilib-
rium, however, PAYG pensions cannot result in a higher γ, the reason being
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that lower investment in government debt would lead to an oversupply of
government bonds. Therefore, γ has to fall to make sure that the government
debt is financed. The nominal rate of return on government bonds will rise to
make this happen. In partial equilibrium, however, rates of return are given
as government bonds can be supplied on the international capital market.
4.4.3 Inflation risk
The time pattern of an increase in inflation risk is given in equation (4.33).
We distinguish between the funded and PAYG case. We do not consider the
case where θ > 1 like we did in partial equilibrium, because (as described in
Section 4.4.1) in general equilibrium a θ > 1 may lead to a dynamic inefficient
economy and does not help to obtain more realistic values for portfolio choice.










In case the country has a fully-funded pension system, the process of Kt+1 and


























If inflation risk increases, people would like to invest more in stocks, that is,
there is an upward pressure on γt. For a given level of savings, this implies
that government debt is not financed. To correct for this, RNb,t+1 will rise, this
is effect 1. In case the nominal interest rate on government bonds increases,
the debt tax has to go up and people can spend less, which decreases their
savings. With a constant level of government debt, a fall in savings imply a
lower capital-labour ratio at t + 2 (effect 2). Moreover, lower savings imply
that γt has to decrease, to make this happen RNb,t+2 will rise. A lower capital-
labour ratio implies lower wages, which decreases savings even more, so that
K continues to decrease (effect 3) and RNb continues to increase.
As the capital-labour ratio falls, we know that γ will decrease. The change
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of σ2pt is given by:
∂σ2pt
∂ζ




+ (1− γ)hσπ︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0
(4.51)
As long as σk−b,b is not too negative, the term before
∂γt
∂ζ is positive and there
are two opposing effects on σ2pt. First, the last term shows the direct effect of
a rise in inflation risk. The fall in γ, however, dampens this direct effect. We
assume that the variance of the log portfolio return rises in case σ2π rises, as the
effect via γ is second order. The expected return increases as both the return
on stocks and the return on bonds rise, see equation (4.118) in Appendix 4.D.2.
As government bonds become less attractive to hold, the log excess return on
stocks over bonds falls, see Appendix 5.D.
In partial equilibrium savings did not react to changes in uncertainty. In
general equilibrium, however, the nominal interest rate on government debt
changes to make sure that the capital market is in equilibrium. This results in
a higher debt tax, which decreases savings. So in general equilibrium savings
do react to changes in uncertainty. In general equilibrium lower savings also
imply that γ will fall, so again we have the opposite result for the portfolio
choice compared to partial equilibrium.
PAYG
The analysis becomes more complicated in case the country uses a PAYG pen-
sion scheme, because people react to changes of risk and return. In Appendix
4.E we derive the dynamic equations below. We can still use the method of
comparative dynamics to separate the various effects. However, as there are
different opposing mechanisms, the ultimate signs of the derivatives cannot















































Effect 1 shows the effect we also had in the funded case; because there is
large upward pressure on γt and to make sure that the government debt is
financed, RNb,t+1 will rise. Effects 2 and 3 are the effects of σ
2
pt and EtRp,t+1
on savings, comparable to the partial equilibrium effects described in Section
4.3.3. On the one hand, the return on the portfolio rises, which decreases the
net present value of the pension benefit and induces people to increase their
savings (SPRp > 0). This effect causes an upward pressure on the capital-labour
ratio (effect 2) and a downward pressure on the nominal interest rate on gov-
ernment bonds. On the other hand, the variance of the log portfolio return
will rise and when we assume that the substitution effect of uncertainty domi-
nates when there is a PAYG pension system in place, savings will fall (SP
σ2p
/ 0).
Lower savings induce a lower KPt+1 (effect 3) and a higher R
N
b,t+1. Simulations
show that savings fall10 after an increase of σ2πt, so effect 3 dominates effect 2
and KPt+1 falls and R
N
b,t+1 rises. This reinforces the initial effect on savings via
the nominal interest rate on government debt and the debt tax, so that KPt+1
and RNb,t+1 move in the same direction as in the funded case. This implies that
the effects on the other variables are also qualitatively the same, only quanti-
tatively the effects will be stronger.
4.4.4 Summary general equilibrium effects
Table 4.3 gives an overview of the general equilibrium effects. Comparing
these results with the results in Table 4.1, shows that in general equilibrium
portfolio choice is affected in exactly the opposite way as in partial equilib-
rium. Individually, consumers would like to adjust their portfolio in a certain
direction after a shock. However, as all people in the economy have the same
incentive, this would mean that the capital market does not clear anymore. In
general equilibrium the rates of return adjust in such a way that both the gov-
ernment debt and the capital stock are financed, and portfolio choice moves
in the same direction as savings. The introduction of a PAYG pension scheme,
for example, where the pension benefits are safe (shown in the second column)
makes people less risk averse and they prefer to hold a more risky investment
portfolio. At the same time, however, PAYG pensions reduce savings, imply-
ing that a larger part of savings has to be invested in government bonds (γ has
10This was also the case in partial equilibrium.
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to fall) to finance the fixed supply of public debt. In order to persuade con-
sumers to invest more in government bonds, the return on government bonds
has to rise relative to the return on stocks, i.e., the excess return of stocks over
bonds has to fall. In the same way will the fall in savings that results from
higher inflation risk (last two columns) result in a lower equity premium so
that people invest a larger part of their savings in government bonds and the
capital market is in equilibrium. In case people become more risk averse, the
risk premium of stocks over bonds will rise to clear the capital market as sav-
ings rise.
Table 4.3: General equilibrium effects
σ2π
θ > 1 PAYG Funded PAYG
γ + - - -
S + - - -
K + - - -
RNb - + + +
E(Rk) - + + +
E(Rp) - + + +
log excess return + - - -
σ2p + - + +
We also ran some numerical simulation experiments. In the baseline sce-
nario described in Section 4.3.4, individuals invested 84% of their savings in
stocks. In contrast to the partial equilibrium analysis it is not possible to obtain
more realistic values for portfolio choice with a higher value for the coefficient
of relative risk aversion. In general equilibrium portfolio choice has to be such
that the capital market is in equilibrium, and γ > 0.8 in all considered cases. A
general equilibrium framework also allows us to derive the equity premium.
The baseline simulation produces a simple annual excess return of 0.6 percent-
age points, which is quite low. Assuming a coefficient of relative risk aversion
of 5 results in an equity premium of 3 percentage points, which is more re-
alistic. In that case, however, savings rise to a large extent and the rates of
return on both assets become negative, which makes the economy probably
dynamically inefficient and the results hard to interpret. The introduction of a
PAYG pension scheme where TP = 0.2W decreases the annual risk premium
of stocks over bonds to 0.4 percentage points, while the simple risk premium
falls to 0.5 percentage points after a rise of σ2π to 0.05.
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4.5 Alternative risk characteristics of debt and
pensions
In the model developed in this chapter government debt and the PAYG pen-
sion scheme differ in riskiness. Government debt is denominated in nominal
terms, implying that the return on government bonds contains inflation risk.
PAYG pension benefits, on the other hand, are guaranteed in real terms and
are therefore completely risk-free. The fact that there is no risk-free asset in our
economy means that markets are incomplete and safe PAYG pensions partly
fill the gap of this missing market11. In this section we will discuss whether
the effects of PAYG pensions on portfolio choice and the excess return will
change if we depart from the assumption of different degrees of risk between
government debt and a PAYG pension system.
First consider the case where investment in government debt does not in-
volve any risk because government debt is denominated in real terms. This
implies that there is no market incompleteness anymore as the government
issues indexed bonds that are risk-free. In that case safe PAYG pensions do
not increase diversification opportunities anymore. The effect of PAYG pen-
sions on portfolio choice and the risk premium will not change qualitatively,
however. The introduction of a PAYG pension system or an increase in PAYG
pension benefits still results in an adjustment of the optimal investment port-
folio of consumers. The fact that part of old-age consumption will consist of
a (larger) safe PAYG pension benefit induces individuals to invest less in safe
government bonds and more in stocks, that is, they will reallocate their in-
vestments more towards stocks in partial equilibrium. In general equilibrium,
however, the return on government bonds will rise relative to the return on
stocks, i.e., the equity premium will fall, to make sure that people do not in-
vest more in stocks and the government debt is financed. The fall in savings
11As explained in the introduction financial markets are also incomplete because there can-
not be trade with unborn generations and human capital is not traded. Wage-linked PAYG
benefits could partly remove this market incompleteness and diversification opportunities
are improved when wages are not perfectly correlated with financial market returns. This is
another possibility to allow for imperfect correlation between PAYG pension benefits and the
return on savings, but would not qualitatively change our analysis. As explained in footnote
3, linking pension benefits to wages and allowing for imperfect correlation between financial
market returns and wages would complicate the analysis to a large extent as the PAYG benefit
becomes stochastic in that case and an extra stochastic factor like depreciation risk has to be
added. Therefore we leave this possibility for future research.
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that results from the PAYG pension system will reinforce the negative effect
on the equity premium.
We can also analyse the opposite case where PAYG pension benefits are guar-
anteed in nominal terms. In this case there is inflation risk on government
bonds as well as on PAYG pension benefits, implying that the PAYG pension
system does not remove any of the market incompleteness. Just like the above
case, the introduction of a PAYG pension scheme or higher PAYG pension ben-
efits means that individuals are in principle "forced" to hold an "asset" that has
the same amount of risk as government bonds and therefore they reduce their
investments in government bonds in partial equilbrium. Moreover, the PAYG
pension scheme still reduces savings even though the pension benefit is risky.
The fact that the pension benefit has the same amount of risk as government
bonds implies that the PAYG pension scheme does not affect precautionary
savings. Life cycle savings still fall, however, as people want to smooth con-
sumption. The combination of lower savings and the preference of consumers
to move away from government bonds implies again that the excess return of
stocks over bonds will fall in general equilbrium.
The discussion in this section thus shows that the effects of PAYG pensions
do not depend on the assumption that PAYG pension benefits are risk-free and
the investment in government bonds is risky. This assumption just gives the
PAYG pension the extra function of partly removing a missing market, but is
not crucial for the analysis of this chapter.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we develop a stochastic version of the standard two-period
overlapping-generations model with government debt and PAYG pensions.
The risk on stock returns arises from productivity risk, while inflation risk
makes investing in government bonds risky. We use the method of Camp-
bell and Viceira (2002) to derive an explicit solution for the optimal portfolio
choice of individuals. The major advantage of the model is that it is a general
equilibrium model that is fairly simple and therefore allows us to interpret
the various shocks in a very intuitive way. We study three shocks that all have
a direct effect on the portfolio choice of consumers. First we analyse the ef-
fects of these shocks in a partial equilibrium framework, where the rates of
return are taken as exogenous. In partial equilibrium, only the effects on indi-
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vidual decisions are considered. The macroeconomic effects all these individ-
ual choices together may have, are not incorporated. We show that it really
matters whether the macroeconomic effects are taken into account or not. In
general equilibrium portfolio choice is determined by the relative size of the
capital stock compared to the level of government debt. The rates of return
adjust to make sure that portfolio choice is such that the capital market is in
equilibrium. In case these general-equilibrium effects are not taken into ac-
count, the analysed shocks affect portfolio choice in exactly the opposite way.
This implies that it is important to distinguish between analysing portfolio
choice in a small open economy or in a large (closed) economy, like the US or
the EU. In the first case a partial equilibrium approach would suffice, while a
general equilibrium framework is more appropriate in the latter case. More-
over, it is necessary to take a general equilibrium approach in case a shock
affects a large number of countries, so that it is not very realistic to assume
that rates of return do not change. Population ageing is global phenomenon,
for example, where the change of rates of return have to be taken into account.
The next chapter will analyse population ageing in an (large) open economy
version of the model presented in this chapter.
We also show that in partial equilibrium individuals increase the riskiness
of their investment portfolio when they receive a safe PAYG pension benefit,
as this reduces the variance of their consumption during old-age. In general
equilibrium, however, this cannot occur because government debt will not be
completely financed in that case and the capital market does not clear. Ac-
tually, the fall in savings induced by PAYG pensions implies that the part of
savings invested in government bonds has to rise, i.e., people have to move
to the less risky asset. To attract a larger part of savings the return on gov-
ernment bonds has to rise to a larger extent than the return on stocks, so that
the excess return on stocks over bonds falls. Safe PAYG pensions make con-
sumers act as if they are less risk averse. In partial equilibrium this means
that the investment portfolio is more risky, while in general equilibrium the
risk premium of stocks over bonds will be lower. Recent proposals to reform
PAYG pension schemes where PAYG pension benefits are reduced and private
retirement savings increased have of course the opposite effects. Higher sav-
ings will boost capital accumulation and lower the rates of return. A lower
PAYG pension benefit also means that a smaller part of old-age consumption
is safe, however, which makes people more risk averse. This increases the
demand for the relatively safe asset, i.e., government bonds, and the equity
premium will rise to restore the equilibrium on the capital market. One could
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also argue that in the coming decades people will perceive their PAYG pen-
sion benefit as less safe because they think that the PAYG system will not be
sustainable with the upcoming ageing of the population. This means that the
political risk of PAYG pension systems will increase over time. In that case
people would like to reduce the riskiness of their investment portfolio and the
risk premium of stocks over bonds will rise in general equilibrium.
In order to gain insight into the effects of a higher level of uncertainty in
the economy we also studied a rise in the riskiness of the benchmark asset,
i.e., a rise in inflation risk. Higher inflation risk makes government bonds less
attractive to hold and to induce people to invest in the given amount of gov-
ernment bonds, the return on bonds has to rise relative to the return on stocks.
The higher interest rate on government debt increases the debt tax and sav-
ings will fall when the coefficient of relative risk aversion equals unity. Lower
savings imply that a larger part of savings has to be invested in government
bonds to have a clearing capital market, which reinforces the initial effect on
the equity premium. In the next chapter we will also analyse the effects of
higher inflation risk in a two-country version of the model presented in this
chapter. There, inflation risk rises as a result of large increases in government
debt to cope with the costs of population ageing.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
4.A Derivation variances
In this appendix we derive the variances of the log gross returns.
4.A.1 Return on capital/stocks
Take the logarithm of optimality condition (4.3) and recall the assumption that
δ = 1:
log(1 + Rk,t) = log(α) + log(At) + (α− 1) log(Kt) (4.54)
Now define log(1 + Rk,t) ≡ rk,t and log Xt ≡ xt, where Xt can be any variable,
with the exception of the returns. Now we can write:
rk,t+1 = log(α) + at+1 + (α− 1)kt+1 (4.55)
The expectation of rk,t+1 at time t is:
Etrk,t+1 = log(α) + Etat+1 + (α− 1)kt+1 (4.56)
The variance of rk,t+1 can be derived using equations (4.55) and (4.56).
4.A.2 Return on bonds
Taking logs of equation (4.6) gives:
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which can be used to write:












These two equations can be used to the derive the variance of rb,t+1.
4.B Consumer optimisation
4.B.1 Portfolio choice
Using equation (4.12) we take logs of the portfolio-return Euler condition, i.e.,
j = p :





+ θ log(CYt ) + Et
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where we used the Jensen’s inequality condition for a lognormal random vari-
able X (see also footnote 1):
log EtXt+1 = Et log Xt+1 +
1
2
Vart log Xt+1 (4.61)


































In the same way we can derive the log of the Euler equation of the return on


























Now subtract the benchmark equation (4.63) from portfolio-return equation
(4.62):
Etrp,t+1 − Etrb,t+1 +
1
2





First we derive the terms on the left-hand side of equation (4.64). As the
return on the portfolio is a linear combination of the return on stocks and the
return on bonds (see equation (4.10)) and the log of a linear combination is
not the same as a linear combination of logs, we follow Campbell and Viceira
(2002) and use a Taylor approximation of the nonlinear function relating log
individual-asset returns to log portfolio returns12. First note that equation
(4.10) can be written as:
1 + Rp,t+1 = 1 + Rb,t+1 + γt[(1 + Rk,t+1)− (1 + Rb,t+1)]
Dividing by (1 + Rb,t+1) gives:
1 + Rp,t+1
1 + Rb,t+1







The log of equation (4.65) is:
rp,t+1 − rb,t+1 = log [1 + γt(exp(rk,t+1 − rb,t+1)− 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
f (rk,t+1−rb,t+1)
(4.66)
Now we take a second-order Taylor expansion of f (·) around rk,t+1− rb,t+1 =
0, which gives:




where σ2k−b,t ≡ Vart[log(1 + Rk,t+1) − log(1 + Rb,t+1)] = σ2kt + σ2bt − 2σkb,t, is
the variance of the excess return of the risky asset over the benchmark return.
From equation (4.67) we know that:




12This approximation holds exactly in continuous time and is an accurate approximation
over short discrete time periods. One may wonder, however, whether this approximation can
still be used in a two-period OLG model with social security, where one period is around 30
years. Viceira (2001), Campbell and Viceira (2002) and in particular the detailed calculations
of Barberis (2000) show that the magnitude of the horizon effects are negligible, which implies
that the approximation is still satisfactory for longer holding periods.
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2σ2k−b,t + 2γtσk−b,bt (4.69)
where σk−b,bt is the covariance of the excess return with the benchmark return,
that is, σk−b,bt ≡ Covt[log(1 + Rk,t+1) − log(1 + Rb,t+1); log(1 + Rb,t+1)] =
σkb,t − σ2bt.
We derive the terms on the right-hand side of equation (4.64) using the life-












log COt+1 = log(1 + Rp,t+1)− log εt+1 + log
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which is equal to:
cot+1 = rp,t+1 − log εt+1
+ log
[





We approximate the term between the brackets with a first-order Taylor ex-
pansion around rp,t+1 = Etrp,t+113:
cot+1 ≈ rp,t+1 − log εt+1
+ log
[












The term zt can be rewritten to:
zt =
ZPt+1





≈ PAYG pension benefit
expected old-age consumption
(4.74)
13This is comparable to the approximation of a linear budget constraint in Campbell (1993).
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so zt is the part of expected old-age consumption financed by PAYG pensions.
Now define yt ≡ log lt + ztEtrp,t+1, so that we can write:
cot+1 ≈ rp,t+1 − log εt+1 + yt − zt rp,t+1 (4.75)
Etcot+1 ≈ Etrp,t+1 − log εt+1 + yt − zt Etrp,t+1 (4.76)
Equation (4.75) and (4.76) can be used to derive the variance of the log of old-
age consumption and the covariance between the log of old-age consumption
and the log portfolio return:
σ2cot = (1− zt)2σ2pt (4.77)
Covt(cot+1; rp,t+1) = (1− zt)σ2pt (4.78)
and the covariance with the log benchmark return:
Covt(cot+1; rb,t+1) = (1− zt)σ2bt + (1− zt)γtσk−b,bt (4.79)
Equation (4.77) shows very clearly that safe PAYG pension benefits lower the
variance of old-age consumption.
Substituting equations (4.68), (4.69), (4.78) and (4.79) into equation (4.64)
gives:





k−b,t + γtσk−b,bt = θ(1− zt)(γt)2σ2k−b,t
+θ(1− zt)γtσk−b,bt
(4.80)
Dividing by γt and rearranging gives:
γt =
Etrk,t+1 − Etrb,t+1 + 12 σ2k−b,t
θ(1− zt)σ2k−b,t










Using the fact that:








gives the expression for γt in terms of simple returns (equation (4.13)).
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4.B.2 Savings
Using equation (4.76) and the definition of yt we can write:
Etcot+1 = Etrp,t+1 − log εt+1 + log lt (4.84)



















































Now use the fact that Etrp,t+1 = Et log(1 + Rp,t+1) = log Et(1 + Rp,t+1)− 12 σ2pt,
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Et(1 + Rp,t+1) exp(−12 σ2pt)
(4.90)
4.C Stability
In case government debt is included in the model, the model can have two
equilibria, a stable and an unstable equilibrium. This is shown in Figure
4.2, point A shows the stable equilibrium and point B is the unstable equi-
librium14. So one has to make sure that the steady state of the economy is at
point A. Another thing to keep in mind is that there is maximum amount of
government debt, i.e., when government debt is too large there is no equilib-
rium anymore.
There are two dynamic equations; equations (4.20) and (4.21), and there are
two pre-determined variables, the capital stock (Kt) and the nominal interest
rate on government bonds (RNb,t). Kt is determined by savings in period t− 1.
RNb,t is the nominal interest rate that is paid at time t on the government debt
that is issued in period t− 1. RNb,t makes sure that γt−1 is such that this govern-
ment debt is financed, so RNb,t is fixed at the beginning of period t. This implies
that for a stable equilibrium the two eigenvalues of the dynamic system given
in equations (4.20) and (4.21) have to be within the unit circle. We checked
this for various parameter values, and both eigenvalues were always within
the unit circle implying that we have stable global equilibrium.
14For stability we need that dKdB < 0, see Croix and Michel (2002) (p. 229f) and Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980) (p. 252).
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4.D Derivation first-order conditions
In this appendix we present a general framework, which we will use to anal-
yse the effects of the different shocks. Again, we use the method of compar-
ative dynamics and equation (4.23) describes the process of the variable that
changes. First we derive the first-order difference equations for the evolution
of the two pre-determined variables, the capital-labour ratio and the nomi-
nal interest rate on government debt. We also derive the first-order difference
equations for the expected portfolio return and the excess return of stocks over
bonds.
4.D.1 Capital-labour ratio and nominal return on government
bonds












We assume that government debt does not change, i.e., ∂Bt+1∂ζ = 0. The total





























We derive every part in this equation around the point where θ = 1 and ZP =
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(1 + ρ + ε)E(1 + Rp) exp(−12 σ2p)
(4.96)
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Ψ ≡ (1 + n)(1 + ρ + ε) (4.101)
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We derive every part in this equation around the point where θ = 1 and ZP =


























































































∂ζ . Substitute this





















where Φ ≡ [K(1+n)(1−γ)σ
2
k−b+(1−α)S](1+RNb )



















where ∂Kt+1∂ζ is given in equation (4.100). Equation (4.100) and (4.115) can be
used to analyse the effects of different shocks over time.
4.D.2 Expected portfolio return












where the last two terms are given in equations (4.111) and (4.112). Using
















E(Rk)(γ− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0 as long as γ> α





(1− γ)E(1 + Rb)





where we used the fact that γS = (1 + n)K.
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4.D.3 Excess return
As people base their portfolio decisions on the log excess return, log Et(1 +
Rk,t+1)− log Et(1 + Rb,t+1), see equation (4.13), we first derive the change in


































Note that the derivative of a log is the percentage change of the respective
variable. This implies that the consumer adjusts his/her portfolio decision on
the basis of the percentage change of the gross returns.





















In case E(Rk) ≈ E(Rb) or α→ 1 the term in front of ∂Kt+1∂ζ approaches zero and
the simple excess return moves in the same direction as the log gross excess re-
turn. On the other hand when E(Rk) and E(Rb) are far apart, the simple excess
return could move in the opposite direction as the log gross excess return. All
shocks analysed in this chapter affect γ directly, and simulations show that in
that case the simple excess return moves in the same direction as the log gross
excess return. The reason for this is that the direct pressure on γ causes a large
response by the nominal return on government bonds.
4.E Effect inflation risk in case of a PAYG scheme
In case there is a PAYG pension scheme in place people do react to changes of
uncertainty and rates of return. This means that the analysis of Appendix 4.D
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Note that we do not take into account that changes of σ2pt also affect zt, this
would complicate the analytical expressions to a large extent. Therefore we
consider this effect as second order and simulations show that this is indeed
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are the same as in equations (4.111),






















15To simplify the analysis we take θ = 1.
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The change of the wage and the debt tax are the same as equations (4.97) and
























































































K(1 + n)(1− γP)(1− z)σ2k−b − (α− 1)SP
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(1 + RNb )




(α− 1)(1 + RNb )− KΦ
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− γP(γP − α) [E(Rk)− E(Rb)] + (α− 1)E(1 + Rb)












































Combining equation (4.144) with equations (4.91) and (4.135) and the defini-

























AGEING, DEBT AND INFLATION IN A
MONETARY UNION
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 we analysed the international spillover effects of pensions under
population ageing in case countries with PAYG pension schemes keep their
pension system balanced, that is, either contributions to the scheme or pension
benefits adjusted in response to an ageing population. In Chapter 3 we inves-
tigated the spillovers of a pension reform where PAYG pension systems are
reduced. This is an often-proposed policy solution to cope with the upcom-
ing problems within social security systems induced by an ageing population.
Another possibility, however, is that governments in PAYG countries use debt
instead to cope with the costs of ageing. High levels of nominal government
debt may give governments an incentive to lobby for surprise inflation at the
central bank as this will reduce the fiscal burden of debt service. The ques-
tion is of course whether the central bank will give in and create unexpected
inflation. The European Central Bank (ECB), for example, is formally inde-
pendent, but the decision-making process about monetary policy is not com-
pletely transparent. In case it is not completely clear how monetary policy
is determined, there is uncertainty about what the final outcome for inflation
will be when public debt levels are high. As a consequence of this uncertainty
about monetary policy, inflation risk may rise with the level of government
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debt. This will affect the spillover effects of ageing discussed in Chapter 2.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore how these spillovers change. More
precisely, we will investigate the international spillover effects of ageing when
the PAYG country uses government debt to cope with the ageing costs, which
will either lead to unexpected inflation or more inflation risk.
The model in this chapter is a combination of the models presented in Chap-
ters 2 and 4. This means that the model presented in the previous chapter is
extended to a two-country model, where one country has fully-funded pen-
sions and the other country relies on PAYG-financed pensions. The two coun-
tries form a monetary union, which implies that the rate of inflation is the
same. In contrast to Chapter 2 consumers allocate their investment portfolio
between stocks and bonds. These assets differ in riskiness, which allows us
to analyse the effect of ageing on the excess return of stocks over bonds. In a
model where the asset returns are uncertain the difference in pension schemes
also implies that people in the two countries have different attitudes towards
risk. As shown in Chapter 4, people who receive a safe PAYG pension benefit
act like less risk averse individuals and prefer to have a more risky portfo-
lio compared to people that do not receive a safe pension benefit, i.e., have
funded pensions. In an open economy, consumers can take advantage of this
difference in risk aversion between the two countries, implying that individ-
uals in the PAYG country have a more risky investment portfolio than people
in the funded country.
An important channel in this chapter is that countries with high debt levels
might be able to put pressure on the central bank to follow an accommodat-
ing policy in order to reduce the debt burden. This implies that we assume
that the monetary authority might not be completely independent and may
have an incentive to inflate away nominal debt. One could argue that this as-
sumption is not very realistic as monetary policy has become more and more
independent in the last decades. We argue, however, that in case PAYG coun-
tries finance their increased pension obligations by issuing more debt, that,
given the scope of projected increases in expenditures (see European Com-
mission (2006)), the accumulation of debt is extensive. These high debt levels
substantially increase the pressure on the central bank to give in. In the Euro-
pean Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) it may happen, for example, that
a group of large countries that rely to a large extent on PAYG-financed pen-
sions (e.g. Italy, Germany and France) put pressure on its national delegates
on the board of the ECB to accommodate. Another argument, put forward for
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example by Annicchiarico et al. (2006), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006), Schabert
and van Wijnbergen (2006), could be that the combination of high nominal
debt and an active inflation targeting policy by the central bank may result
in unstable debt dynamics. The reasoning is that a high level of government
debt increases inflationary pressures. If the central bank raises the nominal
interest rate in response to higher expected inflation, the service costs of debt
rise, which further increases the real debt and thus leads to unstable debt dy-
namics. To avoid an explosive path for debt, the monetary authority has to
follow a "passive" policy such that the rise in inflation reduces real interest
rates and the debt is stabilised. These studies assume Calvo-type price rigidi-
ties and the central bank follows a Taylor-type interest rate rule. In contrast to
these papers we do not model monetary policy explicitly, but we introduce a
simple ad-hoc specification of the link between government debt and inflation
(risk). Moreover, we assume that governments only increase their debt for a
while and make sure that the debt dynamics are stable. The nominal rigid-
ity in our model does not originate from the fact that imperfectly competitive
firms can only change their prices infrequently, but from the fact that people
invest in long-term nominal bonds. This assumption is justified by the fact
that we focus on savings that have to finance old-age consumption, which are
indeed long-term savings. Moreover, the introduction of market-based valu-
ation by regulators forces pension funds to use the yields of fixed-income in-
struments as the basis for discounting liabilities. In response to this, pension
funds hold a larger fraction of long-term bonds to limit the volatility of the
regulatory funding ratios and to reduce the duration gap between assets and
liabilities. Long-term bonds are still mostly denominated in nominal terms1.
Unexpected inflation has real effects because it creates a wedge between the
ex post real interest rate and the ex ante rate.
We show that in a closed-economy setting unexpected inflation is a zero-
sum game. On the one hand, the government gains from unexpected inflation
as it decreases the real value of government debt and the real return on gov-
ernment bonds. On the other hand, those who own government bonds lose
from the unexpected fall of the real return on government bonds2. In a closed
1This is especially relevant for the Netherlands, where a large part of old-age consump-
tion is financed by pension benefits which are taken care of by pension funds. In 2005 the
investment portfolio of the largest pension fund in the Netherlands, the ABP, consisted for 40
percent of nominal bonds (see ABP, 2006, Table 5.5).
2Expected inflation will not have any real effects because people will ask a higher nominal
rate of return on government bonds, so that the real rate of return does not change.
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economy the gain for the government is exactly high enough to compensate
the people who lose from the unexpected inflation shock. In a two-country
model where one country relies on PAYG pensions and the other country has
a fully-funded pension scheme, however, the PAYG country gains from un-
expected inflation at the cost of the funded country. This means that there
may be conflict of interest on monetary policy when countries with different
pension schemes form a monetary union. The reason for this result is that res-
idents of the funded country hold a relatively large share of the total amount
of government bonds because savings in the funded country are higher and
people in the funded country have a more conservative investment portfolio.
This implies that the PAYG country can export part of the inflationary tax on
debt holders to the funded country, while it still receives the full gain of a
lower debt burden and a net gain results. This gain of unexpected inflation
for a PAYG country rises with the amount of nominal government debt, but
this will also increase the loss for the funded country. In the coming decades
the conflict of interest on monetary policy between PAYG and funded coun-
tries may therefore be reinforced if population ageing induces governments of
PAYG countries to raise debt to "finance" their pension system.
We also analyse the spillover effects of ageing when large debt burdens in
PAYG countries cause a rise in inflation risk. The idea is that the conflicting
interests between PAYG- and funded countries about the creation of inflation
results in more uncertainty about what the final outcome of inflation will be
as the decision-making process of the central bank may not be completely
transparent. This uncertainty raises inflation risk and thus increases the riski-
ness of government bonds and the risk on the total portfolio. Higher inflation
risk makes government bonds less attractive to hold and the rate of return on
bonds will rise relative to the return on equity (i.e, the equity premium falls)
to finance the total amount of government debt. This effect is relatively strong
if the funded country holds a relatively large part of the government bonds
as people in the funded country are more risk averse and therefore need to be
compensated more, that is, the rate of return on government bonds has rise to
a larger extent. The increase of the rate of return on government bonds implies
that the costs of government debt rise, which harms both groups of countries.
The analysis in this chapter therefore points out that in a monetary union like
the EMU it may be in the interest of both funded- and PAYG countries to obey
the fiscal constraints stated in the Stability and Growth Pact to prevent large
increases in government debt, which may raise inflation risk. Moreover, it is
important for all countries that a central bank like the ECB is independent,
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credible and transparent to prevent an increase in inflation risk.
A number of other papers have also argued in favour of fiscal restrictions
in case of monetary unification. Chari and Kehoe (2007), for example argue
that there will be a free-rider problem in fiscal policy in case there is a time-
inconsistency problem in monetary policy resulting from an inflation bias by
the central bank. This free-rider problem arises because the fiscal authori-
ties do not fully take into account the cost of higher inflation due to a higher
stock of public debt, as part of these costs wil be borne by residents of other
countries in the monetary union. This results in too much debt accumulation
and an inflation rate that is too high. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) also ar-
gue that monetary unification leads to excessive debt accumulation due to the
lack of commitment in monetary policy and myopic governments. In these
papers the countries in the monetary union are symmetric and the interaction
between monetary policy and fiscal policy is modelled as a game. The ob-
jective function of the central bank comprises the inflation rate, output (gap)
and government debt. In contrast to these papers we take monetary policy as
exogenous, we just note that high debt levels may lead to high inflation (risk).
Moreover, the countries in our model are asymmetric and we show that this
asymmetry has the effect that one country gains from unexpected inflation at
the expense of the other country.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents the open-economy
version of the model presented in Chapter 4. In Section 5.3 we consider the
spillover effects in the benchmark case where no government debt is used by
the PAYG country to cope with the ageing costs. The international spillover
effects are very comparable to the results in Chapter 2. However, as stocks
and bonds differ in their riskiness, the returns on these two assets will differ,
which allows us to derive the effects of population ageing on portfolio choice
and the risk premium. The effects of government debt are discussed in Section
5.4. Government debt crowds out capital, resulting in negative utility effects
in the long run in both countries. The international spillover effects (positive
or negative) become larger in both countries. Section 5.5 analyses the effects
of an unexpected inflation shock where both countries try to compensate the
people that lose from this shock; the elderly. As explained above the govern-
ment in the PAYG country can implement a policy that is Pareto improving
in its own country, while the residents in the funded country necessarily lose.
This result shows that within the EMU there will be conflicting interests be-
tween different groups of countries in setting monetary policy in case debt
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of capital-importing (PAYG) countries reach high levels. Section 5.6 explores
the spillover effects in case these conflicts of interest on monetary policy raise
inflation risk. This will increase the riskiness of government bonds and will
affect utility negatively in both countries. Section 5.7 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Model
As the model in this chapter builds on the model presented in the previous
chapter, we do not repeat the whole model, but only present the model equa-
tions that have to be added to make it an open economy model. The country
with the fully-funded pension scheme is referred to as country F and the coun-
try that relies on a PAYG pension system is denoted as country P. Production
and the risk factors are modelled in exactly the same way as in the previ-
ous chapter. There is productivity risk on stocks, which are used to invest in
the capital stock of firms. The return on government bonds is denominated
in nominal terms, which implies that there is inflation risk on government
bonds. The timing of events is also the same.
5.2.1 Demographics
Individuals born at time t reach the second period of life with a probability
εt+1, which can be interpreted as average longevity. A rise of ε implies that
people expect to live longer. We will vary this parameter to analyse the effects
of ageing.
The working population Lit increases at the same exogenous rate nt. The







(1 + nj) (5.1)
where Li0 is the initial population size in country i, i = P, F. Countries may
differ in their initial population size, i.e., LF0 6= LP0 , in this way we allow for
scale differences between the two countries. We normalise LP0 to 1 and define
LF0
LP0
= ν, so ν can be interpreted as the relative size of LF0 .
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5.2.2 Households
As explained in the previous chapter, as soon as the coefficient of relative risk
aversion (θ) is larger than one, savings are so large that the economy may be-
come dynamically inefficient. Moreover, in general equilibrium a large value
for θ does not really help to obtain more realistic values for γ. Therefore, and
because we want to keep the model as simple as possible we assume that peo-













where ρ is the rate of time preference, CY,it is consumption when young of
an individual living in country i and CO,it+1 is old-age consumption. Labour
supply is inelastic and annuity markets are perfect.
In the funded country contributions of the young (TFt ) are invested and re-
turned to them with interest in the next period when they are retired (ZFt+1),
that is, ZFt+1 =
1+Rp,t+1
εt+1
TFt . The funded scheme has fixed contributions, which
implies that contributions to the pension scheme are exactly offset by an equal
reduction in private savings. This means that the pension fund is neutral and
the economy behaves in exactly the same way as if there were no pension
scheme. This makes the derivation of the optimal portfolio decision a lot more
simple, as we do not have to take a first-order Taylor approximation of the con-
sumer’s budget constraint to obtain the covariance between the returns and
old-age consumption3. The optimal portfolio choices in the funded and PAYG
country, γFt and γ
P
t , are given by:
γFt =











where Rk,t+1 and Rb,t+1 are the return on stocks and bonds respectively. The
variance of the excess return of stocks over bonds is denoted by σ2k−b,t, σk−b,bt
is the covariance between the excess return and the return on bonds, and zt
is the part of expected old-age consumption financed by PAYG pensions (see
equation (4.14) in Chapter 4). People in the country with the PAYG pension
scheme invest more in the risky asset, i.e., γPt > γ
F
t , as they receive a safe
3See Appendix 5.A for the details.
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PAYG pension benefit when they are old (this is shown by the (1− zt) term
in equation (5.4)). In the closed economy case discussed in the previous chap-
ter PAYG pensions resulted in a lower γ in general equilibrium. The reason is
that a PAYG scheme decreases savings and the nominal return on government
bonds adjusts in such way that the part of savings invested in bonds increases
(γ decreases) so that the given level of government debt is financed. In the
open economy case where the other country uses a funded pension scheme,
however, people in the PAYG country can take advantage of the fact that peo-
ple in the funded country have a relatively high savings level and are more
risk averse because they do not receive a safe pension benefit. This implies
that a relatively large part of government debt is in the hands of the funded
country and people in the PAYG country can hold a more risky portfolio.
Optimal savings in case of a logarithmic utility function were already de-
rived in Chapter 4, we repeat them here for convenience4:
SFt =
εt+1


























εt+1 + 1 + ρ
[
Wt − TPt − TB,Pt
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εt+1ZPt+1






where Wt is the real wage, TB,it is the debt tax to keep debt per capita con-
stant, TPt are the lump-sum PAYG pension contributions and Z
P
t+1 is the PAYG
pension benefit. We added the superscript P to the variance of the portfolio
return σ2pt and the return on the portfolio Rp,t+1, because these are affected by
the portfolio decision and this differs between the funded and PAYG country
(compare equations (5.3) and (5.4)).
5.2.3 Government
Pensions in the funded country are organised by pension funds and not by the
government, therefore they do not enter the government budget constraint:
(1 + nt+1)BFt+1 = (1 + Rb,t)B
F
t − TB,Ft (5.7)




where public debt per young individual is denoted by BFt . The government in
the funded country keeps its debt constant by raising a debt tax that is equal
to:
TB,Ft = (Rb,t − nt+1)B
F (5.8)
The public debt dynamics of the PAYG country are already given in the pre-
vious chapter. It is assumed that the level of government debt is the same in
both countries in the initial steady state, i.e., BP = BF = B.
5.2.4 Equilibrium international capital market
Individuals invest their savings in both countries either in capital or in govern-
ment debt. Perfect capital mobility equalises the rates of return between the
two countries. This implies that the capital-labour ratio will be same in the




t+1, as the same production technology is
used. Equilibrium in the international capital market is given by:
SPt + νS
F
t = (1 + nt+1)
[













t = (1 + nt+1)(1 + ν)K
FP
t+1 (5.10)
(1− γPt )SPt + ν(1− γFt )SFt = (1 + nt+1)(BPt+1 + νBFt+1) (5.11)
where one of the equations is abundant5. In Appendix 5.B we show the equa-
tions for the trade balance and the current account.
5.3 Ageing
In this section we analyse the effects of an ageing shock that is comparable to
the ageing shock discussed in Section 2.3.1 in Chapter 2. In particular, we anal-
yse the effects of an increase in longevity. This is modelled as an increase in
εt+1, i.e., the probability that people reach old age increases. The time pattern
of this shock is given by:
εt+1 = ε + ζht+1 (5.12)
As before we assume that the rise in life expectancy is unexpected.
5As in Chapter 4 we checked for stability by verifying whether the two eigenvalues of the
dynamic system given in equations (5.9) and (5.10) were within the unit circle. This was the
case for various parameter values.
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The government in the PAYG country does not use government debt to cope
with the costs of ageing. We assume that the PAYG scheme is of the defined-
benefit type, which implies that the young have to pay higher PAYG contri-








The economic effects and the spillovers are very comparable to the effects de-
scribed in Section 2.3.1 in Chapter 2. In contrast to Chapter 2, however, the
current model also gives the effects on portfolio choice and the excess return
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where Ψ, ΨP, ΨF and Ω are defined in Appendix 5.C. The debt tax changes












The spillover effects are derived in the same way as in Chapter 2. We derive
the same kind of system of dynamic equations for the case where both coun-
tries use a PAYG system and for the case where both economies use a funded
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system. By comparing the results in case the two countries have the same
pension system with the effects when they have different pension schemes,
we derive the pure spillover effects of pensions and ageing in a common cap-
ital market6. We do not show the system of dynamic equations for these two
cases, however, as the system above can be used quite easily to explain the
spillover effects.
Longevity increases at t = 1, but this increase in life expectancy is not an-
ticipated at t = 0. This implies that people do not adjust their savings and
portfolio decisions in the period before the longevity shock, and that the capi-
tal stock per worker and the nominal interest rate on government debt at t = 1
do not change. The direct effects of a rise in longevity on savings are exactly
the same as in Chapter 2. A rise in life expectancy increase the incentives to
save (effect 1). A PAYG pension scheme, however, weakens the direct posi-
tive effect on savings when longevity goes up. Not only because it raises the
present value of the pension benefit (effect 2), but also because contributions
to the PAYG scheme have to rise (the dependency-ratio effect, effect 3). As
in Chapter 2 we assume that savings in the PAYG country still rise after an
increase in longevity7. For a given level of government debt, higher savings
imply a higher capital-labour ratio. This also means that a larger part of sav-
ings has to go to the capital stock, i.e., γ has to rise. To make this happen the
nominal return on government bonds will fall, this can be seen in equation
(5.16); RN,FPb falls in case K
FP rises.
The fall of the interest rate on the government debt leads to a lower debt tax,
so that people have more money to spend and increase their savings (effect 4).
Moreover, a higher capital-labour ratio increases wages, which also engenders
higher savings (effect 5). Both these effects imply that KFP continues to rise
and RN,FPb continues to fall.
Savings unambiguously rise more in the funded country than in the PAYG
country, as funded pensions do not lead to effects 2 and 3. When the funded
country has a common capital market with a PAYG country, part of its extra
savings flow to country P. This implies that the rise of the capital-labour ratio
6To exclude the effects of integration it is assumed that the initial steady state is the same
in all cases.
7We can derive the same kind of condition as in Chapter 2. There we showed that the
capital-labour ratio rises for realistic parameter values, for details see Appendix 2.B.1 in Chap-
ter 2. For the spillover effects, however, it only matters that savings in the funded country
increase more than in the PAYG country.
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and the fall in the nominal interest rate on government debt will be larger in
case both countries use a funded system. In case both countries use a PAYG
scheme exactly the opposite holds, i.e., the rise in K and the fall of RNb are
smaller. To illustrate the mechanics of the model we show the same kind of
simulation graphs as in Chapter 28. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the change in
the capital-labour ratio and the nominal interest rate on government bonds
for the different cases. Notice the resemblance with Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2.
In the initial steady state k = 0.078 and RNb = 0.58, which implies that in
the long run the capital-labour ratio rises by about 7.4% (to 0.084) and the fall
of the nominal interest rate on government bonds is about 14.7% (to 0.49) in
the benchmark case where one country uses a PAYG scheme and the other
country relies on fully-funded pensions (dkPF).
Figure 5.1: Change in K











Figure 5.2: Change in RNb
















Notes: The solid lines refer to the case where one country uses a funded pension
scheme and the other country relies on a PAYG pension system. The dotted lines
show the changes of the variables in case both economies use a funded system, while
the striped lines indicate the changes for the case where both countries use a PAYG
scheme.
8The graphs are based on simulations with F(At, Kt) = K0.3t so we take E(A) = 1, ε = 0.94,
n = 0, δ = 1, E(π) = 0, ν = 1, T
P
W = 0.2 and ht = 0.05. Agents are relatively patient
with a time preference rate of 1% per year and we assume that one period is 30 years so that
ρ = (1.01)30 − 1 = 0.3478. The level of government debt is equal to 0.025, which implies that
there is still an equilibrium. We take σ2a = 0.2 and σ2π = 0.01, which roughly corresponds to an
annual standard deviation of 8.2% for stock returns and 1.8% for bond returns, assuming that
the returns are serially uncorrelated. Here we follow Campbell and Viceira (2005) who show
that returns on stocks are significantly less volatile when the investment horizon is long and
inflation risk on nominal bonds increases with the investment horizon. In the initial steady
state γF = 0.64, γP = 0.95 and the simple excess return on stocks over bonds is equal to 0.43
percentage points.
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The model in this chapter, however, can also be used to analyse the effects on
the portfolio choice of consumers and the excess return of stocks over bonds.
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the change in γ in both countries in the different
cases. As explained a larger part of savings has to be invested in the capital
stock because savings rise and the debt level of the government is constant,
therefore γ rises in all cases. Savings in the funded country increase more in
Figure 5.3: Change in γF













Figure 5.4: Change in γP













case the other country uses a funded scheme too compared to the case where
the other country uses a PAYG scheme (because wages increase more and the
fall in the debt tax is larger), therefore the rise in γ will be larger in the former
case. The reasoning for the PAYG country is exactly opposite; savings rise less
in case the other country also uses a PAYG system instead of a funded scheme,
therefore dγP,PP < dγP,FP. In the benchmark case where the two countries use
different pension schemes, however, the rise in γ is larger in the PAYG country
than in the funded country, i.e., dγP,FP > dγF,FP , even though savings in the
funded country increase more than in the PAYG country. The intuition for
this result is as follows. The change in the rates of return is determined by
the total increase in savings in the two countries. The only factor that causes
the difference in portfolio choice between the two countries is the safe PAYG
pension benefit, which makes people in the PAYG country to behave less risk
averse9. This implies that for a given rise in total savings, the rise of γ will be
larger in the PAYG country.
9Actually people in the PAYG country have the same risk aversion parameter as individ-
uals in the funded country, namely θ = 1. However, as shown in Chapter 4 consumers with
a safe PAYG pension act as if 0 < θ < 1, so they act like a consumer that is less risk averse.
People can take more risk when they receive a safe PAYG pension benefit when they are old.
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In analysing the effects on the excess return we focus on the log gross excess
return, log Et(1 + Rk,t+1) − log Et(1 + Rb,t+1), as people base their portfolio
decisions on the log gross excess return and not on the simple excess return,
see equations (5.3) and (5.4)10. We know that the log gross excess return has
to increase, as γ has to increase to make sure that the capital market clears11.
Figure 5.5 shows that the relative change in the log gross excess return in the
different cases is the same as the relative change in portfolio choice. The log
gross excess return is equal to 0.125 in the initial steady state, so in the long
run the log gross excess return rises by about 2% (to 0.128) in the benchmark
case where the countries use different pension schemes.
Figure 5.5: Change in log excess return


























In Figures 5.6 and 5.7 we show the change in utility in the different cases. The
graphs are very comparable to the graphs shown in Chapter 2 and the intu-
ition is basically the same. We just repeat the main reasoning for convenience.
An increase in longevity has negative utility effects in this model, because in-
dividuals have to share total lifetime consumption with more people. Over
time the direct negative utility effects are reduced because the capital-labour
ratio rises. The relative rise of the capital-labour ratio in the different cases de-
termines the spillover effects. The rise in the capital-labour ratio is smaller in
case the funded country is in a common capital market with a PAYG country
instead of a funded country, so that the spillovers for the funded country are
10Note that the derivative of a log is the percentage change of the respective variable. This
implies that the consumer bases his/her portfolio decision on the percentage change of the
gross returns.
11This does not have to be true for the simple excess return, EtRk,t+1 − EtRb,t+1, see Ap-
pendix 5.D for details.
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negative in the long run. The short-run spillovers, however, are positive for
the funded country. The reason is that these initial generations only incur the
losses that result from a falling portfolio return, while they do not enjoy the
gains from the higher wages. As the fall in the portfolio return is smaller in
case the funded country has a common capital market with a PAYG country
these initial generations experience a smaller utility loss. The spillovers for
the PAYG country are exactly opposite.
Benchmark
Figure 5.6: Change in UF












Figure 5.7: Change in UP













As can be seen from Figures 5.6 and 5.7 especially the initial generations born
around the time of the ageing shock experience negative utility effects. The
main reason is that these generations only incur the negative effects of the
longevity shock (i.e., they share old-age consumption with more people, the
return on their savings goes down and they pay higher PAYG contributions)
and do not enjoy the positive effect of higher wages. Suppose that the gov-
ernment in the PAYG country wants to compensate these initial generations
to some extent by not increasing the PAYG contributions right away. Instead
they temporarily use government debt to finance the increased pension obli-
gations after a rise in longevity. This means that the PAYG pension scheme is





that the government does not adjust the PAYG contributions TPt until period








ht for t = [t∗ + 1, ∞)
(5.18)
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The government can only do this for a certain number of periods, otherwise
the government debt dynamics will be unstable. We assume that as soon the
government increases pension contributions so that the PAYG scheme is bal-
anced again, the debt tax is increased in such a way that the debt per capita is














+ (Rb − n)
∂BPt
∂ζ
for t = [t∗ + 1, ∞)
(5.19)



























We can follow the calculations in Appendix 5.C, but now
∂BPt+1
∂ζ > 0. The
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The direct effects of the longevity shock are the same as in the previous sec-
tion and in the discussion below we concentrate on the extra effects of gov-
ernment debt. As soon as the government uses government debt to finance
the higher pension obligations instead of increasing the contributions to the
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PAYG scheme, this has a direct crowding-out effect on the capital stock. This
crowding-out effect is indicated by a 6 in equation (5.21) and implies that the
capital-labour ratio increases less after the ageing shock.
To finance the higher level of government debt, the nominal interest rate on
government debt will rise (fall less) to induce people to invest a larger part of
their savings in government bonds. This effect is indicated by a 7 in equation
(5.22). The higher interest rate on government debt increases the debt tax in
both countries. The debt tax in the PAYG country also increases because the
level of debt is higher (see equation (5.19)). Both the lower wages that result
from the smaller capital-labour ratio and the higher debt tax affect savings in
both countries negatively. This implies that in the long run both the rise of the
capital-labour ratio and the fall in the nominal interest rate are less after a rise
in longevity in case government debt increases.
Consumers have to invest less in stocks in order to finance the higher level of
government debt. The fall in γP will be even larger in case the PAYG country
does not have integrated capital markets with a funded country, as they have
to absorb the whole government debt by themselves. To make γ fall, the log
excess return on stocks over bonds will fall.
Equation (5.21) shows that also a positive effect of government debt on the
capital stock occurs (effect 8). This effect is due to the higher portfolio re-
turn and the lower variance on the portfolio, which has fallen because people
invest relatively less in stocks. A higher portfolio return decreases the net
present value of the pension benefit and therefore affects savings in the PAYG
country positively. A lower variance on the portfolio also increases savings in
the PAYG country. This implies that these effects via σ2p and E(Rp) dampen
the direct negative crowding-out effect of debt on the capital-labour ratio. It
is unlikely however, that these indirect effects turn around the effect on the
capital-labour ratio as they are of a second-order nature. Simulations show
that it is indeed the case that the direct negative crowding-out effect of debt
on the capital-labour ratio dominates the indirect positive effects of debt on
the capital-labour ratio.
In Figures 5.8 and 5.9 we show the effects on utility in case the PAYG con-
tributions are only adjusted one period after longevity increased. This means
that the level of government debt increases at t = 2 and stays at this higher
level afterwards. The lines with the bullets show the utility effects of this pol-
icy scenario. For convenience we also show the lines of the scenario discussed
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in the previous section where no government debt was used, these are the thin
grey lines without bullets.
Debt
Figure 5.8: Change in UF













Figure 5.9: Change in UP













Notes: The thin grey lines indicate the utility effects in the benchmark case where no
government debt is used. The dotted line in Figure 5.8 refers to the case where both
countries use a funded scheme, while the striped lines in Figure 5.9 denote the case
where both countries rely on PAYG pensions. The solid lines demonstrate the utility
effects in case one country uses a funded scheme while the other country has PAYG
pensions. The lines with the bullets show the effects in case government debt is used
by the PAYG country.
The utility effects in case both countries use a funded pension scheme (the
dotted line in Figure 5.8) do not change, as government debt is only used by
the PAYG country. The distance between the dotted line and the solid line
with the bullets shows the spillover effects for the funded country in case the
PAYG country uses government debt. Comparing the distance between these
two lines with the distance between the dotted and the thin grey solid line
(showing the spillover effects in the benchmark case discussed in the previous
section) indicates that both the short-run and long-run spillovers are larger
for the funded country. The positive spillovers in the short run are larger
because the fall in the portfolio return is smaller in case the PAYG country
uses government debt that crowds out capital (higher Rk) and makes it more
difficult to finance the debt (higher Rb). The negative long-run spillover effects
of the PAYG scheme are also larger, however, as the rise in wages is smaller.
Figure 5.9 shows the utility effects for the PAYG country in the different
cases. The thin grey solid and -striped lines indicate the effects in the bench-
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mark case, while the solid and striped lines with the bullets point out what
happens in case government debt is used. First note that using government
debt at the time of the longevity shock (t = 1) instead of increasing PAYG
contributions makes people born at t = 1 better off; the fall in utility is less.
Future generations lose, however, as the capital stock is crowded out. This
policy can be implemented by governments that put more weight on the wel-
fare of current generations than future generations’ welfare.
The long-run utility losses are much smaller in case the PAYG country shares
one capital market with a funded country, as the funded country absorbs part
of the extra government debt so that the crowding out of capital is less. This
implies that it is easier to implement such a policy in case the PAYG country
forms a monetary union with a country that uses a funded system instead of
a PAYG scheme. Actually, by comparing the distance between the solid and
striped lines in case government debt is used (lines with bullets) with the dis-
tance between these two lines where no government debt is used (lines with-
out bullets), shows that the positive long-run spillovers of being integrated
with a funded country are larger in case government debt is used.
5.5 Unexpected inflation
In case government debt is very large and this debt is denominated in nom-
inal terms, the government has an incentive to put pressure on the central
bank to create surprise inflation as this will erode the real value of govern-
ment debt and lower the real return on government bonds. In this section we
will analyse the effects of an unexpected inflation shock. The idea behind this
is that the PAYG country has an incentive to lobby for unexpected inflation af-
ter it created government debt to cope with the ageing costs. First we consider
the situation where the other country also uses a PAYG scheme. This implies
that there are no capital flows between the two countries and can therefore
be regarded as a closed economy. In that case the gain for the government
is exactly high enough to compensate the elderly that experience a loss when
inflation rises unexpectedly. So in a closed economy unexpected inflation is
only a matter of redistribution between the old and the young (or future gen-
erations) and can be implemented in a neutral way (so that no generation
loses). In an open economy where the other country uses a funded scheme,
however, unexpected inflation affects the PAYG country positively, while the
funded country is affected negatively. The reason for this result is that the
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funded country exports financial capital to the PAYG country and individuals
in the funded country have a more conservative portfolio. This implies that
residents of the funded country own a relatively large part of the government
bonds, so they are affected more negatively by the unexpected inflation shock.
The government in the funded country cannot fully compensate its residents
for this loss. To isolate the effects of an unexpected inflation shock, we leave
out the effects of ageing in the analytical analysis below. In the simulation
graphs, however, we combine the ageing and unexpected inflation shock.
5.5.1 Closed economy





Suppose that the time pattern of βt is as follows:
βt = β + ζgt (5.25)
where gt < 0 in case of inflation. By taking the derivative with respect to ζ we
analyse the effects of inflation.
In case of unexpected inflation there will be a difference between the ex-
pected real return on government bonds and the realised real return:
∂Rb,t+1
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where we assumed that in steady state β = E(β), so the steady state value of
the inflation factor is equal to its expected value. In case people do not expect
any inflation, i.e., ∂Etβt+1∂ζ = 0 and unexpected inflation is created
∂βt+1
∂ζ < 0, the
real return on bonds will fall, while nothing has happened with the expected
return.
We assume that consumers have static expectations; their inflation expecta-








This implies that inflation can only be raised unexpectedly during one period,
after that people adjust their inflation expectations. Suppose that inflation










so the inflation expectations for period τ + 1 are correct again.
The result of this policy is that the real interest rate on government debt is
lower, which affects the financial position of the government positively, but
will harm people that own government bonds. There are various options for
the government how to use this interest gain. Firstly, it can give the benefit to
the young people by lowering the debt tax in the same period. Second, it can
repay part of its debt so that future generations gain. In both these scenarios
however, the elderly alive at the time of the unexpected inflation episode will
lose. The third policy option would therefore be to compensate these elderly.
We will analyse this last policy option.
The compensation to the elderly is denoted by ZB,Pt . In case the elderly re-
ceive the whole advantage of a lower real interest rate on government debt
the change of ZB,Pt is equal to:
∂ZB,Pτ
∂ζ
= −1 + n
ε




where we used the fact that at time τ only a fraction ε of young people at τ− 1































In the closed-economy case it has to hold that SP(1− γP) = (1 + n)BP, so that
∂Co,Pτ
∂ζ = 0 and the elderly are exactly compensated. Young people at time τ
know that inflation is higher and will ask a higher nominal rate of return on
government bonds, and the real rate of return will be back at its old value.
Combined with the fact that government debt does not change, this implies
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that an unexpected inflation shock does not have any real effects. So indeed
the government can set its policy in such a way that no generation is hurt
after an unexpected rise in inflation. The gain of the lower real interest rate on
government debt is exactly high enough to compensate the people who lose
from the unexpected inflation shock.
5.5.2 Open economy
In this subsection we analyse the effects of unexpected inflation in the open-
economy case where one country uses a PAYG pension scheme, while the
other country relies on funded pensions. First we consider the scenario dis-
cussed in the previous subsection where the whole interest gain is used to
compensate the old at the time of the shock. It turns out that in an open econ-
omy where the PAYG country imports capital from the funded country, the
interest gain for the PAYG country is larger than the loss of the old owners of
capital, so that these people gain. In the funded country we have exactly the
opposite result, the interest gain is not high enough to fully compensate the
elderly, so they lose. In the second scenario we consider the effects of unex-
pected inflation where the current old are fully compensated and the rest of
the gain/loss is transferred to future generations in the form of a lower/higher
debt tax.
Scenario 1
In case a PAYG country has an integrated capital market with a funded coun-
try, the policy described in the previous subsection will have real effects.
Equation (5.32) shows the change in old-age consumption in the PAYG coun-
try in case the whole interest gain is transferred to the old at time τ. In
the open-economy case equation (5.11) has to hold. Because residents of
the funded country save more and invest a larger part of their savings in
government bonds than people living in the PAYG country, we know that
SF(1− γF) > SP(1− γP). Defining SF(1− γF) ≡ αSP(1− γP) where α > 1,
we can use equation (5.11) to derive12:
SP(1− γP) = 1 + ν
1 + να︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 1
(1 + n)B (5.33)
12We assume that the two countries have the same level of government debt in the initial
steady state, i.e., BF = BP = B.
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so that SP(1 − γP) < (1 + n)B and the term between brackets in equation
(5.32) is smaller than zero. Combining this result with the fact that ∂βτ∂ζ < 0 in
case of unexpected inflation, we see that old-age consumption at time τ rises.
So there is at least one generation in the PAYG country that gains from the
unexpected inflation shock, while no other generation loses.
In the funded country the government also gains from the lower real interest
rate on government debt at time τ. Suppose that this government follows the
same strategy as the government in the PAYG country, that is, the gain of the
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Using the same method as for the PAYG country above, we can write:
SF(1− γF) = 1 + ν1
α + ν︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 1
(1 + n)B (5.36)
which implies that SF(1− γF) > (1 + n)B and the term between brackets in
equation (5.35) is positive. This means that the effects of an unexpected infla-
tion shock are still negative for the elderly, that is, ∂C
o,F
τ
∂ζ < 0. Even though the
government in the funded country uses the whole interest gain to compensate
the pensioners, they still experience welfare losses.
So in an open economy the PAYG country gains from an unexpected inflation
shock at the expense of the funded country. It takes advantage of the fact
that the funded country owns a relatively large part of the total supply of








so the effects on old-age consumption are opposite to each other. In case the
two countries are of equal size, i.e., if ν = 1, the gain of the elderly in the
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PAYG country is exactly as large as the loss of the elderly in the funded coun-
try. If ν > 1, the funded country is relatively large and there will be more
capital flows to the PAYG country. The larger ν, the more the PAYG coun-
try can profit from these capital flows and the larger the gain of unexpected
inflation is. There is no possibility, however, that the PAYG country compen-
sates the funded country for its loss and the union as a whole experiences a
Pareto improvement. It is true that the gain in old-age consumption in the
PAYG country is larger than the loss of the old in the funded country in case
ν > 1, but this is exactly offset by the fact that the funded country has more
inhabitants.
Scenario 2
Instead of transferring the whole gain of the lower interest rate to the elderly
alive at the time of the shock, the government in the PAYG country can also
decide to compensate those elderly in such a way that they do not experience
any welfare gains or losses. This means that these people get full compensa-
tion but do not gain as was the case when the whole advantage was trans-
ferred to them. The rest of the gain is used to pay off some of the government
debt, to decrease the debt burden for future generations. The compensation is





















Suppose that from period τ + 1 onwards the government debt is kept constant
again, but then at this lower level. Future generations indeed profit from the
lower debt burden because the interest obligations on the debt and thus the
debt tax paid by the young decrease:
∂TB,Pτ+1
∂ζ




Suppose that the government in the funded country also fully compensates











As the gain of the lower interest rate was smaller then the loss of the elderly,
the funded country has to use government debt to be able to give full com-











so that future generations have to pay a higher debt tax:
∂TB,Fτ+1
∂ζ


















because the term between the brackets equals zero as can be seen from equa-
tion (5.11). So the rise of government debt in the funded country and the fall
in government debt in the PAYG country exactly cancel. This implies that the
capital-labour at τ + 1 will not change.
In the next period people adjust their inflation expectations and demand a









so that the real rate of return is back at its old level. The debt tax in the PAYG
country is lower at τ + 1, which affects savings positively, while the debt tax is
higher for inhabitants of the funded country, which decreases their savings. So
it is ambiguous what happens to the capital-labour ratio at τ + 2. Simulations
show, however, that these effects more or less cancel and that the effect on the
capital-labour ratio is negligible. This implies that the effect on the debt tax
determines the long-run welfare effects of this policy. Future generations in
the funded country lose and people in the PAYG country gain.
The utility effects of an ageing shock combined with government debt and
the policy described here are shown in Figures 5.10 and 5.11 by the lines with
the diamonds. Inflation rises unexpectedly at time t = 7. Comparing the
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Unexpected inflation
Figure 5.10: Change in UF













Figure 5.11: Change in UP












Notes: The dotted line in Figure 5.10 refers to the case where both countries use a
funded scheme, where no government debt is used and no surprise inflation is cre-
ated. The solid lines demonstrate the utility effects in case one country uses a funded
scheme while the other country has PAYG pensions. The lines with the bullets show
the effects in case government debt is used by the PAYG country, while the lines with
the diamonds indicate the effects where not only government debt is used but also
unexpected inflation is created. The inflation rate rises to 3.58 percentage point. The
elderly at the time of the unexpected inflation shock are fully compensated and the
rest of the gain/loss is transferred to future generations in the form of a lower/higher
debt tax. The case where both countries rely on PAYG pensions is denoted by the
striped line with the bullets in Figure 5.11. As explained in the main text there are no
capital flows between the two countries in that case and the gain of surprise inflation is
exactly high enough to compensate the elderly. Therefore the line with the diamonds
(unexpected inflation) coincides with the line with the bullets (only government debt)
in case both countries have a PAYG pension scheme.
utility effects of this scenario with those of the scenario described in the previ-
ous section where only government debt was used (the lines with the bullets),
shows indeed that the generations after the unexpected inflation shock gain in
the PAYG country and lose in the funded country. This implies that the neg-
ative long-run spillovers of the PAYG scheme for the funded country become
larger.
The two scenarios discussed in this subsection show that the governments
in both countries can decide how the total gain or loss of unexpected inflation
is shared between generations. The main result is, however, that unexpected
inflation is always advantageous for capital-importing PAYG countries, while
in funded countries there are always some generations that lose. The gains
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of unexpected inflation for PAYG countries will be larger the larger the debt
burden is. In the coming decades the public finances will be put more un-
der pressure because of the ageing of the population. In case government
debt is used to cope with the ageing costs, the incentive of PAYG countries to
put pressure on the central bank to accommodate and create surprise inflation
will rise. On the other hand will unexpected inflation harm funded countries
more if PAYG countries issued large amounts of nominal government debt.
The conflict of interest on monetary policy between PAYG- and funded coun-
tries will therefore be reinforced if population ageing raises government debt
in PAYG countries. If the decision-making process of the central bank is not
completely transparent and it is not clear how the central bank will react to
these conflicting interests, inflation risk may rise when public debt levels are
high. This scenario will be analysed in the next section.
5.6 Inflation risk
In the previous section we showed that PAYG governments have an incentive
to lobby for surprise inflation when their debt burden is large. If it is not
completely clear how monetary policy is determined inflation risk may rise,
that is, inflation risk rises with the level of government debt13. In this section
we will analyse this scenario. This means that inflation risk is a function of the






where λ shows the responsiveness of inflation risk to government debt, so







Government debt in the funded country does not affect inflation risk as the
funded country does not have an incentive to lobby for unexpected inflation.
Inflation risk has a direct effect on the portfolio choice of consumers and the
variance of the portfolio (see equations (4.113), (4.131)-(4.133) in Chapter 4).
13The increase in riskiness of government bonds in case government debt rises can also be
interpreted as a rise in default risk.
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For a given rise in the riskiness of government bonds people would like to
switch to stocks and this effect will be stronger in the funded country. The
intuition for this result is twofold. First, people in the funded country do not
receive a safe PAYG pension benefit during retirement, which makes them
relatively more risk averse (compare the denominators of equations (5.3) and
(5.4)). Second, in the initial steady state inhabitants of the funded country
own a relatively large part of the total amount of government debt in the two
countries because they save more and invest a larger part of their savings in
government bonds than the PAYG country. The upward pressure on γ causes
the nominal rate of return on government bonds to rise to make sure that
government debt is financed. This is effect 9 in equation (5.49) and the rise of
RNb has to be larger in case the PAYG country has integrated capital markets
with a country that uses a funded pension scheme instead of PAYG pensions.
The rise in RNb increases the debt tax and implies lower savings, which affects
the capital-labour ratio negatively. A lower capital-labour ratio in turn, affects
wages negatively so that savings continue to decrease. As can be seen from
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equation (5.48) there is an extra effect 10 on the capital-labour ratio. This is the
indirect (second-order) effect of changes in (σ2pt)
P and EtRPp,t+1, which affect
savings in the PAYG country. See Section 4.4.3 in Chapter 4 for more details.
The higher riskiness of government bonds makes bonds much less attractive
to hold and the return on government bonds has to rise to a much larger extent
than the return on stocks to make sure that the capital markets clears. This
implies that the excess return of stocks over bonds will fall.
The fall in savings implies that γ has to fall in case both countries use a PAYG
scheme. When the two countries use different pension schemes the effects on
portfolio choice are not that straightforward, however. The equilibrium con-
dition on the bond market, equation (5.11), shows that the part of savings in-
vested in bonds in the two countries together ((1− γP) + (1− γF)) has to rise
in case total savings (SP + SF) decline. Simulations show that the movement
of γF is opposite to the movement of γP. People in the funded country move
to stocks; they move away from the asset that becomes more risky. People in
the PAYG country, on the other hand, move to government bonds. Consumers
in the funded country invest more in stocks even though the excess return on
stocks falls, so the direct effect of the higher risk on bonds dominates for these
people. They can do this because people in the PAYG country put less weight
on risk in their portfolio decision and decrease γP in response to the lower
excess return.
In Figures 5.12 and 5.13 we compare the utility effects of a longevity shock in
the different cases. The dotted line in Figure 5.12 shows the utility effects for
the funded country when it has an integrated capital market with a country
that uses a funded scheme too. In that case no government debt is created
and inflation risk will not rise. The solid lines show the effect in case one
country uses a funded system and the other country relies on PAYG pensions.
The bullets refer to the case where only government debt is used, whereas
the diamonds denote the case where inflation risk also rises. The spillovers
are determined by the relative change of the capital-labour ratio. A rise in
inflation risk increases the interest rate on government debt, which implies
a higher debt tax and lower savings. This results in a smaller capital-labour
ratio and lower wages and utility is negatively affected14. This implies that
the negative spillover effects in the long run increase for the funded country.
14Higher inflation risk also has a direct negative effect on utility because people are risk
averse. This direct effect is negligible compared to the negative utility effects of the higher
debt tax, however.
176 AGEING, DEBT AND INFLATION IN A MONETARY UNION
Inflation risk
Figure 5.12: Change in UF














Figure 5.13: Change in UP















Notes: The dotted line in Figure 5.12 refers to the case where both countries use a
funded scheme, where no government debt is used and inflation risk does not rise.
The case where both countries rely on PAYG pensions is denoted by the striped lines
in Figure 5.13. The solid lines demonstrate the utility effects in case one country uses a
funded scheme while the other country has PAYG pensions. The lines with the bullets
show the effects in case government debt is used by the PAYG country, while the lines
with the diamonds indicate the effects where not only government debt is used but
inflation risk also rises. Inflation risk (σ2π) rises with 0.08 to 0.09.
Figure 5.13 shows that the change in utility effects in the PAYG country after
a rise in inflation risk is much larger in case the PAYG country has a com-
mon capital market with a funded country (the solid lines), compared to the
case where it shares one capital market with a country that also uses a PAYG
scheme (the striped lines). This means that higher inflation risk affects res-
idents in the PAYG country more negatively in case they form a monetary
union with a funded country. The reason for this result is that in that case
a large part of government bonds is in the hands of citizens of the funded
country and because these people are more risk averse, the rise of the nominal
interest rate on government bonds has to be much larger compared to the case
where both countries rely on PAYG pensions. This implies that the effects on
the debt tax and thus the negative effects on savings and the capital-labour
ratio are also much larger. This shows that the PAYG country cannot share the
adverse effects of higher inflation risk with the funded country, which was
the case for example with the use of government debt. The positive long-
run spillovers of having a common capital market with a funded country are
therefore smaller for people in the PAYG country.
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In contrast to unexpected inflation, a rise in inflation risk has adverse ef-
fects in both countries of the monetary union. Inflation risk rises in case
PAYG countries have a large debt burden, which results in conflicting inter-
ests between PAYG- and funded countries about the creation of inflation. If
the decision-making process about monetary policy is not completely trans-
parent, it is not clear what the final outcome will be for inflation and this un-
certainty raises inflation risk. The fact that both funded- and PAYG countries
lose from a rise in inflation risk shows that it may be in the interest of both
countries that government debt levels stay at low levels. In case government
bonds are treated as more risky when debt levels are high, there is a trade-off
for the PAYG country between the short-run benefits of debt and the increase
in inflation risk this debt induces. This implies that not only funded countries
in the EMU benefit from the rules in the Stability and Growth Pact, but that
PAYG countries may benefit from these rules as well. Moreover, the indepen-
dence, credibility and transparency of the ECB is important for all countries
to prevent an increase in inflation risk.
5.7 Conclusion
The ageing of the population will confront governments in developed coun-
tries with serious challenges. As a large number of countries rely on pension
schemes that are financed on the basis of pay-as-you-go, the rise of the num-
ber of retirees relative to the number of working people forces governments
to think about the way their pension systems are organised. This thesis analy-
ses how countries that rely to a different extent on PAYG pensions affect each
other during an ageing episode, where countries with large PAYG pension
schemes react in different ways to population ageing. In Chapter 2 we assume
that governments with PAYG schemes will keep their PAYG system balanced
and the pension benefits or -contributions are adjusted accordingly. It is also
often proposed that countries that only rely on PAYG pensions should down-
size their pension schemes and move to a more funded scheme. Chapter 3
investigates how such reforms affect countries that already have fully-funded
schemes. In this chapter we analyse the international spillover effects of age-
ing and pensions in case PAYG governments do not increase the contributions
to the pension scheme or do not lower the pension benefits for the initial gen-
erations that suffer most from ageing. They neither reform their pension sys-
tem. These PAYG governments use debt instead to spare the generations alive
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around the time ageing starts. This will benefit these initial generations, but
future generations will lose as government debt crowds out capital. The util-
ity effects spill over to the funded country that does not use government debt.
The initial generations gain from the higher rates of return, while later genera-
tions are affected negatively because wage levels fall. This implies that the use
of government debt by the PAYG country increases both the positive short-run
spillovers and the negative long-run spillovers for the funded country.
We also show that in a monetary union where a PAYG country has a joint
capital market with a funded country, unexpected inflation will affect the
PAYG country positively. In a closed economy, unexpected inflation is only
a matter of redistribution from the old to the young- or future generations
and can be implemented in such a way that no generation gains or loses. The
reason why unexpected inflation creates a net gain in the PAYG country when
it forms a monetary union with a funded country is that capital flows from the
funded country to the PAYG country, so that part of the government bonds of
the PAYG country is in the hands of citizens in the funded country. Therefore,
part of the costs of unexpected inflation are transmitted to the funded coun-
try, while the gain of the lower debt burden does not change and a net gain
results. So when a PAYG country forms a monetary union with a funded coun-
try it has an incentive to put pressure on the central bank to increase inflation
unexpectedly. The gains from unexpected inflation for the PAYG country will
be larger the larger the level of government debt is. In the coming decades the
ageing of the population will put the public finances more under pressure and
when PAYG countries finance their increased pension obligations by issuing
more debt, the incentive of PAYG governments to lobby for surprise inflation
will rise. It will lead to negative spillovers for the funded country when the
central bank gives in.
These opposing utility effects of surprise inflation in the PAYG country and
the funded country imply that there are conflicting interests between the two
countries about the direction of monetary policy. Because the monetary pol-
icy strategy is not completely transparent, it is not clear how the central bank
will react to these conflicting interests. As a consequence, inflation risk may
rise with the level of government debt. Higher inflation risk makes govern-
ment bonds less attractive to hold and the rate of return on bonds will have
to increase to induce people to buy the existing stock of government bonds.
This increases the debt tax and lowers savings and the capital-labour ratio,
and both countries experience negative utility effects from the rise in inflation
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risk. Actually, the PAYG country experiences negative spillover effects from
the fact that they form a monetary union with a funded country in case in-
flation risk increases. This result arises because the funded country owns a
relatively large part of the government bonds and people in the funded coun-
try are more risk averse as they do not receive a safe PAYG pension benefit.
This implies that these people need to be compensated more in order to be
willing to hold the more risky government bonds, that is, the rate of return on
government bonds has to increase more in case a funded pension scheme is in
place. The rise in the debt tax and its negative consequences will therefore be
larger in the PAYG country when it forms a monetary union with a country
that uses a fully-funded pension scheme instead of a PAYG pension system.
All the scenarios analysed in this chapter show that in the long run funded
countries are affected even more negatively by the fact that other countries
in the monetary union rely on PAYG-financed pensions when these countries
use government debt to cope with the ageing costs. The use of government
debt itself has negative long-run spillover effects for funded countries. More-
over a high debt burden may lead to unexpected inflation or a higher inflation
risk, which both increase the negative spillover effects even more. In the com-
ing decades it will therefore be important for funded countries that the rules of
the Stability and Growth Pact are met, so that debt levels of PAYG countries do
not rise to too high levels. The use of government debt by PAYG countries to
cope with the costs of ageing benefits the initial generations in these countries
that suffer most from ageing. Future generations, however, are harmed by the
larger debt burden. In a monetary union part of this burden can be shifted to
the funded country. The debt burden for the PAYG country can be reduced by
an unexpected rise in inflation when this country successfully lobbies at the
central bank. If this lobbying only raises perceived inflation risk, the negative
effects of a rise in the riskiness of government bonds in response to a higher
level of public debt cannot be shared with the funded country, however. It
may therefore also be in the interest of PAYG countries to obey the fiscal con-
straints stated in the Stability and Growth Pact to prevent that government
debt rises to too high levels. Moreover, it is important for all countries that a
central bank like the ECB is independent, credible and transparent about its
monetary policy strategy, so that it is clear how monetary policy is determined
and the risk of inflation does not rise when debt levels are high.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5
5.A Portfolio choice funded country
Taking logs of the portfolio-return and benchmark-return Euler condition and
subtracting gives (see equation (4.64) in Chapter 4):










We can use the second-order Taylor approximation of rp,t+1 from the previous
chapter to derive:
EtrFp,t+1 ≈ Etrb,t+1 + γFt (Etrk,t+1 − Etrb,t+1) +
1
2
γFt (1− γFt )σ2k−b,t (5.53)
(σ2pt)


















Using the fact that ZFt+1 =
1+Rp,t+1
εt+1











182 AGEING, DEBT AND INFLATION IN A MONETARY UNION














In case of a logarithmic utility function people consume a fixed proportion of
their wealth, which implies that the term gt is constant. Taking logs gives:
log CO,Ft+1 − log C
Y,F
t = log(1 + R
F











p,t+1 − log εt+1 + log gt (5.60)
Equations (5.59) and (5.60) imply that the variance of the log of old-age con-















Substituting equations (5.53), (5.54), (5.61) and (5.62) into equation (5.52) gives:














Dividing by γFt and rearranging gives:
γFt =
Etrk,t+1 − Etrb,t+1 + 12 σ2k−b,t
σ2k−b,t
(5.64)
Or in simple returns:
γFt =





5.B Trade balance and current account
The balance of trade surplus is the excess of domestic product over domestic





t (·)− CY,it −
εt
1 + nt
CO,it − (1 + nt+1)K
i
t+1 (5.66)
where we take into account that only a fraction εt of young people in t − 1
survived to period t.
The current account surplus is the excess of national product over domestic
absorption. National product equals domestic product plus net foreign invest-
ment income. Thus, the current account surplus is defined as the balance of



































Using the budget constraints of the consumers and the government and the
fact that in case of perfect competition the following condition has to hold:
Fit (·) = Wt + (1 + Rk,t)Kit (5.69)


























(1 + nt+1)KFt+1 − KFt
]
(5.71)
These equations show that, because there is no official settlements balance,
the current account surplus of a country should be equal to its capital account
deficit. Therefore the current account surplus can be viewed as the net foreign
investment by the country. Net foreign investment is the excess of domestic
wealth accumulation (savings) over domestic capital formation. Market clear-
ing requires that world savings are equal to world investment. In other words,
the current account surpluses of the two countries must sum to zero in equi-
librium: CAPt + CA
F
t = 0. When nt > 0, country F exports capital abroad
and therefore runs a current account surplus. Conversely, country P imports
capital and will run a current account deficit. Moreover, because we assumed
15Note that we have to assume that the capital stock depreciates completely in one period
to make sure that the gross return on stocks is lognormally distributed.
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dynamic efficiency we know that country F runs a steady state trade balance
deficit and country P has a steady state trade balance surplus. So country F
uses its interest income from its savings abroad to pay for its net imports of
commodities, and country P runs a surplus on its trade account to service its
external debt.
5.C Ageing
In this appendix we show the derivation of the first-order difference equations
in case longevity increases. The PAYG system is balanced, that is, contribu-
tions adjust in response to the larger number of elderly. The government does
not use government debt to cope with the costs of ageing.
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16As in Chapter 4 we do not take into account the second-order effects on zt, as this com-
plicates the analysis to a large extent.
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, see equations (5.77) and (5.80).
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< 0, combining this
















188 AGEING, DEBT AND INFLATION IN A MONETARY UNION
Use this equation to substitute for
∂RN,FPb,t+1
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> 0 (5.97)
∆Rp ≡
[E(Rk)− E(Rb)][(α− 1)(1 + RNb )−ΦK]
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ΨF ≡ (1 + ρ + ε)
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Equations (5.99), (5.95) and (5.89) together give the system of equations in
Section 5.3.
5.D Excess return
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which indeed shows that the log excess return increases when savings (and
thus the capital stock) rise.
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Substituting equations (5.83), (5.84) and (5.95) and simplifying gives:
∂excess returnFP
∂ζ









(1 + ν)(1 + n)(1− γP)
∂KFPt+1
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∂ log excess returnFP
∂ζ > 0
(5.107)
In case E(Rk) ≈ E(Rb) or α→ 1 the term in front of
∂KFPt+1
∂ζ approaches zero and
the simple excess return moves in the same direction as the log gross excess
return. In case E(Rk) and E(Rb) are far apart, however, the simple excess
return could move in the opposite direction as the log gross excess return. In
case of an ageing shock that does not affect portfolio choice directly this was
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SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH)
Veel westerse landen zullen de komende decennia te maken krijgen met een
vergrijzende bevolking. Vergrijzing wordt met name veroorzaakt door het
feit dat we steeds langer leven en minder kinderen krijgen. In 1950 kregen
vrouwen in Europa gemiddeld nog 2,5 kinderen per persoon, terwijl dat aan-
tal in 2005 terug is gelopen tot 1,6 kinderen per persoon. De levensverwach-
ting bij geboorte is in Europa tussen 1950 en 2005 met 11,6 jaren toegenomen
van 67,1 jaar naar 78,7 jaar. De verwachting is dat het aantal kinderen per
vrouw de komende decennia zal stabiliseren of zelfs iets zal toenemen. De
toename van de levensverwachting is echter structureel; de Verenigde Naties
voorspellen dat de levensverwachting in 2050 zal zijn toegenomen tot 84,2
jaar. Aan de ene kant is vergrijzing het gevolg van positieve ontwikkelingen
zoals de emancipatie van vrouwen en een verbeterde gezondheidszorg. Aan
de andere kant worden collectief gefinancierde voorzieningen als pensioenen
en zorgverzekeringen onder druk gezet door de ongekende stijging van het
relatieve aantal ouderen ten opzichte van het aantal werkenden. In Europa
is de zogenaamde ouderen-afhankelijkheidsratio17 tussen 1950 en 2005 geste-
gen van 13,9 procent naar 30,5 procent. De voorspelling van de Verenigde
Naties is dat dit percentage in 2050 verder zal stijgen naar 65,4. Deze enorme
stijging van het relatieve aantal gepensioneerden dwingt overheden om na
te denken over de manier waarop hun pensioenen georganiseerd zijn. In de
meeste landen wordt gebruik gemaakt van een publiek omslagstelsel, waarbij
17De ouderen-afhankelijkheidsratio is gedefinieerd als het aantal mensen dat 65 jaar of ou-
der is ten opzichte van de potentiële beroepsbevolking, oftewel het aantal mensen tussen de
15 en 65 jaar.
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de huidige beroepsbevolking de pensioenen van de huidige ouderen betaalt.
Deze publieke pensioenstelsels zullen onder druk komen te staan als het aan-
tal pensioengerechtigden stijgt en er relatief minder werkende mensen zijn.
Veel economen pleiten er daarom voor dat overheden een gedeelte van hun
omslaggefinancierde pensioenen vervangen door een pensioenstelsel dat via
kapitaaldekking gefinancierd is. Bij een kapitaaldekkingsstelsel sparen indi-
viduen zelf of via een pensioenfonds voor hun oude dag en daarom zou een
kapitaalgedekt pensioensysteem beter bestand zijn tegen vergrijzing. Boven-
dien wordt er over het algemeen vanuit gegaan dat het rendement dat op
de kapitaalmarkt behaald kan worden hoger is dan het impliciete rendement
van een omslagstelsel18. Kapitaaldekkingsstelsels zullen echter ook beïnvloed
worden door vergrijzing. Omdat vergrijzing een wereldwijd fenomeen is zal
het macro-economische gevolgen hebben en op die manier de rendementen
van investeringen beïnvloeden. Daarnaast zal de omschakeling naar meer
kapitaaldekking politiek moeilijk haalbaar zijn omdat er een generatie is die
zowel de pensioenen van de huidige ouderen moet betalen als moet sparen
voor de eigen oude dag. Verder is het zo dat het hogere verwachte rende-
ment van kapitaalgedekte pensioenen samengaat met meer financieel risico
en inflatierisico.
Het publieke debat over de houdbaarheid van pensioenstelsels richt zich
met name op de vraag hoe de problemen als gevolg van een vergrijzende be-
volking binnen het land zelf opgelost dienen te worden. Vergrijzing is echter
een wereldwijd fenomeen en internationale kapitaalmarkten raken in toene-
mende mate geïntegreerd. Dit heeft tot gevolg dat inwoners van een bepaald
land beïnvloed zullen worden door vergrijzing en de in reactie daarop geno-
men beleidsmaatregelen in andere landen. De toenemende integratie van in-
ternationale kapitaalmarkten betekent dat financieel kapitaal steeds mobieler
wordt en meer reageert op internationale verschillen in rendementen. Ver-
grijzing kan leiden tot rendementsverschillen tussen landen omdat de bespa-
ringsreacties en de kapitaalbehoeften als gevolg van vergrijzing verschillend
kunnen zijn. Deze rendementsverschillen zullen leiden tot internationale ka-
pitaalstromen en op die manier de welvaart in andere landen beïnvloeden.
De welvaartseffecten van deze kapitaalstromen worden wel aangeduid als in-
ternationale spillovereffecten. Dit proefschrift analyseert de internationale spil-
lovereffecten van vergrijzing via kapitaalmarkten. De aandacht is gericht op het
18Het impliciete rendement van een omslagstelsel is gelijk aan de groeivoet van de econo-
mie, d.w.z., de som van de bevolkingsgroei en de technologische vooruitgang.
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feit dat landen verschillen in de omvang van de kapitaaldekkingscomponent
van hun pensioensysteem. Deze internationale verschillen in pensioenstel-
sels hebben tot gevolg dat landen verschillend reageren op een vergrijzende
bevolking, wat tot kapitaalstromen en dus tot internationale spillovereffecten
zal leiden. Dit geval is in het bijzonder relevant voor de Europese Economi-
sche en Monetaire Unie (EMU) waar de lidstaten één kapitaalmarkt vormen
en één centrale bank hebben. Aan de ene kant is er een grote groep landen
met omvangrijke publieke pensioenstelsels die volgens het omslagprincipe
gefinancierd worden en waar kapitaaldekkingsstelsels te verwaarlozen zijn.
In deze landen financieren omslagpensioenen meer dan 90 procent van het
totale inkomen van de ouderen (Boeri et al., 2006). Aan de andere kant is er
een kleinere groep landen die grote kapitaaldekkingsstelsels hebben. De in-
vesteringen van pensioenfondsen in een land als Nederland zijn bijvoorbeeld
gelijk aan 124,9 procent van het BBP (OECD Global Pension Statistics, 2006).
Het doel van dit proefschrift is om inzicht te krijgen in hoe, bij vergrij-
zing, mensen die in landen wonen met een omvangrijk kapitaaldekkingsstel-
sel worden beïnvloed door het feit dat andere landen omvangrijke omslag-
stelsels hebben en vice versa. Er worden verscheidende scenario’s bestudeerd
waarbij landen met omvangrijke omslagstelsels op verschillende manieren re-
ageren op vergrijzing. Deze landen kunnen hun omslagstelsel in evenwicht
houden. In dat geval moeten óf de bijdragen van de jongeren worden ver-
hoogd óf de pensioenuitkeringen van de ouderen worden verlaagd als gevolg
van vergrijzing. Een andere mogelijkheid is dat ze ervoor kiezen om hun pen-
sioenstelsel te hervormen en een groter gedeelte van de pensioenen op basis
van kapitaaldekking te financieren om zo hun pensioensysteem houdbaar-
der te maken bij vergrijzing. Deze landen zouden er echter ook voor kunnen
kiezen om overheidsschuld te gebruiken om de kosten van vergrijzing op te
vangen. Als de overheidsschuld erg hoog is kan dit tot een inflatoire druk
leiden of overheidsobligaties risicovoller maken. In een economische en mo-
netaire unie zoals de EMU zullen al deze scenario’s effect hebben op andere
landen die een grote hoeveelheid pensioenvermogen hebben omgebouwd via
hun kapitaaldekkingsstelsel. Dit proefschrift geeft een theoretische uiteenzet-
ting en economische interpretatie van deze scenario’s. Het basismodel dat in
elk hoofdstuk gebruikt wordt is het model met twee overlappende generaties
zoals dat ontwikkeld is door Samuelson (1958) en Diamond (1965). In dit mo-
del leven individuen gedurende (maximaal) twee perioden. Mensen werken
in de eerste periode en het arbeidsinkomen wordt gebruikt om de pensioen-
premies te betalen, te consumeren en te sparen. In de tweede periode zijn
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mensen gepensioneerd en de pensioenuitkering en de opbrengst van de be-
sparingen worden gebruikt om de oudedagsconsumptie te financieren. Dit
model is uitermate geschikt om de vragen in de verschillende hoofdstukken
te beantwoorden. In het onderstaande zal een samenvatting per hoofdstuk
gegeven worden.
Hoofdstuk 2 gaat in op de vraag hoe landen (zoals Nederland) die een om-
vangrijk kapitaaldekkingsstelsel hebben, na een vergrijzingsschok beïnvloed
worden door het feit dat andere EMU landen (zoals Italië en Duitsland) hun
pensioenstelsels voornamelijk op omslagbasis hebben gefinancierd en vice
versa. Om deze vraag te analyseren wordt een tweelandenmodel gebruikt,
waarbij het ene land de pensioenen volledig via een omslagstelsel financiert
en het andere land een volledig kapitaalgedekt pensioensysteem heeft. In het
oorspronkelijke evenwicht leent het land met het kapitaaldekkingsstelsel fi-
nancieel kapitaal uit aan het land met het omslagstelsel omdat de besparin-
gen in het kapitaaldekkende land hoger zijn. We maken onderscheid tussen
de twee voornaamste oorzaken van vergrijzing, namelijk een stijging van de
levensverwachting en een daling van het geboortecijfer. Zowel het feit dat
mensen ouder worden als dat ze minder kinderen krijgen resulteert in een
stijging van het relatieve aantal ouderen, oftewel een stijging van de ouderen-
afhankelijkheidsratio. Vergrijzing heeft een verschillend effect op omslagstel-
sels en kapitaaldekkingsstelsels. Omslagstelsels worden direct beïnvloed door
de stijging van de ouderen-afhankelijkheidsratio, terwijl kapitaaldekkings-
stelsel indirect beïnvloed worden door de verandering van het rendement op
investeringen. Daarom zullen de besparingsreacties als gevolg van vergrij-
zing verschillen tussen de landen als ze verschillende pensioensystemen ge-
bruiken. Als deze landen een gezamenlijke kapitaalmarkt vormen dan zullen
deze verschillen in besparingen tot kapitaalstromen tussen de landen leiden
en op die manier internationale spillovereffecten veroorzaken.
De stijging van de ouderen-afhankelijkheidsratio zal omslagstelsels onder
druk zetten omdat het aantal jongeren dat pensioenpremies betaalt daalt ten
opzichte van het aantal ouderen dat pensioenuitkeringen ontvangt. In dit
hoofdstuk wordt verondersteld dat de overheid in het land met het omslag-
stelsel het pensioensysteem in evenwicht houdt. Dit betekent dat ofwel de
pensioenpremies van de jongeren moeten stijgen of de pensioenuitkeringen
van de ouderen moeten dalen als de bevolking vergrijst. In het eerste geval
is er sprake van een systeem van vaste uitkeringen (defined benefits’, DB) en
draagt de werkende generatie de lasten van vergrijzing door hogere pensi-
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oenpremies te betalen. In het laatste geval liggen de vergrijzingslasten bij de
gepensioneerden en wordt het omslagstelsel gekenmerkt door vaste bijdra-
gen (’defined contributions’, DC). Beide varianten worden in dit hoofdstuk
geanalyseerd.
Beide vormen van vergrijzing leiden tot een toename van de kapitaalar-
beidsverhouding, de centrale variabele van het model. Op het moment dat
mensen verwachten langer te leven zullen ze meer gaan sparen. Hogere be-
sparingen leiden tot meer kapitaalaccumulatie en hebben dus een positief ef-
fect op de kapitaalarbeidsverhouding. Een daling van het geboortecijfer leidt
tot een lagere bevolkingsgroei en zorgt ervoor dat de beroepsbevolking re-
latief kleiner wordt. Dit impliceert dat minder investeringen nodig zijn om
elke werknemer te voorzien van een bepaalde hoeveelheid kapitaal. Dit zoge-
naamde ’capital-thickening’ effect betekent dat bij een gegeven hoeveelheid
besparingen per persoon er een hogere kapitaalarbeidsverhouding gehand-
haafd kan worden.
De stijging van de ouderen-afhankelijkheidsratio heeft echter een extra effect
op de besparingen wanneer er een omslagstelsel gebruikt wordt om de pensi-
oenen te financieren. In het geval van een DB omslagstelsel moeten de pensi-
oenbijdragen van de jongeren stijgen om het pensioensysteem in evenwicht te
houden. Dit zal de besparingen negatief beïnvloeden en zal het directe positie-
ve effect op de kapitaalarbeidsverhouding verzwakken. Op het moment dat
er een DC omslagstelsel in gebruik is zal dit effect precies tegengesteld zijn;
de pensioenuitkeringen dalen als gevolg van de hogere afhankelijkheidsratio,
wat leidt tot hogere besparingen en een hogere kapitaalarbeidsverhouding.
We laten zien dat voor realistische waarden van de verschillende parameters
de kapitaalarbeidsverhouding in alle geanalyseerde gevallen per saldo stijgt.
Tevens is het zo dat de besparingen in het land met het kapitaaldekkingsstel-
sel meer stijgen dan in het land met het omslagstelsel, wat tot gevolg heeft dat
financieel kapitaal van het land met het kapitaaldekkingsstelsel naar het land
met het omslagstelsel stroomt. Dit betekent dat de stijging van de kapitaal-
arbeidsverhouding in het land met het omslagstelsel kleiner zou zijn als het
niet geïntegreerd was met een kapitaaldekkend land. Op de lange termijn re-
sulteert dit in positieve spillovereffecten voor het land met het omslagstelsel,
omdat het zowel voordeel ondervindt van de hogere kapitaalgoederenvoor-
raad als van de resulterende lagere rente die betaald moet worden op de le-
ningen die ze bij het kapitaaldekkende land hebben. In het land met het kapi-
taaldekkingsstelsel zou de stijging van de kapitaalarbeidsverhouding echter
groter zijn als het niet één kapitaalmarkt zou vormen met een land met een
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omslagstelsel. Enerzijds heeft de lagere kapitaalgoederenvoorraad negatie-
ve effecten voor het kapitaaldekkende land. Anderzijds ondervindt het land
voordeel van de resulterende hogere rendementen op de buitenlandse inves-
teringen. Simulaties laten zien dat voor realistische parameterwaarden het
eerstgenoemde effect domineert. De centrale conclusie is daarom dat, als de
bevolking vergrijst, landen met een groot kapitaaldekkingsstelsel op de lange
termijn negatief beïnvloed worden door het feit dat andere landen omvang-
rijke omslagstelsels in gebruik hebben, ook al houden ze hun omslagstelsels
in balans. De spillovers op de korte termijn zijn echter tegengesteld aan de
spillovers op de lange termijn. De reden hiervoor is dat de stijging van de
kapitaalarbeidsverhouding tot een daling van de rente leidt, wat met name
de generaties treft die geboren zijn ten tijde van de vergrijzingsschok. Dit be-
tekent dat deze initiële generaties in het kapitaaldekkende land baat hebben
van het feit dat het andere land een omslagstelsel in gebruik heeft omdat de
daling van de rente in dat geval minder groot is. De eerste generaties in het
land met het omslagstelsel ondervinden op de korte termijn juist negatieve
spillovereffecten van het land met het kapitaaldekkingsstelsel.
Vergrijzing zet pensioenstelsels die op omslagbasis gefinancierd worden on-
der druk omdat de enorme stijging van de ouderen-afhankelijkheidsratio im-
pliceert dat óf de pensioenbijdragen van de werkenden flink moeten stijgen óf
de pensioenuitkeringen van de gepensioneerden sterk moeten dalen. Eén van
de meest besproken voorstellen om de houdbaarheid van publieke omslag-
stelsels te verbeteren is om het pensioensysteem te hervormen en naar een
meer kapitaalgedekt stelsel over te stappen. Ook deze (gedeeltelijke) over-
stap naar een kapitaaldekkingsstelsel zal spillovereffecten hebben in een ge-
ïntegreerde kapitaalmarkt. Het doel van hoofdstuk 3 is om deze internationa-
le spillovereffecten van pensioenhervorming te bestuderen. In het bijzonder
richten we ons op de vraag hoe landen die al een kapitaaldekkingsstelsel heb-
ben worden beïnvloed wanneer landen met omslagstelsels een groter gedeelte
van hun toekomstige pensioenuitkeringen met geaccumuleerd kapitaal gaan
financieren.
Het model dat in dit hoofdstuk wordt gebruikt is vergelijkbaar met het mo-
del in het voorgaande hoofdstuk. De belangrijkste aanpassing is dat we het
mogelijk maken dat het omslagstelsel tot verstoringen in de economie leidt,
wat betekent dat de omslagpremie tot welvaartsverliezen of een zogenaam-
de ’excess burden’ leidt. De aanwezigheid van een ’excess burden’ geeft de
ruimte om een pensioenhervorming in te voeren die tot een Paretoverbetering
SAMENVATTING 209
leidt19.
We analyseren eerst de spillovereffecten van een pensioenhervorming in het
land met het omslagstelsel onder de aanname dat de omslagpremies niet ver-
storend zijn. In dat geval is het omslagstelsel Pareto-efficiënt en bestaat er bij
de implementatie van de hervorming een afruil tussen het nut van verschil-
lende generaties. Dit betekent dat als er een aantal generaties zijn die baat
hebben bij de overgang naar meer kapitaaldekking, het onvermijdelijk is dat
andere generaties nadeel ondervinden van deze conversie. Het hervormende
land moet daarom een keuze maken welke generaties voordeel ondervinden
van de hervorming en welke niet. We laten zien dat deze keuze doorwerkt
naar het kapitaaldekkende land als de twee landen een gezamenlijke kapi-
taalmarkt vormen. Als het hervormende land besluit dat toekomstige gene-
raties profijt zullen hebben van de hervorming, dan zullen de toekomstige
generaties in het land met het kapitaaldekkingsstelsel er ook op vooruit gaan.
Deze welvaartswinsten op de lange termijn gaan echter gepaard met een la-
ger nut voor de initiële generaties en deze verliezen op de korte termijn zul-
len ook via de kapitaalmarkt worden doorgegeven aan het kapitaaldekkende
land. Als de overheid in het omslagland echter besluit dat de hervorming tot
een welvaartsverbetering moet leiden voor een meerderheid van de huidige
bevolking (de werkende en gepensioneerde generaties die leven op het mo-
ment dat de hervorming wordt ingevoerd), dan zullen de initiële generaties
in het kapitaaldekkende land ook baat hebben van de hervorming in het an-
dere land. Bij dit hervormingsscenario zullen de toekomstige generaties van
het land met het omslagstelsel de kosten van de hervorming dragen en de toe-
komstige generaties in het land met het kapitaaldekkingsstelsel zullen er ook
op achteruit gaan.
Vervolgens veronderstellen we dat het heffen van omslagpremies tot een
’excess burden’ leidt, zodat het voor het land met het omslagstelsel mogelijk
wordt om een pensioenhervorming in te voeren die leidt tot een Paretoverbe-
tering. Op het moment dat zo’n Paretoverbeterend hervormingsbeleid wordt
ingevoerd, deelt het kapitaaldekkende land opnieuw de lange termijn voorde-
len met het land met het omslagstelsel. Echter, hoewel de hervorming in het
land met het omslagstelsel zo vormgegeven is dat geen enkele generatie in dit
land verliest, kunnen enkele generaties in het kapitaaldekkende land op korte
termijn toch nadeel ondervinden. Met andere woorden, een hervormings-
beleid dat tot een Paretoverbetering leidt als het land met het omslagstelsel
19Dit betekent dat de pensioenhervorming zo ingevoerd kan worden dat minstens één ge-
neratie erop vooruit gaat zonder dat een andere generatie erop achteruit gaat.
210 SAMENVATTING
alleen in ogenschouw wordt genomen, hoeft niet Paretoverbeterend te zijn als
er rekening wordt gehouden met de internationale spillovereffecten.
De centrale conclusie van dit hoofdstuk is dat, in een gezamenlijke kapi-
taalmarkt, de effecten van pensioenhervormingen in landen met omvangrijke
omslagstelsels doorwerken op landen met grote kapitaaldekkingsstelsels. De
laatstgenoemde landen kunnen zich niet afschermen van de effecten van de
hervormingsmaatregelen in de eerstgenoemde landen. De beleidsconclusie
van dit hoofdstuk is daarom dat, als in een gemeenschappelijke markt zo-
als de EU bij besluiten over pensioenhervormingen rekening gehouden wordt
met de effecten voor niet-hervormende landen, het noodzakelijk kan zijn om
deze landen te compenseren.
In hoofdstukken 2 en 3 bestaat er geen onzekerheid over het rendement op
besparingen. De modellen in deze hoofdstukken zijn compleet determinis-
tisch. In hoofdstukken 4 en 5 kiezen we een andere aanpak en ontwikkelen
we een stochastische versie van het tweeperioden-overlappende-generatie-
model. Individuen kunnen in twee soorten vermogenstitels beleggen, aande-
len en overheidsobligaties, waarbij de totale hoeveelheid obligaties bepaald
wordt door de gegeven omvang van de overheidsschuld. Beide vermogensti-
tels zijn risicovol; productiviteitsrisico maakt het rendement op aandelen on-
zeker en er rust een inflatierisico op overheidsobligaties. Het is dus niet moge-
lijk om in een risicovrije vermogenstitel te investeren. Er wordt verondersteld
dat de pensioenen die op omslagbasis worden gefinancierd gegarandeerd zijn,
wat betekent dat er geen onzekerheid bestaat over de hoogte van de pensi-
oenuitkering. Deze gegarandeerde omslagpensioenen hebben een tweeledige
functie in onze stochastische economie. Ten eerste voorziet de uitkering pen-
sioengerechtigden van een bepaald minimuminkomen. Ten tweede levert het
gegarandeerde omslagpensioen een risicovrije vermogenstitel die de markt
niet aanbiedt. Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert een versie van dit model met een ge-
sloten economie, terwijl in hoofdstuk 5 het model wordt uitgebreid naar een
tweelandenmodel waar het ene land een omslagstelsel gebruikt en het andere
land een kapitaaldekkingsstelsel in gebruik heeft. Dit laatste hoofdstuk analy-
seert de internationale spillovereffecten wanneer het land met het omslagstel-
sel overheidsschuld gebruikt om de vergrijzingskosten op te vangen, waarbij
een hoge schuld samengaat met meer inflatie(risico).
Hoofdstuk 4 verbindt het laatste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift met hoofd-
stukken 2 en 3 en het voornaamste doel van dit hoofdstuk is om inzicht te krij-
gen in de werking van het stochastische model. We bestuderen drie schokken
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die alledrie de portefeuillebeslissing van individuen direct beïnvloeden; meer
risico-aversie van consumenten, de introductie van een pensioenstelsel dat op
omslagbasis gefinancierd wordt en een hoger inflatierisico. We onderzoeken
de effecten van deze schokken op de portefeuillekeuze, de besparingen en de
risicopremie op aandelen.
De analyse van de portefeuillebeslissing van consumenten wordt in de fi-
nancieringsliteratuur vaak gedaan onder de veronderstelling dat de rende-
menten op de vermogentitels exogeen zijn. Dit betekent dat de rendementen
buiten het model om worden bepaald en als gegeven worden beschouwd.
In dat geval is er sprake van een partieel evenwichtsmodel. Het model dat
in dit hoofdstuk wordt ontwikkeld is echter een algemeen evenwichtsmodel
waar de rendementen op de vermogenstitels endogeen worden bepaald. Om
de resultaten in een algemeen evenwichtsmodel te vergelijken met die in een
partieel evenwichtsmodel, bekijken we eerst de effecten op de portefeuille-
en besparingsbeslissing onder de veronderstelling dat de rendementen op de
vermogenstitels exogeen zijn. Als eerste analyseren we de effecten van meer
risico-aversie van individuen. De voornaamste reden waarom deze parame-
terwijziging in beschouwing wordt genomen is om de resultaten te kunnen
vergelijken met de effecten van de tweede te analyseren schok; het introdu-
ceren van gegarandeerde omslagpensioenen. Gegarandeerde omslagpensioe-
nen verminderen de variantie van de oudedagsconsumptie en zullen op die
manier de investeringsbeslissingen van consumenten beïnvloeden. Als we
de effecten van omslagpensioenen vergelijken met de effecten van een ho-
gere risico-aversie dan zien we dat gegarandeerde omslagpensioenen ervoor
zorgen dat individuen zich als minder risico-averse agenten gaan gedragen.
Dit betekent dat ze minder sparen en een risicovollere investeringsportefeuille
aanhouden; ze investeren een groter gedeelte van hun besparingen in aande-
len. Om aan te geven wat de invloed van onzekerheid is op het gedrag van
consumenten bestuderen we tenslotte de effecten van een stijging van het in-
flatierisico, wat inhoudt dat het risico op overheidsobligaties stijgt. Een hoger
inflatierisico zorgt ervoor dat het minder aantrekkelijk wordt om overheids-
obligaties aan te houden en consumenten zullen dus een groter gedeelte van
hun besparingen in aandelen investeren.
In partieel evenwicht worden alleen de effecten op individuele beslissingen
in ogenschouw genomen. Er wordt geen rekening gehouden met de macro-
economische effecten die al deze individuele beslissingen tezamen hebben.
We laten zien dat het uitmaakt of deze macro-economische effecten worden
meegenomen of niet. De portefeuillebeslissing beweegt in algemeen even-
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wicht precies in tegengestelde richting als in partieel evenwicht. Consumen-
ten willen individueel hun beleggingsportefeuille in een bepaalde richting
aanpassen na een schok. Omdat alle mensen in de economie dezelfde prik-
kel hebben zal in dat geval de kapitaalmarkt niet meer in evenwicht zijn. In
algemeen evenwicht passen de rendementen zich zo aan dat zowel de over-
heidsschuld als de kapitaalgoederenvoorraad volledig gefinancierd worden.
Omdat de hoogte van de overheidsschuld vastligt en daarmee dus ook het
aantal obligaties waarin belegd kan worden, zal het deel van de besparingen
dat in kapitaal en dus in aandelen wordt belegd in dezelfde richting moeten
bewegen als de besparingen. In partieel evenwicht is de financiering van de
overheidsschuld of de kapitaalgoederenvoorraad geen enkel probleem omdat
de obligaties en aandelen op de internationale kapitaalmarkt kunnen worden
aangeboden voor gegeven rendementen.
Neem bijvoorbeeld de effecten van het introduceren van gegarandeerde om-
slagpensioenen. In partieel evenwicht zullen individuen meer risico nemen
met hun investeringsportefeuille als ze een gegarandeerde pensioenuitkering
ontvangen. In algemeen evenwicht is dit echter niet mogelijk omdat er dan te
weinig geïnvesteerd wordt in de overheidsschuld. Het is zelfs zo dat vanwege
het feit dat omslagpensioenen tot een daling van de besparingen leiden, het
deel van de besparingen dat in overheidsobligaties wordt belegd moet stijgen.
Om consumenten over te halen om meer in overheidsobligaties te investeren
moet het rendement op overheidsobligaties stijgen ten opzichte van het ren-
dement op aandelen. Dit impliceert dat de risicopremie op aandelen ten op-
zichte van obligaties zal dalen. Een gegarandeerde pensioenuitkering zorgt
ervoor dat mensen zich minder risico-avers gaan gedragen en in algemeen
evenwicht betekent dit dat de risicopremie op aandelen lager kan zijn. Het
effect op de risicopremie is tegengesteld op het moment dat mensen risico-
averser worden, in dat geval zorgt de stijging van de besparingen ervoor dat
de risicopremie van aandelen ten opzichte van obligaties stijgt om evenwicht
op de kapitaalmarkt te bewerkstelligen.
Als het inflatierisico stijgt hebben we hetzelfde resultaat: het effect op de
portefeuillebeslissing is in algemeen evenwicht tegengesteld aan het effect in
partieel evenwicht. Een hoger inflatierisico maakt het minder aantrekkelijk
om overheidsobligaties aan te houden en consumenten geven er de voorkeur
aan om meer in aandelen te beleggen. In algemeen evenwicht kan dit ech-
ter niet gebeuren omdat de overheidsschuld dan niet volledig gefinancierd is.
Om ervoor te zorgen dat mensen investeren in de gegeven hoeveelheid over-
heidsobligaties, moet het rendement op obligaties stijgen. De hogere rente
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op de overheidsschuld leidt tot een stijging van de zogenaamde schuldbelas-
ting. Dit is de belasting die betaald moet worden om de rentebetalingen op
de overheidsschuld te voldoen om zo de schulddynamiek stabiel te houden.
De besparingen zullen dalen als gevolg van deze hogere schuldbelasting. La-
gere besparingen impliceren dat een groter gedeelte van de besparingen geïn-
vesteerd moet worden in overheidsobligaties om kapitaalmarktevenwicht te
hebben. De risicopremie op aandelen zal dalen om dit bewerkstelligen.
Deze tegengestelde effecten in partieel en algemeen evenwicht betekenen
dat het uitmaakt of de portefeuillekeuze van consumenten voor een kleine
open economie wordt bestudeerd of voor een grote (gesloten) economie zoals
de VS of de EU. In het eerste geval kan men volstaan met de partiële evenwicht
aanpak, terwijl het algemene-evenwichtsraamwerk geschikter is in het laatste
geval. Daarnaast is het resultaat ook relevant voor de analyse van schokken
die wereldomvattend zijn, zoals bijvoorbeeld vergrijzing, waar rendementen
niet constant kunnen worden gehouden.
Wanneer landen met omvangrijke omslagsystemen hun pensioenstelsel niet
hervormen (zoals in hoofdstuk 3) en niet gelijk de pensioenbijdragen of pen-
sioenuitkeringen aanpassen (zoals in hoofdstuk 2) om de initiële generaties te
sparen die het meeste nadeel ondervinden van vergrijzing, zou ook overheids-
schuld gebruikt kunnen worden om de kosten van vergrijzing op te vangen.
Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt de internationale spillover effecten van vergrijzing
voor dit scenario. Het gebruik van overheidsschuld komt ten goede aan de
initiële generaties, maar toekomstige generaties zullen er op achteruit gaan
omdat overheidsschuld kapitaal verdringt (dit wordt wel het zogenaamde
’crowding out’ effect van overheidsschuld genoemd). De nutseffecten zul-
len doorwerken op het kapitaaldekkende land dat geen overheidsschuld ge-
bruikt. De initiële generaties profiteren van de hogere rendementen die het
gevolg zijn van de daling van de kapitaalarbeidsverhouding. Een lagere kapi-
taalarbeidsverhouding leidt echter ook tot lagere lonen en dit zal latere gene-
raties negatief beïnvloeden. Dit betekent dat het gebruik van overheidsschuld
door het omslagland zowel de positieve spillovers van vergrijzing op de kor-
te termijn als de negatieve spillovers op de lange termijn vergroot voor het
kapitaaldekkende land.
Overheden kunnen de prikkel krijgen om bij de centrale bank te lobbyen
voor onverwachte inflatie als het niveau van de overheidsschuld hoog wordt,
omdat dit de begrotingsdruk van de rentebetalingen op de schuld verlaagt.
De vraag is natuurlijk of de centrale bank zal toegeven en onverwachte in-
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flatie zal creëren. De veronderstelling in dit hoofdstuk is dat het besluitvor-
mingsproces over monetair beleid niet volledig transparant is. In dat geval
kan het zo zijn dat mensen niet overtuigd zijn van de onafhankelijkheid van
de centrale bank. De monetaire autoriteit zou dan een prikkel kunnen hebben
om nominale schuld weg te infleren. We laten zien dat onverwachte inflatie in
een gesloten economie een nul-somspel (’zero-sum game’) is. Aan de ene kant
ondervindt de overheid voordeel van onverwachte inflatie omdat het de reële
waarde van overheidsschuld en het reële rendement op overheidsobligaties
verlaagt. Aan de andere kant is het zo dat mensen die in overheidsobligaties
hebben belegd nadeel ondervinden van de onverwachte daling van het reële
rendement op overheidsobligaties, dit is de zogenaamde inflatiebelasting. In
een gesloten economie is het voordeel voor de overheid precies groot genoeg
om de mensen die nadeel ondervinden van onverwachte inflatie te compense-
ren. In een tweelandenmodel waar het ene land een omslagstelsel heeft en het
andere land een kapitaaldekkingsstelsel in gebruik heeft, heeft het omslag-
land echter een netto voordeel van onverwachte inflatie wat ten koste gaat
van het kapitaaldekkende land. Dit betekent dat er tegenstrijdige belangen
ontstaan over de richting van monetair beleid als landen met verschillende
pensioensystemen een monetaire unie vormen. De reden voor dit resultaat is
dat inwoners van het land met het kapitaaldekkingsstelsel een relatief groot
gedeelte van de totale hoeveelheid overheidsobligaties in handen hebben om-
dat ze meer sparen en een conservatievere beleggingsportefeuille aanhouden
dan mensen die gegarandeerde omslagpensioenen ontvangen. Dit betekent
dat het land met het omslagstelsel een deel van de inflatiebelasting naar het
land met het kapitaaldekkingsstelsel kan exporteren, terwijl het nog wel het
volledige profijt van de lagere schuldenlast heeft en er dus een netto voor-
deel resulteert. Een land met een omslagstelsel heeft dus een prikkel om de
centrale bank onder druk te zetten om de inflatie onverwacht te verhogen als
het een monetaire unie vormt met een land met een kapitaaldekkingsstelsel.
Het voordeel van onverwachte inflatie voor het land met het omslagstelsel
stijgt met de hoogte van de nominale overheidsschuld. In de komende decen-
nia zal vergrijzing de overheidsfinanciën verder onder druk zetten. Wanneer
landen met omvangrijke pensioenstelsels hun toegenomen pensioenverplich-
tingen financieren met overheidsschuld, zal de prikkel van overheden in deze
landen om voor onverwachte inflatie te lobbyen stijgen. Onverwachte infla-
tie zal landen met kapitaaldekkingsstelsels echter meer benadelen als landen
met omslagstelsels grote hoeveelheden nominale overheidsschuld uitgeven.
De tegenstrijdige belangen bij monetair beleid tussen landen met omslagstel-
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sels en kapitaaldekkingsstelsels zullen dus versterkt worden als vergrijzing
de overheidsschuld in omslaglanden verhoogt.
Als het besluitvormingsproces van de centrale bank niet helemaal transpa-
rant is, is het niet duidelijk hoe de centrale bank zal reageren op de tegenstrij-
dige belangen bij de creatie van inflatie van landen met omslagstelsels en ka-
pitaaldekkende landen. Als gevolg daarvan zal er meer onzekerheid bestaan
over wat de uiteindelijke uitkomst voor inflatie zal zijn en het inflatierisico zou
kunnen stijgen met de hoogte van de overheidsschuld in landen met omslag-
stelsels. Een hoger inflatierisico betekent dat het minder aantrekkelijk wordt
om overheidsobligaties aan te houden en om er voor te zorgen dat mensen de
bestaande hoeveelheid overheidsobligaties kopen, zal het rendement op obli-
gaties stijgen ten opzichte van het rendement op aandelen (de risicopremie op
aandelen daalt dus). Dit leidt tot een hogere schuldbelasting en een daling van
de besparingen en de kapitaalarbeidsverhouding, en beide landen zullen ne-
gatieve nutseffecten ondervinden van de stijging van het inflatierisico. Het is
zelfs zo dat het land met het omslagstelsel negatieve spillovereffecten ervaart
van het feit dat het een monetaire unie vormt met een land met een kapitaal-
dekkingsstelsel als het inflatierisico stijgt. Dit resultaat doet zich voor omdat
het land met het kapitaaldekkingsstelsel een relatief groot gedeelte van de
overheidsobligaties in handen heeft en mensen in het kapitaaldekkende land
risico-averser zijn omdat ze geen gegarandeerde pensioenuitkering ontvan-
gen. Dit betekent dat deze mensen meer gecompenseerd dienen te worden
om bereid te zijn de risicovollere overheidsobligaties in hun beleggingspor-
tefeuille te houden. Het rendement op overheidsobligaties moet dus meer
stijgen als individuen kapitaalgedekte pensioenen ontvangen. De stijging van
de schuldbelasting zal daarom groter zijn in het land met het omslagstelsel als
het een monetaire unie vormt met een land dat een kapitaaldekkingsstelsel
gebruikt in plaats van een omslagstelsel.
Alle geanalyseerde scenario’s in dit hoofdstuk laten zien dat het kapitaal-
gedekte land op de lange termijn nog negatiever wordt beïnvloed door het
feit dat het andere land in de monetaire unie een omslagstelsel in gebruik
heeft als dit land overheidsschuld gebruikt om de vergrijzingskosten op te
vangen. Het gebruik van overheidsschuld op zichzelf heeft op de lange ter-
mijn negatieve spillovereffecten voor het land met het kapitaaldekkingsstel-
sel. Daarnaast kan een hoge schuldenlast tot onverwachte inflatie of een ho-
ger inflatierisico leiden, wat beide de negatieve spillovereffecten versterkt. In
de komende decennia is het daarom van belang voor landen met grote kapi-
taaldekkingsstelsels dat er wordt voldaan aan de regels van het Stabiliteits en
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Groei Pact, zodat de schuldniveaus in landen met omvangrijke omslagstelsels
niet te hoog worden. Het gebruik van overheidsschuld door omslaglanden
om de vergrijzingskosten op te vangen bevoordeelt de initiële generaties die
het meeste nadeel ondervinden van vergrijzing. Toekomstige generaties zul-
len echter worden benadeeld door de grotere schuldenlast. In een monetaire
unie kan een deel van deze last afgewenteld worden op het land met het ka-
pitaaldekkingsstelsel. De schuldenlast kan tevens verminderd worden door
een onverwachte stijging van de inflatie als het land met het omslagstelsel
succesvol lobbyt bij de centrale bank. Als dit lobbyen echter alleen maar het
gepercipieerde inflatierisico verhoogt, dan kunnen de negatieve effecten van
een stijging van het risico op overheidsobligaties als gevolg van de hogere
overheidsschuld niet gedeeld worden met het land met het kapitaaldekkings-
stelsel. Het kan daarom ook in het belang zijn van landen met omslagstelsels
om te voldoen aan de restricties van het Stabiliteits en Groei Pact. Daarnaast is
het belangrijk voor alle landen dat een centrale bank zoals de ECB onafhanke-
lijk, geloofwaardig en transparant is, zodat het duidelijk is hoe het monetaire
beleid wordt bepaald en het inflatierisico niet stijgt als de schuldniveaus hoog
oplopen.


